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FREEDOM 


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The  American  Books 


Municipal  Freedom 

A  Study  of  the  Commission 
Government 


By  OSWALD  RYAN 

of  the  Indiana  Bar 

Formerly  of  the  Department  of  Government, 
Harvard  University 


^  7  9S'i 


WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION 

BY 

A.  LAWRENCE  LOWELL 


Pre-ii-n.  jf  Ha.-vcrd  Univirsity.   ,,,     ,      ,,     ^     .  ,      , 


»  -.•  I 


GARDEN  CITY  NEW  YORK 

DOUBLEDAY,  PAGE  &  COMPANY 
1915 


Copyright,  igi^,  by 
DOUBLEDAY,  PaGE  &  CoMPANY 

All  rights  reserved,  including  that  of 

translation  into  foreign  languages, 

including  the  Scandinavian 


I  C     L 


To 
EDWARD  C.  TONER 

OF  INDIANA 

f 

WHOSE  POLITICAL  ACTS  HAVE 
BEEN  IMBUED  WITH  HIS  OWN 
INTELLECTUAL  HONESTY  AND 
HIGH  PERSONAL    INTEGRITY 


BIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

Although  he  writes  this  volume  at  the  age  of 
twenty-six,  Oswald  Ryan  is  already  entitled  to  speak 
authoritatively  on  municipal  problems.  He  was  ed- 
ucated in  the  common  schools  of  Anderson,  In- 
diana, Butler  College,  Harvard  College,  and  the 
Harvard  Law  School.  While  an  undergraduate  at 
Harvard  he  was  awarded  in  1910  the  Baldwin  Prize 
by  the  National  Municipal  League  for  his  "Com- 
mission Plan  of  City  Government,"  which  was  pub- 
lished by  the  American  Political  Science  Review.  In 
191 1  he  became  a  joint  contributor  to  "City  Govern- 
ment by  Commission"  (New  York,  191 1)  under  the 
editorship  of  Clinton  Rogers  Woodruff.  In  the  same 
year  he  was  appointed  assistant  to  Albert  Bushnell 
Hart,  head  of  the  department  of  government  at 
Harvard,  and  entered  upon  the  work  of  teaching  at 
Harvard  and  RadclifFe  colleges.  During  the  years 
1911-13  he  took  an  active  part  as  a  writer  and 
speaker  in  the  movement  for  charter  reform  in  Massa- 
chusetts, and  in  191 1  he  participated  in  the  fight  for 
the  passage  through  the  Massachusetts  Legislature 
of  a  permissive  commission  government  act  which 
he  had  drafted.  He  left  Cambridge  in  June,  191 3, 
to  take  up  the  practice  of  law  at  Anderson,  Indiana, 
and  in  the  following  fall  waged  a  vigorous  campaign 


Vll 


viii  Biographical  Note 

for  the  mayoralty  of  that  city  as  the  nominee  of  one 
of  the  leading  parties.  This  was  the  first  municipal 
battle  to  be  waged  in  Indiana  on  a  constructive  pro- 
gram of  municipal  advance,  and  it  had  a  far-reaching 
educative  effect.  Mr.  Ryan  was  defeated  by  a  small 
margin,  but  one  year  later  the  same  city  gave  him 
a  record-breaking  plurality  as  candidate  for  state's 
attorney  of  the  fiftieth  Indiana  Judicial  District.  He 
is  now  recognized  as  one  of  the  practical  leaders  in  the 
municipal  movement  in  Indiana, 

Mr.  Ryan  is  known  as  a  contributor  to  several 
national  periodicals,  including  Harper  s  Weekly,  the 
American  Political  Science  Review,  the  Popular  Sci- 
ence Monthly,  and  the  New  England  Magazine.  The 
present  volume  is  based  largely  on  personal  investi- 
gations by  the  writer  in  progressive  cities  in  various 
parts  of  the  United  States  since  1910. 


FOREWORD 

I  wish  here  to  express  my  thanks  to  Mr.  A. 
Lawrence  Lowell,  Harvard's  distinguished  presi- 
dent, who  writes  the  Introduction  to  this  little 
book;  to  Professor  Augustus  Raymond  Hatton, 
of  the  Department  of  Political  Science  at  West- 
ern Reserve  University;  and  to  Mr.  Paul  P. 
Haynes,  of  the  Indiana  bar,  for  their  helpful 
criticisms  in  connection  with  the  revision  of  my 
manuscript.  To  my  esteemed  friend  Professor 
Arthur  N.  Holcombe,  with  whom  I  was  for  a  time 
associated  in  teaching  at  Harvard,  I  am  grateful 
for  a  similar  kindness.  I  am  indebted  to  Miss 
Mary  Murray,  of  Newton,  Massachusetts,  for- 
merly of  Radcliffe  College,  for  certain  significant 
data  collected  in  commission-governed  cities. 

The  substance  of  an  article  on  Salt  Lake  City's 
experience  under  commission  government,  which 
I  published  in  Harper's  Weekly  in  October,  191 3, 
is  incorporated  in  Chapter  II  by  the  kind  per- 
mission of  Mr.  Norman  Hapgood,  the  editor. 

Anderson,  Indiana.  Oswald  Ryan. 

March  ji,  IQI4. 

ix 


CONTENTS 

Introduction.     By  A.  Lawrence  Lowell,  Presi- 
dent of  Harvard  University.  xiii 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

L     The  New  Departure  in  Municipal  De- 
mocracy     3 

IL     A  Tale  of  Two  Cities    ....  25 

III.  Democracy  and  Efficiency       .      .  49 

IV.  Fixing  Responsibility  ....  67 
V.     Changing  Municipal  Organization 

to  Preserve  Municipal   Democ- 
racy       79 

VI.     The  Coming  of  the  Burgomaster  .  94 
VII.     Is  the  Party  System  Passing  from 

the  City.? 107 

VIII.     Vitalizing  the  Ballot     ....  126 

IX.     Municipal  Freedom      ....  142 

Appendix 

I.     The  Des  Moines  Plan    ....  161 

II.     The  Commission-Manager  Plan  198 

III.  Preferential  Voting 213 

IV.  Selected  References  on  Commission 

Government 231 

xi 


INTRODUCTION 

Until  the  latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury the  attention  of  public-spirited  American 
citizens,  as  Mr.  Ryan  remarks  in  this  book,  was 
directed  in  small  measure  to  the  problem  of 
municipal  organization.  He  attributes  the  fact 
to  the  slight  importance  of  cities  in  American 
political  and  economic  life  prior  to  1850,  and  to 
the  engrossing  nature  of  the  national  problems, 
which  caused  political  parties  to  be  divided  on 
national  issues.  It  seems,  indeed,  a  general 
principle  that  parties  tend  everywhere  to  be  based 
upon  the  issues  presented  by  the  largest  political 
area  over  which  they  can  extend.  Certainly 
the  elections  in  our  large  cities  were  fought  up- 
on national  party  lines  without  a  perception  of 
the  disastrous  consequences  to  municipal  gov- 
ernment. During  the  last  forty  years  the  efforts 
at  improvement  have  been  aimed  at  divorcing 
city  elections  from  national  party  politics,  and 
at  framing  city  charters  better  adapted  to  munic- 
ipal needs. 

Rural  local  government  in  the  United  States 

xiii 


1/ 


xiv  Introduction 

has  varied  greatly  in  different  parts  of  the 
country,  according  to  the  nature  and  traditions 
of  the  place.  It  has  grown  up  almost  insensibly, 
and  has  been  fairly  well  fitted  to  the  wants  of 
the  public,  or  at  least  it  has  been  the  subject 
of  little  criticism.  But  city  governments  have 
been  artificial  things,  modeled  on  the  pattern 
in  vogue  for  the  nation,  although  the  functions 
they  were  to  perform  were  of  quite  a  different 
nature;  and  hence  they  have  been  found  highly 
unsuited  for  their  work. 

Every  one  sees  now  that  the  problem  of  the 
city  is  essentially  one  of  administration,  and 
to  that  end  the  reforms  of  the  last  few  decades 
have  been  directed;  they  have  hitherto  proved 
on  the  whole  disappointing,  because  too  much 
was  expected  from  them,  because  the  enthusiasm 
that  brought  them  into  being  has  usually  sub- 
sided, leaving  the  management  in  less  worthy 
hands,  and  because  the  fundamental  principles 
of  sound  administration  have  been  only  partly 
grasped.  Nevertheless,  there  has  been  improve- 
ment, not,  indeed,  steady,  but  in  the  aggregate 
notable  and  encouraging. 

Of  all  the  plans  yet  tried,  the  one  advocated 
in  this  book,  that  of  government  by  a  commission 
conducting  the  city  departments  by  means  of 


,         Introduction  xv 

a  corps  of  expert  administrators,  is  the  most 
j   promising.     The  dread  of  bureaucracy  was  a 
I    bugbear  to  our  ancestors  because  it  was  asso- 
V.  ciated  in  their  minds  with  the  old  autocratic 
governments    of  continental    Europe,    because 
they   had    not    learned    to   control    permanent 
oJEcials,  and  because  they  did  not  feel  the  need 
of  efficiency  required  in  the  life  of  the  present 
day.     Prejudices   are   apt  to  persist   after  the 
reason  for  them  has  vanished,  but  the  march 
of  science  has  destroyed  many  more  formidable 
than  this.     In  the  interest  of  public  health  we 
submit  to  medical  regulations  that  would  have 
annoyed  and  repelled  our  fathers.     We  adopt 
factory  and  commercial  laws  that  would  have 
violated  their  conceptions  of  liberty;  and  little 
by  little  we  are  adapting  ourselves  to  the  de- 
mands of  a  more  dense  and  complex  community. 
The  use  of  professional  experts  has  been  the  key 
to   our  material   progress;  it   is  the   secret   of 
success  in  municipal  administration  in  Europe. 

Nor,  as  experience  has  shown,  is  it  difficult  for 
a  properly  constituted  elective  body  to  keep  the 
permanent  official  under  control  and  in  har- 
mony with  popular  opinion.  Within  twenty 
years  we  have  made  great  strides  in  this  direc- 
tion in  our  public  schools,  which  respond  more 


xvi  Introduction 

nearly  to  the  demands  of  the  people  than  they 
did  before.  About  some  of  the  proposals  made 
by  Mr.  Ryan  in  this  book  one  may  be  more 
skeptical,  but  without  expecting  the  millennium 
from  the  plan  of  a  commission  working  through 
a  professional  city  manager,  one  must  admit 
that  he  shows  its  practicability  and  its  value. 

A.  Lawrence  Lowell. 


MUNICIPAL  FREEDOM 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  NEW  DEPARTURE  IN 
MUNICIPAL  DEMOCRACY 

That  no  problem  has  laid  a  severer  tax  on  the 
political  genius  of  our  people  than  the  perplexing 
problem  of  city  government  every  student  of  our 
political  experience  knows.  Ever  since  James 
Bryce  called  attention  to  "the  one  conspicuoi4S 
failure  of  the  American  people" — the  failure  oi 
the  city  governments — our  publicists  and  states- 
men have  searched  restlessly  for  the  model 
system  of  government  which  was  to  rescue  the 
cities  from  inefficiency  and  misrule.  Incident- 
ally a  certain  class  of  politicians  has  exerted 
itself  with  equal  vigor  to  render  ineffectual  the 
efforts  of  these  workers  for  a  new  municipal  era. 
To  say  that  the  new  forms  of  government 
^hich  constitute  the  fruits  of  this  reform  quest 
have  been  complete  successes  in  practical  oper- 
ation would  be  as  far  from  the  truth  as  to  say 
that  they  have  been  complete  failures.  Practi- 
cally all  of  the  new  forms  of  city  government 

3 


4  Municipal  Freedom 

launched  during  the  past  thirty  years  wrought 
some  sort  of  improvement  in  municipal  condi- 
tions; but,  with  one  exception,  it  cannot  be  said 
that  any  one  of  them  proved  so  efficient  as  to 
give  promise  of  becoming  the  prevailing  munici- 
pal system  in  the  United  States.  Each  new  plan 
was  set  in  motion  amid  brilliant  prophecies  for 
the  future  city  government;  but  in  due  time  the 
charm  which  had  brought  the  initial  success 
wore  off,  and  the  prophecies  w^ent  unfulfilled. 
In  a  large  measure,  the  tale  was  "full  of  sound 
and  fury,  signifying  nothing." 

A  striking  exception  to  the  usual  reform  tra- 
dition is  apparently  revealed  in  the  story  of  the 
Commission  plan  of  city  government.  About 
fourteen  ^'^ears  ago  a  great  tidal  wave  swept  a 
substantial  part  of  the  city  of  Galveston,  Texas, 
into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  the  necessity  arose 
for  supplanting  the  notoriously  inefficient  alder- 
manic  government  of  that  city  with  a  govern- 
ment which  should  be  equal  to  the  task  of 
restoration.  A  plan  was  devised  by  which  all 
municipal  powers  were  intrusted  to  a  single 
body  of  five  men,  each  one  of  whom  was  given 
supervision  of  one  of  the  city's  departments,  for 
the  proper  management  of  which  he  was  held 
responsible.     The  new  system,  which  came  to 


The  New  Departure  5 

be  called  the  "commission  plan,"  proved  un- 
usually efficient  and  was  adopted  by  several 
other  Texas  cities.  To-day  some  three  hundred 
and  fifty  cities,  containing  one  fifth  of  the  entire 
urban  population  of  the  country,  are  being  ad- 
mirably governed  under  this  system,  which  is  in 
a  fair  way  to  become  the  prevailing  form  of  mu- 
nicipal government  in  the  United  States. 

The  commission  government,  since  its  intro- 
duction fourteen  years  ago,  has  had  a  larger 
share  of  consideration  at  the  hands  of  charter 
reformers  and  students  of  government  than  any 
other  single  measure  of  municipal  reform.  It 
was  even  made  the  subject  of  an  address  in  the 
United  States  Senate  by  a  member  who  was 
convinced  that  the  new  system  was  so  important 
a  discovery  in  popular  government  as  to  warrant 
calling  the  attention  of  the  nation  to  it.  Well 
may  it  be  said  of  this,  as  of  the  other  new  mu- 
nicipal systems,  that  its  early  story  has  been 
"full  of  sound  and  fury," 

Is  it  also  to  be  a  tale  "signifying  nothing?" 
Is  the  dream  of  a  new  municipal  era,  aroused  by 
the  striking  success  of  this  new  instrument  of 
municipal  democracy,  destined  to  vanish  as 
the  former  dreams  have  vanished?  To  throw  a 
possible  light  on  this  question,  rather  than  to 


6  Municipal  Freedom 

relate  the  well-known  story  of  the  commission 
governments,  is  the  purpose  of  this  little  volume. 

To  appreciate  the  real  significance  in  mu- 
nicipal affairs  of  the  movement  toward  city 
government  by  commission,  some  knowledge  of 
the  general  trend  of  American  municipal  de- 
velopment is  necessary;  for  it  is  as  a  phase  of  a 
general  tendency,  and  not  as  an  isolated  ex- 
periment, that  the  movement  is  to  be  properly 
regarded.  Like  most  of  our  institutions,  our 
city  government,  both  in  form  and  substance, 
was  transplanted  from  England  to  the  colonies, 
where  it  underwent  the  usual  differentiation 
under  the  influence  of  changed  conditions.  This 
differentiation,  however,  did  not  proceed  to  any 
marked  degree  during  the  colonial  period,  and 
at  the  beginning  of  the  national  era  the  general 
form  of  municipal  government,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  New  England  town-meeting  sys- 
tem, was  that  of  the  English  borough  or  council 
system.  Then  began  a  new  period,  during  which 
the  influence  of  the  Federal  and  state  govern- 
ments dominated  the  organic  development  of  the 
municipalities. 

That  the  "federal  analogy"  should  have  thus 
become  the  controlling  factor  in  this  develop- 


The  New  Departure  7 

ment  was  due  partly  to  a  widespread  belief 
in  the  efficacy  of  the  governmental  principles 
which  it  involved,  and  partly  to  a  misconception 
of  the  functions  of  the  municipality.  A  cardinal 
feature  of  the  federal  plan  was  Montesquieu's 
principle  of  the  separation  of  powers,  having  for 
its  object  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  the  people 
against  the  arbitrary  and  ill-advised  acts  of  pub- 
lic officers.  Another  characteristic  was  the 
bicameral  legislature,  composed  of  members 
representing  geographical  districts.  By  incor- 
porating these  principles  in  the  municipal 
charters  which  the  rapidly  growing  needs  of  the 
urban  population  brought  into  existence  during 
the  nineteenth  century,  the  state  legislatures 
sowed  the  seed  of  municipal  inefficiency,  which 
was  destined  to  bear  fruit  in  "the  one  conspicu- 
ous failure  of  the  American  people." 

The  consequence  of  this  senseless  diffusion  o(  ■ 

powers  among  various  boards  and  officials,  which 
received  its  widest  application  during  the  last 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  was  to  render 
almost  impossible  the  prompt  and  efficient  per-  ^- 
formance  of  municipal  functions.  The  principle 
of  "checks  and  balances,"  intended  as  a  curb 
on  the  arbitrary  and  ill-advised  acts  of  public 
officials,  became  instead  an  obstacle  to  the  wise 


8  Municipal  Freedom 

and  salutary  measures  of  men  who  had  at  heart 
the  best  interests  of  the  people.  Moreover,  since 
the  concomitant  of  the  division  of  power  is  divi- 
sion of  responsibility,  it  became  impossible  to  fix 
the  blame  for  inefficiency  and  corruption,  which 
became  ever-present  factors  in  city  administra- 
tion. 

Scarcely  less  sinister  in  its  result  was  the 
principle  of  the  representative  legislature.  The 
belief  in  sectional  representation  was  doubtless 
based  upon  the  assumption  that  the  different 
states  sometimes  possess  diverse  interests.  Ex- 
perience proved,  however,  that  in  the  city  there 
was  no  such  division  of  interests  as  was  supposed, 
and  the  municipal  council,  instead  of  regarding 
the  general  interests  of  the  city,  came  to  repre- 
sent the  special  interests  of  particular  wards. 
A  blind  adherence  to  principles  which  had  con- 
tributed to  the  success  of  a  national  government, 
besides  opening  the  way  to  extravagance,  waste- 
fulness, and  inefficiency,  gave  demagogic  poli- 
ticians an  opportunity  to  exploit  the  public  inter- 
ests, and  thus  prepared  the  way  for  the  spoils 
system  in  local  government. 
J  The  logical  result  of  this  growth  toward  a 
cumbersome  and  complex  system  was  the  birth, 
in  the  closing  decades  of  the  last  century,  of  a 


The  New  Departure  9 

counter  movement  toward  the  centraHzation  of 
administrative  power  and  responsibiHty.  The 
important  powers  which  had  been  gradually 
taken  from  the  municipal  council  and  distributed 
among  numerous  boards  and  officials  were  now 
centred  in  the  mayor,  who  became  the  most 
powerful  member  of  the  government,  fit  is  as 
a  climax  of  this  well-defined  tendency  toward 
administrative  centralization  that  the  present 
movement  for  city  government  by  commission 
finds  its  proper  place  in  our  general  municipal 
development. 

The  principle  of  the  commission  government 
was  not  without  precedent  in  the  United  States. 
A  charter  granted  by  the  California  legislature 
to  the  city  of  Sacramento,  in  1863,  vested  all 
municipal  powers  in  a  "Board  of  Trustees" 
composed  of  three  members  elected  at  large,  each 
of  whom  was  placed  in  charge  of  a  municipal  de- 
partment. The  Sacramento  government  is  said 
to  have  given  excellent  service,  but  in  time  other 
officers  and  boards  were  created  for  the  exercise 
of  administrative  powers,  and  the  original  board 
developed  into  a  purely  legislative  body. 

A  more  striking  precedent  to  the  present-day 
commission  government  was  embodied  in  a 
charter  which  the  Louisiana  legislature  granted 


lo  Municipal  Freedom 

to  New  Orleans  in  1870,  as  a  result  of  the  bank- 
rupt condition  of  that  city.  This  government 
consisted  of  a  board  of  seven  administrators 
who  collectedly  acted  as  a  legislative  body  and 
individually  served  as  department  heads.  The 
members  of  the  board,  though  at  first  appointed 
by  the  Governor,  were  to  be  elected  by  the  voters 
at  large  and  were  to  receive  an  annual  salary  of 
$6,000.     In  1882  the  old  form  of  government 

/as  restored  in  New  Orleans. 
Although  there  is  some  conflict  of  testimony 
as  to  the  efficiency  of  these  former  commission 
governments,  the  weight  of  the  evidence  is  in 
their  favor.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  they  never 
quite  squared  with  the  political  ideals  of  their 
time,  and  that  they  had  no  noticeable  effect  on 
the  general  trend  of  municipal  development. 
Like  the  appointive  commission  which  has  man- 
aged the  affairs  of  the  national  capital  since 
1878,  and  the  Memphis  commission  appointed 
after  the  yellow-fever  epidemic  of  1874,  they 
have  been  precedents  without  influence. 

The  first  city  to  abandon  the  old  form  of 
government  for  the  commission  plan,  as  it  is 
understood  to-day,  was  Galveston,  and,  as  in 
the  case  of  New  Orleans  and  Memphis,  the  im- 
pelling cause  was  an  emergency.     On  September 


The  New  Departure  ii 

8,  1900,  a  terrific  West  Indian  hurricane  sent 
high  waves  over  the  low  islands  on  which  the  city 
of  Galveston  was  located,  destroying  six  thou- 
sand lives  and  ^i7,cxx),ooo  worth  of  property. 
The  great  calamity  came  as  a  kind  of  climax  to 
a  long  period  of  wretched  experience  during 
which  the  city  government  had  become  so  clogged 
with  inefficiency  and  corruption  as  to  reduce  the 
administration  to  a  deplorable  state.  At  this 
juncture,  when  the  city  was  facing  bankruptcy, 
the  Deepwater  Committee,  an  organization  of 
business  men  who  represented  large  property 
interests  in  the  city,  undertook  to  improve  con- 
ditions through  an  attempt  to  secure  a  new 
government.  The  idea  of  government  by  com- 
mission was  suggested  and  embodied  in  a  new 
charter,  though  it  does  not  appear  that  those 
who  drafted  the  new  instrument  were  familiar 
with  the  former  commission  governments.  As 
a  result  of  a  vigorous  campaign  in  which  many 
prominent  citizens  joined,  the  Texas  legislature 
passed  the  necessary  act,  and  twelve  months 
after  the  flood  the  old  government  of  Galveston 
was  replaced  by  the  commission. 

The  basic  idea  of  the  new  government  was  the 
centralization  of  all  municipal  powers,  legislative 
and  administrative,  in  a  single  board  of  five  mem- 


12  Municipal  Freedom 

bers,  one  of  whom  was  given  the  title  of  "mayor- 
president."  The  original  act  provided  for  the 
appointment  of  three  of  the  commissioners  by  the 
Governor,  and  for  the  election  of  the  remaining 
two  by  the  voters  at  large.  The  Supreme  Court 
of  Texas  later  sustained  a  constitutional  ob- 
jection to  the  appointive  feature  and  the  charter 
was  amended  by  providing  for  the  election  at 
large  of  all  five  members  of  the  commission.  The 
government,  under  the  amended  charter,  is  di- 
vided into  four  departments,  each  of  which  is 
in  charge  of  a  commissioner  for  the  management 
of  the  department  intrusted  to  him.  The  general 
supervision  of  the  affairs  of  the  municipality  is 
vested  in  the  mayor-president,  who  is  the  ex- 
ecutive head  of  the  city,  but  exercises  no  veto 
power  or  power  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  any 
of  the  departments;  he  is  primus  inter  pares,  pos- 
sessing no  more  power  than  any  other  member 
of  the  governing  commission. 

The   very   striking   improvement   which    fol- 

iV' ^  lowed  the  installation  of  this    simple    and    ef- 

^  \        ficient  system  attracted  the  attention  of  other 

^        cities  which  were  suffering  from  the  common 

municipal  ills,   and  within   a   few  years  other 

Texas  cities,  notably  Houston,  Fort  Worth,  and 

Dallas,  received  similar  charters  from  the  legis- 


The  New  Departure  13 

lature.  Interest  now  spread  to  the  north,  where 
the  legislatures  of  Iowa  and  other  states  passed 
acts  permitting  cities,  by  a  referendum  vote,  to 
adopt  the  new  form  of  government.  The  growth 
of  the  movement  now  became  rapid.  By  the 
end  of  the  year  1907  nine  cities  were  operating 
under  commission  government,  seven  of  which 
were  in  the  south  and  two  in  Iowa.  Three  and 
a  half  years  later  the  number  of  cities  and  towns 
in  which  the  new  form  was  either  in  operation  or 
had  been  provided  for  either  by  special  charter 
or  by  an  election  under  general  law  was  one 
hundred  and  forty-four.  In  January,  1914,  over 
three  hundred  and  fifty  cities  and  towns  contain- 
ing an  aggregate  of  over  seven  million  people 
were  being  governed  under  the  commission  form. 
U-^  must  not  be  thought  that  the  Galveston 
plan  was  adopted  in  its  entirety  by  the  cities 
which  later  adopted  the  commission  idea.  In- 
deed, the  opinion  generally  prevailed  that  the 
Galveston  charter  was  seriously  defective  in  not 
providing  sufficient  safeguards  against  the  mis- 
use of  power  by  members  of  the  governing  body, 
and  the  Galveston  plan  soon  underwent  a  modi- 
fication out  of  which  evolved  the  typical  com- 
mission government  of  the  present  time.  Thus 
the  initiative,  referendum,  and  recall,  the  non- 


14  Municipal  Freedom 

partisan  nomination  and  election  of  members  of 
the  commission,  and  the  civil-service  commission 
were  added  for  the  purpose  of  giving  to  the 
people  a  more  complete  control  over  the  com- 
mission and  of  checking  the  ever-present  in- 
fluence of  partisan  politics  in  municipal  affairs. 
The  Iowa  commission  government  law  was  the 
first  to  embody  all  of  these  new  features,  al- 
though some  of  them  were  being  worked  out 
by  Texas  cities  simultaneously  with  their  con- 
sideration by  the  Iowa  legislature. 

The  Iowa  law,  which  has  been  commonly 
called  the  "Des  Moines  Plan,"  at  once  became 
the  model  after  which  later  commission  charters 
were  patterned,  and  it  continues  to  furnish  the 
prevaiHng  form.  The  division  of  administrative 
functions  varies  with  the  different  charters. 
As  in  the  Galveston  plan,  the  mayor  is  always 
the  titular  head  of  the  administration,  and,  ex- 
cept in  a  very  few  instances,  has  no  more  power 
than  the  other  members  of  the  board.  Some- 
times he  is  in  charge  of  a  department,  and  some- 
times he  exercises  a  general  coordinating  or  su- 
pervisory power  over  the  administration  as  a 
whole.  The  departments  of  "finance  and  reve- 
nue" and  "police  and  fire"  are  almost  uni- 
formly provided,  while  the  remaining  functions 


The  New  Departure  15 

vary  in  their  nature  and  distribution  in  the 
different  charters.  The  general  legislative  pow- 
ers and  the  powers  of  appointment  and  removal 
are  vested  in  the  commission,  which  is  com- 
monly called  the  "council." 

The  members  of  the  commission,  or  council, 
are  regularly  elected  at  large  for  a  term  varying 
in  most  cases  from  two  to  four  years.  In  some 
instances  they  are  elected  to  serve  as  head  of 
a  specific  department,  but  the  more  common 
practice  is  for  the  commission  as  a  whole  to 
assign  its  members  to  the  several  departments. 
Which  plan  is  more  efficacious  has  been  a  subject 
of  much  discussion  among  commission  charter 
reformers,  and  it  is  still  an  unsettled  question. 
Election  to  specific  office,  some  say,  is  essential 
for  consistency  with  the  fundamental  principle 
of  commission  government  that  responsibility 
should  be  clear  and  sharp.  ^Tnus,  according  to 
advocates  of  this  method,  the  member  of  the 
council  is  in  a  position  which  he  has  agreed  with 
the  voters  to  take,  and  he  can  therefore  be  held 
much  more  effectively  responsible  than  if  in  a 
position,  perhaps  unwelcome  to  him,  to  which 
he  has  been  assigned  by  his  colleagues.  It  is 
further  claimed  that  the  plan  of  election  to  a 
specific  office  will  secure  a  higher  grade  of  men, 


i6  Municipal  Freedom 

and  instances  are  often  cited  where  commission 
governments  have  lost  a  highly  competent  of- 
ficial because  of  his  defeat  by  a  less  competent, 
but  a  more  popular,  man,  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
voters  did  not  realize  what  place  in  the  council 
was  at  stake.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  argued 
that  election  to  specific  office  invests  the  indi- 
vidual commissioner  with  a  certain  independence 
which  mihtates  against  harmonious  action  on 
the  council. 
J  The  present  trend  seems  to  favor  the  plan 
of  election  to  specific  office,  and,  not  only  have 
the  latest  commission  charters  embodied  this 
plan,  but  one  city,  Colorado  Springs,  has  lately 
registered  its  dissatisfaction  with  the  plan  of 
election  at  random  by  adopting  an  amendment 
providing  for  election  to  specific  office.  It 
should  be  considered,  however,  whether  election 
to  specific  office  may  not  encourage  the  false  idea 
that  experts  may  be  secured  by  popular  election. 
A  similar  question  has  been  raised  with  regard 
to  the  length  of  time  which  the  members  of  the 
commission  should  be  required  to  devote  to  the 
work  of  their  office.  It  has  been  held  by  some 
that  a  liberal  compensation  should  be  provided, 
and  the  commissioner  required  to  devote  all 
his   time.     Others   have   insisted   that   such   a 


The  New  Departure  17 

provision  discourages  from  entering  the  public 
service  men  who  would  be  unwilling  to  give  up 
their  private  business,  thus  depriving  the  city  of 
the  services  of  the  most  competent  of  its  citizens. 
This  controversy  is  significant  of  the  difference 
in  view  which  has  prevailed  with  regard  to  the 
nature  of  the  commissioner's  function;  to  say 
that  he  should  devote  all  of  his  time  to  the  office 
is  to  assume  that  he  is  an  active  manager  of  his 
department;  to  say  that  he  should  give  only  part 
of  his  time  is  to  assume  that  he  is  merely  a  super- 
visor, leaving  to  his  subordinate  the  actual  work 
of  management.  Which  assumption  is  the  more 
consistent  with  principles  of  administrative 
efficiency  will  be  discussed  later.*  The  present 
trend  of  opinion  favors  the  plan  of  requiring  the 
commissioner  to  devote  his  entire  time  to  the 
city's  work. 

The  presence  of  the  initiative,  referendum,  and 
recall  in  the  commission  plan  as  outlined  in  the 
Des  Moines  charter  has  had  much  to  do  with 
overcoming  the  objection  that  the  new  system 
is  undemocratic;  indeed,  it  is  probable  that  it 
would  never  have  received  such  wide  adoption 
had  not  these  devices  been  added  to  insure  its 
responsiveness  to  the  popular  will.     The  Iowa 

*  See  Chapter  III. 


i8  Municipal  Freedom 

law,  which  may  be  regarded  as  typical  in  this 
respect,  provides  that  if  any  proposed  ordinance 
is  submitted  to  the  council  by  petition  signed  by 
not  less  than  25  percentum  of  the  voters,  and 
containing  a  request  for  a  referendum  in  case 
the  council  does  not  pass  it,  the  council  must 
either  pass  the  ordinance  without  alteration 
within  twenty  days  or  submit  it  to  a  referendum 
vote.  The  voters  thus  have  the  privilege  of  en- 
acting the  ordinance  into  law,  which  may  not  be 
repealed  or  amended  except  by  vote  of  the 
people.  If  the  petition  is  signed  by  not  less 
than  10  or  not  more  than  25  percentum  of  the 
voters,  then  the  council  "must  pass  said  or- 
dinance without  change,  or  submit  the  same  at 
the  next  general  city  election  occurring  not  more 
than  thirty  days  after  the  clerk's  certificate  of 
sufficiency  is  attached  to  the  petition."  The 
charter  further  provides  that  any  ordinance 
which  has  been  passed  by  the  council  may  be 
suspended  on  petition  of  25  percentum  of  the 
voters  and  presented  within  ten  days  after  the 
passage  of  the  ordinance,  and  makes  it  obligatory 
on  the  council  either  to  repeal  the  ordinance  or 
submit  it  to  a  referendum  vote.  A  referendum 
is  required  on  all  franchises. 

The  recall  may  be  brought  into  operation  by 


The  New  Departure  19 

a  petition  signed  by  not  less  than  25  percentum 
of  the  voters;  if  the  petition  is  found  to  be  suffi- 
cient the  council  is  required  to  call  an  election 
not  less  than  thirty  nor  more  than  forty  days 
from  the  day  the  petition  is  declared  sufficient. 
In  this  election  the  name  of  the  offending  official 
is  placed  on  the  ballot  as  a  candidate  (unless  he 
requests  otherwise);  other  candidates  may  se- 
cure a  place  on  the  recall  ballot  by  a  petition 
signed  by  not  less  than  10  percentum  of  the 
voters.  The  percentum  of  votes  required  for 
the  recall  petition  varies  in  the  different  cities 
from  15  to  55.  The  general  opinion  seems  to 
be  that  the  required  percentum  should  be  less 
in  the  large  than  in  the  small  city. 

It  has  been  said  that  a  final  verdict  on  the 
efficacy  of  the  initiative,  referendum,  and  recall 
is  premature  at  this  time,  as  these  instruments 
have  not  yet  been  subjected  to  wide  use  in 
cities.  Nevertheless,  it  is  significant  that  the 
lamentations  of  those  who  opposed  their  intro- 
duction have  not  been  justified.  It  was  prophe- 
sied that  these  instruments  would  become  weap- 
ons in  the  hands  of  corporations  seeking  public 
favors,  and  that  the  members  of  the  council 
would  be  shorn  of  their  independence  of  action 
and  made  subservient  to  the  popular  clamor. 


20  Municipal  Freedom 

Far  from  these  predictions  being  fulfilled,  it 
may  be  said  that  the  potentiality  of  the  initia- 
tive, referendum,  and  recall  as  means  of  effec- 
tive popular  control  has  made  the  commission 
governments  strikingly  responsive  to  public 
opinion,  enhancing  and  not  diminishing  their 
efficiency. 

A  no  less  important  element  in  the  success  of 
the  commission  governments  is  embodied  in  the 
provisions  for  the  non-partisan  choice  of  public 
officials  and  employees.  The  methods  which 
have  been  almost  uniformly  adopted  to  accom- 
plish this  object  are  the  non-partisan  primary 
and  election  and  the  civil-service  board.  The 
non-partisan  primary,  or  preliminary  election, 
as  it  is  commonly  called,  is  used  as  a  means  of 
selecting  two  candidates  for  each  office  to  be 
voted  on  in  the  second  election.  The  candi- 
dates secure  a  place  on  the  primary  ballot,  which 
like  the  second  ballot  is  free  of  any  party  desig- 
nation, by  petition  of  a  certain  percentum  of 
qualified  voters.  A  modification  of  this  system 
is  found  in  the  Berkeley  (Cal.)  charter,  which 
provides  that  if  any  candidate  in  the  prelimi- 
nary election  receives  a  majority  of  the  votes 
cast  he  is  thereby  elected.  Some  charters  have 
provided  for  the  preferential  plan  of  choosing 


The  New  Departure  21 

the  members  of  the  commission,  an  innovation 
which  will  be  discussed  in  a  later  chapter.  At 
the  present  time  the  Des  Moines  plan  of  non- 
partisan preliminary  and  second  elections  is  the 
prevailing  method  of  choosing  the  members  of 
the  council  in  the  commission-governed  cities. 

The  merit  system  of  appointment  is  generally 
provided  for  in  the  commission  charter,  though 
sometimes,  as  in  New  York  and  Massachusetts, 
it  is  imposed  by  the  general  law  of  the  state. 
The  Iowa  commission  government  act  provides 
for  a  civil-service  board  of  three  members,  to 
be  appointed  by  the  council  for  six  years,  the 
term  of  one  member  expiring  every  two  years. 
Twice  a  year  the  civil-service  board  holds  exam- 
inations to  select  persons  qualified  to  fill  posi- 
tions under  the  city  government,  and  from  the 
Hst  secured,  all  appointments  to  places  under  the 
civil  service  must  be  made.  All  appointive  offi- 
cers and  employees,  except  the  city  clerk,  fire 
chief,  assessor,  street  commissioner,  and  chiefs 
of  sub-departments,  commissioners  of  any  kind, 
unskilled  laborers,  mayor's  secretary,  and  assist- 
ant solicitor,  have  been  brought  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  civil  service.  The  Iowa  law  further 
gives  the  council  the  power  to  remove  members 
of  the  civil  service  board  by  a  four  fifths  vote. 


no 


Municipal  Freedom 

The  principle  of  the  merit  system,  thus  em- 
bodied in  a  typical  charter,  is  doubtless  essential 
to  the  well-being  of  the  administrative  service; 
the  provisions  prescribing  the  manner  in  which 
this  principle  shall  be  applied,  however,  are 
open  to  serious  criticism  and  constitute  an  im- 
portant defect  in  the  commission  charters.  The 
ordinary  charter,  like  that  of  Des  Moines,  con- 
tains a  brief  statement  of  the  merit  principle 
and  leaves  it  to  the  commission  to  supplement 
this  principle  by  establishing  the  scope  and 
duties  of  the  civil-service  board.  But  this 
scheme  is  inconsistent  with  the  fundamental 
principle  of  the  commission  plan:  the  centraliza- 
tion of  official  responsibility;  for  if  the  civil- 
service  board  failed  to  carry  out  the  principle 
laid  down  in  the  charter,  the  responsibility  for 
this  failure  would  be  divided  between  it  and  the 
commission. 

Moreover,  this  arrangement  places  the  civil- 
service  board  too  much  in  the  power  of  the 
council.  From  one  point  of  view,  the  civil-ser- 
vice board  is  an  employment  agency  to  aid  the 
governing  council;  from  another  point  of  view, 
it  is  an  independent  authority  to  restrain  the 
possible  political  tendencies  of  the  council  to  use 
appointments    for    political    purposes.     If   the 


The  New  Departure  23 

tenure  of  the  civil-service  commissioners  is 
dependent  upon  the  council  itself,  then  the 
council  is  possessed  of  a  club  by  which  it  can 
compel  the  civil-service  commission  to  act  in 
accordance  with  its  desires.  Again,  the  ex- 
tension of  the  merit  system  by  the  commission 
charters  is  generally  given  to  the  council  itself, 
and,  in  most  cases,  the  council  itself  is  given  the 
power  to  frame  the  rules.  Thus  we  find  the 
charter  creating  a  restraining  body,  but  making 
that  body  dependent,  in  the  exercise  of  its  pow- 
ers, upon  the  very  council  which  it  is  created  to 
restrain. 

Already  the  inadequacy  of  these  civil-service 
provisions  has  been  revealed  in  their  practical 
operation.  Thus  in  Des  Moines,  it  is  the  con- 
sensus of  opinion  that  these  provisions  of  the 
law  have  not  been  thoroughly  enforced  and  that 
members  of  the  council  in  several  instances  have 
overridden  the  civil-service  board  in  the  matter 
of  appointments.  Both  in  Des  Moines  and 
Cedar  Rapids  the  rules  adopted  by  the  civil- 
service  board  have  not  conformed  to  the  pro- 
visions of  the  charter,  and  have  been  much  less 
stringent  than  the  latter.  It  is  clear,  in  view 
of  the  experience  of  commission  cities,  that  the 
effective  application  of  the  merit  principle  re- 


24  Municipal  Freedom 

quires  a  more  complete  definition  of  the  powers 
of  the  civil-service  board  than  the  commission 
charters  at  present  contain. 

From  the  foregoing  brief  review  of  the  com- 
mission charters  the  following  may  be  regarded 
as  the  essential  characteristics  of  the  straight 
commission  plan  as  it  is  in  effect  to-day  in 
American  cities:  (i)  a  small  governing  council, 
consisting  generally,  but  not  necessarily,  of 
five  members,  exercising  administrative,  execu- 
tive, and  legislative  powers;  (2)  the  election  of 
the  members  of  this  council  by  the  people  at 
large,  instead  of  by  wards;  (3)  the  placing  of  a 
council  member  in  charge  of  each  department, 
for  the  efficient  administration  of  which  he  is 
responsible  to  the  council;  (4)  the  non-partisan 
selection  of  both  elective  and  appointive  officials 
through  the  non-partisan  election  and  merit 
systems,  respectively,  and  (5)  the  placing  of  the 
council  under  direct  popular  control  through  the 
initiative,  referendum,  and  recall. 


CHAPTER   II 

A  TALE  OF  TWO  CITIES 

The  marked  improvement  in  civic  conditions 
which  has  been  accomphshed  in  commission- 
governed  cities  cannot  but  impress  the  impartial 
investigator,  no  matter  what  his  opinion  may 
be  of  the  cause  of  the  improvement.  In  a  few 
commission  cities  he  finds  conditions  only  mod- 
erately improved;  in  the  great  mass  of  the  cities 
which  adopted  the  new  system,  however,  he 
encounters  results  that  are  striking  when  set 
up  against  the  background  of  American  munici- 
pal experience. 

Looking  into  the  department  of  municipal 
finance,  he  finds  this  branch  of  the  administra- 
tion responding,  almost  without  exception,  to 
the  enlightened  efforts  of  the  new  governments. 
He  observes  that  large  floating  debts  have  been 
wiped  out,  sinking  funds  created,  and  the  public 
credit  restored;  that  the  improvident  policy  of  re- 
sorting to  bond  issues  to  meet  current  expenses 
has  been   abandoned;  that  the  people's  funds 

25 


i/ 


26  Municipal  Freedom 

have  been  let  out  to  financial  institutions  to 
afford  an  additional  income  to  the  public  treas- 
ury; that  current  expenses  have  been  curtailed, 
and  the  tax  burden, in  many  instances,  lightened. 
He  detects,  too,  an  unmistakable  improvement 
in  the  various  public  services,  which  is  revealed 
in  purer  water,  better  streets,  and  a  more  effi- 
cient fire  and  police  service.  And,  finally,  the 
investigator  notes  a  distinct  elevation  in  the 
moral  tone  of  the  cities  which  have  adopted  the 
commission  plan;  in  the  elimination  of  the  gam- 
bling den,  the  policy  shop,  and  the  disreputable 
resort,  he  sees  an  effective  tribute  to  the  simple 
program  of  strict  and  impartial  law  enforcement 
which  generally  has  characterized  commission 
rule. 

To  relate  the  individual  achievements  of  the 
commission-governed  cities  does  not  fall  within 
the  scope  of  the  present  volume;  a  brief  de- 
scription, however,  of  the  experience  of  two  of 
these  cities — Haverhill,  Massachusetts,  and  Salt 
Lake  City,  Utah — should  be  serviceable  as  in- 
dicating to  the  reader  the  spirit  and  method 
characteristic  of  commission-government  reform. 
Neither  of  the  cities  mentioned  adopted  com- 
mission government  as  an  emergency  measure; 
neither  made  the  change  while  in  the  grip  of 


A  Tale  of  Two  Cities  27 

a  civic  upheaval  shaking  the  depths  of  her 
citizenship.  Moreover,  neither  of  the  two  cities 
can  be  properly  credited  with  the  maximum  or 
with  the  minimum  of  commission-government 
achievement.  The  examples  of  Haverhill  and 
Salt  Lake  City,  therefore,  being  typical,  should 
be  useful  both  to  the  general  reader  and  to  the 
student. 


AN   EASTERN    EXAMPLE 

Thomas  Jefferson  once  wrote  that  the  final  test 
of  democracy  in  America  would  take  place  in  the 
cities.  It  was  a  sudden  realization  of  her  urban 
responsibility,  in  the  light  of  the  great  Virginian's 
words,  together  with  a  conviction  that  democracy 
was  not  really  embodied  in  the  municipal  system 
which  the  Massachusetts  legislature  had  im- 
posed upon  her,  that  impelled  the  city  of  Haver- 
hill to  a  new  civic  life.  Accordingly  the  old 
government,  with  its  partisan  mayor,  board  of 
aldermen,  and  common  council,  was  swept  away, 
root  and  branch,  by  act  of  the  Massachusetts 
legislature,  and,  in  January,  1909,  the  com- 
mission system  was  installed  in  its  place.  Ap- 
parently the  citizens  of  Haverhill,  who  had  been 
responsible  for  the  change,  were  determined  that 
if  the  test  of  democracy  was  to  come  in  the  city. 


28  Municipal  Freedom 

it  should  be  a  fairer  test  than  had  been  possible 
under  an  antiquated  scheme  of  municipal  organi- 
zation. 

The  old  government  of  Haverhill  was  typically 
American,  which  is  to  say  that  its  machinery 
consisted  of  a  mayor,  aldermen,  councilmen, 
and  numerous  boards,  all  sharing  power  with 
each  other,  and  that  the  only  organizing  idea 
apparent  in  this  machinery  was  a  studied  lack 
of  organization.  A  victim  of  Montesquieu's 
doctrine  of  divided  powers,  the  system,  to  use 
the  words  of  a  municipal  expert,  was  "cursed 
with  the  curse  of  divided  responsibility."  This 
multiplicity  of  authorities  was  meant  to  secure 
democracy  and  efficiency;  but  the  government 
of  Haverhill  embodied  neither. 

The  cardinal  defect  of  the  system  may  be 
verified  from  the  concrete  experience  of  the  city 
prior  to  the  installation  of  the  present  govern- 
ment. The  ward  plan  of  representation  made 
the  city  legislature  a  contending  chamber  for 
the  selfish  and  conflicting  interests  of  particular 
wards.  "It  was  a  case  of  swap  a  lamp-post  in 
Ward  3  for  a  special  policeman  in  Ward  5," 
declared  a  man  in  the  street.  No  wonder  a  con- 
structive plan  of  street  building,  much  needed 
by  the   city,  was    impossible.     Of  course  the 


A  Tale  of  Two  Cities  29 

finances  of  the  city  suffered  from  the  system,  and 
in  January,  1909,  a  floating  debt  of  ^160,000  had 
accumulated — the  fruits  of  a  policy  of  making 
up  annual  deficits  through  a  resort  to  bond 
issues.  It  is  significant  of  the  inefficiency  of  the 
old  government  that  one  of  its  last  acts  was  to 
issue  $39,000  worth  of  bonds  with  which  to  pay 
current  expenses. 

The  city's  deplorable  financial  condition, 
more  than  any  other  thing,  pointed  out  the 
urgent  need  of  a  change,  and  a  number  of  public- 
spirited  citizens,  convinced  that  any  improve- 
ment in  the  government  of  the  city  must  be 
preceded  by  a  change  in  the  machinery  of 
government,  invited  President  Eliot,  of  Har- 
vard, to  lecture  in  the  city  on  the  subject  of 
charter  improvement.  Dr.  Eliot  so  impressed  his 
hearers  w^ith  the  merits  of  the  commission  plan 
that  a  civic  association  was  formed  for  the  ex- 
press purpose  of  securing  a  commission  charter 
for  the  city.  It  w^as  largely  due  to  the  tireless 
efforts  of  the  leaders  of  this  organization  that 
theMassachusetts  General  Court  of  1908  granted 
the  present  charter,  which  went  into  effect  in 
January,  1909. 

The  new  government  thus  established  may 
be  said  to  rest  upon  a  theory  of  municipal  gov- 


30  Municipal  Freedom 

ernment  entirely  different  from  that  embodied 
in  the  old  system;  its  structure  recognizes  city 
government  as  largely  a  question  of  business 
management,  rather  than  of  legislation.  "Ours 
is  not  to  legislate  on  the  tariff,  the  currency,  or 
the  trusts,"  declared  a  Haverhill  reformer,  "but 
to  build  and  maintain  streets,  provide  pure  water, 
fire  protection,  and  the  like,  and  these  are  purely 
matters  of  business.  We,  therefore,  want  a  gov- 
ernment organized  with  a  view  to  administra- 
tive efficiency."  One  may  be  inclined  to  take 
issue  with  Haverhill's  citizens  upon  this  view 
of  the  nature  of  municipal  government  on  the 
ground  that,  while  the  municipality  is  not  con- 
cerned with  legislating  on  subjects  of  national 
politics,  it  nevertheless  finds  a  legitimate  func- 
tion in  legislating  on  questions  of  local  pol- 
icy, and  therefore  should  be  organized  with  a 
view  to  legislative  as  well  as  administrative 
efficiency.  But  when  one  considers  that  a  so- 
called  system  of  state  regulation  has  reduced 
Massachusetts  cities  to  a  subject  state  where  they 
are  scarcely  more  than  administrative  agents, 
he  will  be  apt  to  revise  his  judgment,  and  con- 
clude that,  after  all,  the  Haverhill  view  is  correct 
in  so  far  as  it  applies  to  Massachusetts  cities. 
Once  the  colonial  champion  of  the  right  of  self- 


A  Tale  of  Two  Cities  31 

government,  Massachusetts  now  denies  that 
right  to  her  own  cities! 

The  new  government  is  admirably  constructed 
from  an  administrative  standpoint.  The  con- 
centration of  all  powers  (except  those  connected 
with  school  administration)  in  a  small  elective 
board  of  five  men — a  mayor  and  four  alder- 
men— the  division  of  the  city's  business  into 
four  departments,  each  of  which  is  under  the 
superintendence  of  an  alderman  who  is  person- 
ally responsible  to  the  board,  or  council,  for  the 
administration  of  his  department;  the  appoint- 
ment of  all  officials  by  the  council,  on  a  merit 
basis;  the  election  of  members  of  the  council  by 
the  people  at  large  on  a  non-partisan  ballot,  and 
provisions  for  direct  legislation  and  the  recall  of 
elective  officers  are  the  leading  features  of  the 
new  system. 

And  the  practical  working  of  the  new  govern- 
ment conforms  to  the  theory  on  which  it  is  built. 
Out  of  the  sixty  or  more  candidates  who  pre- 
sented themselves  for  the  council  in  the  first 
election,  the  people  chose  five  men  who  came 
nearer  to  being  a  board  of  competent  municipal 
directors  than  any  body  of  men  elected  in  the 
history  of  the  city.  For  mayor  they  chose  a 
business  man  of  distinguished  ability,  who  had 


32  Municipal  Freedom 

given  a  great  deal  of  study  to  the  municipal 
problem;  for  aldermen  a  retired  bank  cash- 
ier highly  versed  in  technical  financial  matters, 
an  expert  civil  engineer  of  long  experience,  a 
prominent  contractor  and  bank  president,  and 
a  shoemaker  of  more  than  ordinary  ability.  The 
retired  bank  man  was  placed  in  charge  of  the 
city's  finances,  the  engineer  in  charge  of  the 
street  department,  the  contractor  in  charge  of 
public  property,  and  the  shoemaker  in  charge  of 
the  police  and  fire  departments.  The  mayor 
first  elected  under  the  new  charter  and  one 
alderman  are  still  in  office.  How  completely 
partisanship,  in  the  sense  of  adherence  to  na- 
tional party  lines,  has  been  eliminated  is  seen 
from  the  fact  that  the  council  has  generally 
been  composed  of  Democrats,  Republicans,  and 
Socialists, 
y  To  the  practical  efficiency  of  the  new  govern- 
ment the  striking  improvement  in  the  city's 
finances  further  attests.  As  a  result  of  the  ap- 
plication of  improved  business  methods,  $15,000 
was  saved  in  current  expenses  during  the  first 
year  of  the  new  regime;  $61,000  worth  of  bills, 
received  as  a  legacy  from  the  old  government, 
was  paid  off;  $133,000  of  bonded  indebtedness 
was   swept    away,   and    a   cash  surplus  depos- 


A  Tale  of  Two  Cities  33 

ited  to  the  credit  of  the  people.  The  popular 
confidence  which  the  new  government  inspired 
resulted  in  an  increase  of  over  ^17,000  in  the 
tax  collections  over  previous  years.  The  high 
standard  of  municipal  economy  thus  established 
during  the  first  year  of  the  present  government 
has  been  consistently  maintained,  and  each 
year  has  ended  with  a  surplus  in  the  treasury — 
a  condition  almost  unknow^n  prior  to  1909. 

The  old  government  kept  no  systematic  over- 
sight over  expenditures,  bought  supplies  at  rates 
dictated  by  the  dealers,  and  permitted  gross  ex- 
travagance and  waste  in  the  administration  of 
the  departments.  The  new  government,  through 
the  aldermen  department  heads,  keeps  a  rigid 
supervision  over  expenditures,  requires  a  cash 
discount  on  the  prepayment  of  bills,  lets  munici- 
pal work  on  a  system  of  competitive  bids,  and 
buys  municipal  supplies  in  large  quantities,  effect- 
ing thereby  a  substantial  saving.  Clearly  the  ap- 
plication of  economy  and  promptness  to  the  city's 
affairs  would  not  have  been  possible  under  the  old 
government  of  divided  power  and  responsibility. 

Many  examples  might  be  cited  to  show  the 
superiority  of  the  present  government  over  the 
old  form,  but  perhaps  the  most  striking  contrast 
between  the  two  governments  is  revealed  in  the 


34  Municipal  Freedom 

story  of  the  city's  difficulty  with  a  public-service 
corporation.  The  case  is  interesting  because  it 
suggests  the  potentiality  for  good  that  lies  in  a 
simple  system  of  the  people's  choice,  which  is 
sensitive  to  the  popular  needs. 

In  1900  the  SociaHst  mayor  of  Haverhill, 
under  a  Massachusetts  statute,  appealed  to  the 
State  Gas  and  Electric  Light  Commission  for 
protection  against  an  exorbitant  gas  rate.  The 
commission,  acknowledging  the  justice  of  the 
city's  cause,  fixed  a  maximum  gas  rate  of  80 
cents  per  thousand.  The  Haverhill  Gas  Com- 
pany, contending  that  the  commission's  act  was 
confiscatory  under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
of  the  United  States  Constitution,  secured  an 
injunction  from  the  United  States  District  Court 
against  the  enforcement  of  the  commission's 
order.  A  master  was  appointed  to  investigate 
the  case,  but  the  investigation  never  took  place, 
and  the  case  slumbered.  Neither  the  commis- 
sion, the  court,  nor  the  city  government  made 
any  serious  effort  to  reopen  it.  Meanwhile,  both 
the  city  government  and  the  people  of  Haverhill 
continued  to  pay  the  old  gas  rate  of  ^i. 

Immediately  after  the  inauguration  of  the  pres- 
ent government,  the  City  Council,  on  the  advice 
of  the  City  Solicitor,  served  notice  on  the  gas 


A  Tale  of  Two  Cities  35 

company  that  it  would  discontinue  paying  the 
one-dollar  rate.  The  solicitor  took  the  case  to 
the  Massachusetts  Supreme  Court  and  obtained 
an  order  assuring  the  city,  as  a  municipality,  the 
80-cent  rate. 

The  city  government  had  now  obtained  the 
desired  gas  rate,  but,  because  of  the  subject 
relation  in  which  it  stood  to  the  state,  it  was 
helpless  as  to  the  main  question  of  the  price  of 
gas  to  the  people  of  Haverhill.  The  city  was 
really  not  a  party  to  the  case,  its  rightful  privi- 
leges having  been  consigned  by  law  to  author- 
ities over  which  it  had  no  control.  The  only 
possible  escape  from  the  situation  seemed  to  lie 
in  municipal  ownership,  and  the  council  at  once 
went  to  work  to  study  the  question. 

After  a  preliminary  announcement  of  its  de- 
termination to  construct  a  gas  plant,  the  gas 
company  opened  negotiations  with  the  council 
with  the  result  that  a  new  franchise,  looking  to  a 
gradual  reduction  of  the  price  of  gas  to  80  cents, 
was  granted  to  the  company,  which  had  been 
reorganized.  The  city  government  now  aban- 
doned its  public-ownership  plan  in  consequence 
of  this  satisfactory  adjustment  of  its  differences 
with  the  gas  company. 

[t  must  not  be  inferred  from  the  determined 


36  Municipal  Freedom 

attitude  of  the  Haverhill  government  in  its  con- 
troversy with  the  gas  monopoly  that  absolute 
harmony  has  always  existed  among  the  five 
members  of  the  governing  council.  Indeed,  in 
the  very  controversy  described,  one  alderman 
fought  bitterly  the  agreement  with  the  gas  com- 
pany, advocating  public  ownership.  The  same 
alderman  later  opposed  unsuccessfully  the  re- 
election of  the  mayor  who  had  preferred  a  sat- 
isfactory franchise  to  what  he  considered  the 
uncertain  venture  of  municipal  ownership.  The 
significant  fact  is  that  despite  this  and  similar 
disagreements  between  the  members  on  questions 
of  policy,  the  new  government  has  been  able  to 
achieve  marked  and  permanent  improvements 
in  the  affairs  of  the  city,  bringing  economy  and 
efficiency  out  of  waste,  and  curbing  corporate 
extortion;  while  the  old  government  had  stood 
helplessly  inefficient  in  the  bitterness  of  partisan 
strife.  Such  a  result  pleads  eloquently  against 
an  antiquated  system  of  checks  and  balances 
which  has  conclusively  proved  its  own  worth- 
lessness. 

A    WESTERN    EXAMPLE 

Most   American   cities,    suffering   from   mis- 
government,  have  cried  out  in  their  distress  that 


A  Tale  of  Two  Cities  37 

the  influence  of  the  great  national  parties  in  their 
local  affairs  was  responsible  for  their  ills;national 
parties  and  national  issues  dominated  the  city, 
which  was  mercilessly  sacrificed  on  the  altar  of 
national  and  state  politics.  But  Salt  Lake  City, 
for  several  years  preceding  191 2,  was  not  domi- 
nated by  national  parties  or  national  issues;  yet 
the  issue  in  the  local  elections  was  as  foreign  to 
city  government  as  the  questions  of  the  tariff, 
the  currency,  or  trust  regulation.  That  issue 
grew  out  of  religious  prejudice:  Should  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Mormon  Church  be  permitted  to 
hold  any  city  office  or  exercise  any  political  in- 
fluence in  municipal  affairs? 

Here  was  the  element  which  was  to  make  the 
Utah  capital  unique  among  the  politics-ridden 
cities  of  America.  Its  appearance  resulted  sev- 
eral years  ago  in  the  formation  of  a  political 
party— "The  American  Party" — which  was 
dedicated  to  the  task  of  excluding  Mormons  and 
Mormon  influence  from  the  city  administration. 
That  party,  based  on  no  principle  either  of 
municipal,  state,  or  national  administration, 
governed  Salt  Lake  City  almost  without  inter- 
ruption for  several  years,  until  a  non-partisan 
commission  government  dislodged  it  from  power 
in  1912.     There  had  been  the  usual  Democratic 


38  Municipal  Freedom 

and  Republican  parties  in  Salt  Lake  City,  but 
these  did  not  count;  the  American  Party  ruled 
the  city. 

The  origin  of  this  anti-church  party  dates 
back  to  an  interesting  combination  of  circum- 
stances: Several  years  ago,  Reed  Smoot,  high 
official  of  the  Mormon  Church,  was  a  candidate 
for  the  office  of  United  States  Senator  from  Utah, 
and  his  opponent,  a  citizen  of  Salt  Lake  City 
and  a  Gentile,  as  the  non-Mormons  are  called, 
conceived  the  plan  of  drawing  to  his  support  all 
elements  of  opposition  to  the  church.  For  a 
time  it  appeared  that  the  Gentile  candidate 
would  be  sent  to  Washington.  Smoot  was 
elected,  however,  and  practically  all  clear-think- 
ing citizens  of  Salt  Lake  City  agree  that  the 
defeated  candidate's  desire  for  revenge  achieved 
the  formation  of  the  American  Party,  first  called 
the  Liberty  Party,  which  immediately  followed 
Smoot's  election. 

But  the  spirit  of  revenge,  which  moved  the 
managers  of  the  new  movement,  by  no  means 
moved  the  great  mass  of  its  supporters  in  the 
years  that  followed.  Hundreds  of  people  be- 
lieved that  the  powerful  church  on  the  hill  was 
a  dangerous  political  influence  and  should  be 
curbed,  and  they  were  the  bulwark  of  the  new 


A  Tale  of  Two  Cities  39 

party.  "In  what  way  did  the  church  interest 
itself?"  the  writer  asked  a  score  of  citizens. 
"Well,"  came  the  invariable  answer,  "just  about 
election  time  a  whisper  would  come  forth  from 
a  high  official  of  the  Mormon  Church,  and  the 
Mormons  would  all  vote  one  way." 

The  members  of  the  church  stoutly  denied  the 
charge  of  church  influence,  but  the  magnificent 
temple  on  Temple  Square,  shrouded  in  eternal 
secrecy,  represented  an  ominous  influence  in 
the  minds  of  many  citizens,  who  continued  to 
register  their  votes  for  the  American  Party. 
Then  the  aggressive  business  influence  of  the 
church  added  weight  to  the  popular  charge. 
"The  church,  in  the  person  of  its  rulers,  owns  a 
hotel,  a  bank,  a  great  department  store,  a  power- 
ful sugar  concern;  such  an  organization  cannot 
possibly  keep  out  of  politics."  So  reasoned  the 
majority  of  Salt  Lake  voters,  and  the  majority 
were  Gentiles.  Whether  the  church  of  Jesus 
Christ  of  Latter  Day  Saints  was  guilty  of  the 
charge  is  unimportant  so  far  as  this  story  is 
concerned;  the  vital  fact  is  that  a  ruling  majority 
thought  the  church  guilty,  and  feared  to  vote  for 
any  other  than  the  American  Party  candidates. 

The  result  of  municipal  government  by  a  party 
which  was  the  instrument  of  an  anti-church  cru- 


40  Municipal  Freedom 

sade  was  what  might  be  expected.  People  voted 
according  to  their  religious  sentiments,  not  accord- 
ing to  their  municipal  convictions;  questions  of 
municipal  policy  and  of  good  city  government 
had  no  place  in  the  civic  consciousness  of  Salt 
Lake's  citizenship.  As  the  issue  of  monarchism 
for  years  cut  across  the  natural  party  divisions 
of  France,  frightening  great  masses  of  voters 
into  the  anti-monarchist  ranks;  or  as  the  race 
issue  for  half  a  century  has  demoralized  the 
natural  party  divisions  of  our  own  Southern 
States,  forcing  voters  into  the  white  man's  party; 
so  the  question  of  whether  the  members  of  the 
Mormon  Church  should  be  permitted  to  exercise 
their  right  to  hold  office  or  to  be  politically  in- 
fluential stifled  the  political  voice  of  Salt  Lake 
City  by  driving  hundreds  of  her  voters  into  the 
ranks  of  the  only  municipal  anti-church  party 
that  has  ever  appeared  in  this  country. 

Secure  in  the  thought  that  the  Gentiles  would 
not  dare  desert  the  anti-Mormon  standard,  the 
managers  of  the  American  Party  did  not  trouble 
themselves  to  give  the  people  a  high  quality  of 
government.  Contractswere  awarded  to  political 
favorites,  regardless  of  cost  to  the  city  treasury, 
and  one  of  these  favorites  received  so  many 
municipal  jobs  that  people  ironically  referred  to 


A  Tale  of  Two  Cities  41 

him  as  the  "official  contractor."  The  police  de- 
partment was  so  successfully  dominated  by  petty 
politics  that  all  forms  of  vice  flourished  without 
interference.  The  fire  department,  a  crib  for 
the  faithful,  became  so  inefficient  that,  according 
to  reports  of  leading  citizens,  valuable  properties 
were  allowed  to  burn  to  the  ground  a  few  years 
ago  because  the  firemen  were  too  intoxicated  or 
too  inefficient  to  fight  the  fire  effectively.  There 
were  no  starthng  cases  of  official  corruption,  but 
there  was  abundant  evidence  of  official  ineffi- 
ciency. While  good  citizens  of  Salt  Lake  City 
rested  in  the  peaceful  thought  that  the  govern- 
ment was  secure  from  the  influence  of  the  Mor- 
mon Church,  the  petty  politicians  ruled  with  free 
hand.  Then,  suddenly,  the  idea  dawned  upon 
several  leading  spirits  that  their  city  was  the 
victim  of  a  false  idea  and  a  groundless  fear,  and 
that  if  Salt  Lake  City  were  to  hold  her  place  in  the 
march  of  the  cities  she  must  revise  her  municipal 
point  of  view.  From  the  moment  the  newidea  got 
abroad  dates  the  new  era  for  the  Utah  capital. 

A  just  regard  for  political  science  demands 
the  admission  that  the  idealism  of  her  citizens 
was  not  the  sole  motive  which  moved  Salt  Lake 
City  to  reform  herself.  Here,  as  in  all  previous 
history,   we   can   find   traces   of  the   economic 


42  Municipal  Freedom 

motive  which  Karl  Marx  made  the  foundation 
of  his  case  for  modern  SociaUsm,  and  we  must 
admit  that,  to  many  citizens,  the  new  movement 
represented  primarily  a  gain  in  business  pros- 
perity. "This  church  issue  is  hurting  business," 
wailed  some.  "I  can't  afford  to  antagonize  my 
Mormon  customers,"  declared  others  in  their 
despair.  How  the  followers  of  Marx  and  the 
materialistic  interpretation  of  history  would  have 
chuckled  at  these  evidences  of  the  truth  of  their 
creed ! 

But  there  were  idealists  in  Salt  Lake  City> 
too — people  who  dreamed  dreams  and  saw  vi- 
sions, people  who  saw  the  moral  and  civic  needs 
of  their  city — and,  be  it  said  to  the  credit  of 
Salt  Lake  City,  these  people  took  the  lead  in 
the  battle  for  good  government.  It  was  they 
who  undertook  the  task  of  getting  a  new  com- 
mission charter  drawn  up  by  a  self-appointed 
committee  of  citizens,  and  who,  when  the  com- 
mittee had  drawn  up  a  new  charter  embodying 
most  of  the  ideas  of  the  commission  government, 
took  the  responsibility  of  putting  the  new  char- 
ter through  the  state  legislature. 

It  was  when  the  proposed  charter  was  projected 
into  the  Utah  legislature  that  an  event  occurred 
which  made  certain  that  Salt  Lake  City  would 


A  Tale  of  Two  Cities  43 

get  her  commission  government,  and  that  was 
the  alUance  of  the  Mormon  leaders  in  the  legis- 
lature with  the  proponents  of  the  new  charter. 
The  Mormon  political  leaders  in  control  of  the 
legislature  were  willing  to  give  Salt  Lake  City  a 
commission  government  if  by  so  doing  they  could 
break  the  power  of  the  anti-Mormon  party  in  the 
capital,  and  the  non-partisan  primary  and  election 
provisions,  which  appeared  conspicuously  in  the 
proposed  charter,  offered  an  apparently  effective 
means  to  this  end.  The  result  was  that  an  act 
was  passed  in  March,  191 1,  placing  the  cities  of 
first  and  second  classes,  which  included  Salt  Lake 
City,  under  commission  government. 

To  Mormon  leaders  the  measure  meant  an 
opportunity  for  putting  an  end  to  the  "Baby- 
lonian captivity"  of  the  church;  to  the  good- 
government  people  it  meant  an  opportunity 
for  civic  betterment  and  expansion.  The  anti- 
American  feeling  had  played  into  the  hands  of 
the   reformers. 

After  an  exciting  municipal  campaignin which 
all  of  the  old  political  elements  combined  to  elect 
candidates  who  would  carry  on  the  old  anti- 
Mormon  tradition  of  misrule,  the  good-govern- 
ment element  elected  their  candidates  and  the  new 
government  was  installed  in  January,  191 2. 


44  Municipal  Freedom 

The  new  commissioners  were  not  politicians. 
The  head  of  the  government,  Mayor  Parke,  a 
young  university  man,  was  the  leading  member 
of  a  jewelry  firm,  and  had  been  state  senator 
and  brigadier-general  of  the  State  Guard.  The 
other  commissioners  included  a  former  mayor, 
a  young  Harvard  man  of  wealth,  who  had  en- 
tered the  lists  for  good  government  from  a  sense 
of  public  duty;  a  Socialist  of  advanced  political 
and  economic  ideas,  and  a  warehouseman. 
They  were  not  men  of  brilliant  administrative 
ability,  but  they  were  efficient  and  earnest  men, 
and  were  sincerely  bent  on  instituting  an  ad- 
ministration that  would  measure  up  to  its  high- 
est public  obligations. 

The  new  government  began  its  work  by  over- 
hauling the  police  department,  placing  in  charge 
as  chief  of  police,  one  who,  as  special  officer,  had 
for  many  years  been  regarded  as  an  expert  in 
the  detection  of  crime.  The  new  chief  lost  no 
time  in  notifying  law-breaking  saloonkeepers, 
gambling  and  "dope"  house  operators,  and  the 
proprietors  of  the  "red  light"  district  that  there 
was  to  be  a  change  of  policy,  and  that  they 
would  be  expected  to  abandon  their  unlawful 
activities  without  delay.  The  prostitute  was 
ordered  to  leave  the  city,  and  the  gambler  in- 


A  Tale  of  Two  Cities  45 

vited  to  do  the  same  or  secure  an  honest  job. 
It  was  made  clear  to  these  people  that  the  alter- 
native was  the  jail,  and  the  whole  troop  took 
Hobson's  choice  and  either  changed  their  resi- 
dence or  their  occupation. 

It  must  not  be  thought  that  the  captains  of 
the  underworld  calmly  accepted  the  new  regime 
without  making  any  effort  to  understand  it. 
"Surely,"  exclaimed  one  of  these  to  the  chief 
of  police,  "surely,  this  is  but  another  of  the  old- 
time  political  spasms,  and  surely,"  he  added 
with  a  knowing  wink,  "an  envelope,  properly 
filled,  and  dropped  in  the  chief's  desk  at  the 
beginning  of  each  month,  would  make  things 
all  right  again."  The  chief  always  endeavored 
patiently  to  explain  to  these  callers  that  some- 
thing had  happened  to  Salt  Lake  City  which  was 
different  from  the  things  that  had  happened 
before,  and  that  it  would  be  useless  extravagance 
to  leave  envelopes  in  the  chief's  desk.  Needless 
to  say,  the  would-be  benefactor  of  the  depart- 
ment always  departed  with  no  uncertain  idea 
of  the  new  policy  of  law  enforcement  which  was 
to  be  imposed  on  the  city.  One  of  these,  a 
Chinese  manager  of  an  opium  den,  went  so  far 
as  to  solicit  the  aid  of  members  of  the  chiefs 
family  in  trying  to  persuade  him  against "  fanati- 


46  Municipal  Freedom 

cal  ideas  of  law  enforcement!"  "Mr.  Chief, 
he  velly  nice  man,"  asserted  another  Mongo- 
lian, ''but  he  no  savvy." 

The  fire  department  underwent  a  similar  re- 
organization. For  many  years  firemen  had 
been  appointed  and  discharged  on  a  basis  of 
political  expediency  and,  naturally,  the  efficiency 
of  the  department  had  gone  steadily  down, 
while  the  fire  insurance  rate  in  the  city  had  gone 
steadily  up.  The  commission  now  added  new 
equipment  and  newmen  to  the  service  and  placed 
at  its  head  an  expert  who  spends  part  of  his  time 
in  a  comparative  study  of  the  best  methods  of 
fire-fighting  which  have  been  worked  out  in 
other  cities.  People  now  inform  you  in  Salt 
Lake  City  that  Chief  Bywater,  and  not  the 
chairman  of  the  fire  committee  of  the  council,  is 
in  control  of  the  fire  department,  and  that  it  is 
a  more  efficient  department.  Moreover,  ^9,175 
less  than  the  budget  estimate  was  spent  in  this 
department  during  the  year  1913. 

As  a  business  investment,  the  new  Salt  Lake 
City  government  has  measured  up  to  the  com- 
mission-government tradition  of  achievement. 
For  example,  the  first  semi-annual  report  of  the 
new  government  showed  a  saving  of  over  60 
per  cent,  in  the  legal  advertising  of  the  city,  and 


A  Tale  of  Two  Cities  47 

$18,000  in  the  purchase  of  suppHes.  The  first 
annual  report  disclosed  a  saving  of  $33,750  in 
the  purchase  of  supplies;  the  second  annual 
report  issued  in  January,  1914,  reveals  a  net 
saving  of  $33,185  over  the  preceding  year  in  the 
engineering  department  alone.  Other  savings 
may  be  noted  in  the  various  departments.  Con- 
tracts are  now  awarded  to  the  lowest  bidder,  and 
the  good  old  days  when  there  was  an  "official 
contractor,"  who  was  patriotically  chosen  over 
outsiders  who  had  offered  to  do  better  work  for 
one  third  less  money,  have  passed  away  with  the 
old  council  government.  Another  significant 
feature  of  the  new  business  policy  is  the  col- 
lection of  interest  on  the  city  funds  deposited  in 
banks.  In  the  old  days,  the  banks  paid  interest 
but  the  city  never  received  it.  Now  it  goes 
into  the  treasury. 

But  after  all,  the  success  of  the  new  Salt  Lake 
City  government,  after  three  years  of  experience, 
cannot  be  measured  by  its  administrative 
economies.  It  is  in  a  new  civic  consciousness 
that  one  sees  the  change.  The  old  order  of  boss- 
ridden  administration,  of  unrestrained  license  for 
the  lawless  elements,  of  ceaseless  religious  strife, 
has  given  away  to  the  new,  and  somehow  the 
people  as  a  whole  seem  to  be  thoroughly  satisfied. 


48  Municipal  Freedom 

The  visitor  will  now  see  in  the  heart  of  the 
city  a  large  "stockade,"  enclosing  long  rows  of 
uniformly  built  houses — a  notorious  pen  in 
which  were  accustomed  to  gather  the  most 
vicious  elements  of  the  Utah  mountains;  silent 
and  deserted,  to-day  it  stands  an  eloquent  monu- 
ment to  the  new  order  of  things  in  Salt  Lake  City. 


CHAPTER  III 

DEMOCRACY  AND  EFFICIENCY 

To  FRAME  a  government  that  will  be  democratic 
but  not  efficient,  or  a  government  that  will  be 
efficient  but  not  democratic,has  been  regarded  as 
a  comparatively  simple  task;  but  to  construct  a 
municipal  organization  that  will  be  both  demo- 
cratic and  efficient  has  been  the  perplexing 
problem  of  the  municipal  builder.  Does  the 
commission  plan  offer  a  solution  to  this  problem? 
Assuming  that  the  new  system  is  democratic — 
a  question  which  is  discussed  in  a  later  chapter 
— is  it  also  efficient  ? 

Any  significant  answer  must  come  from  a 
scrutiny,  in  the  light  of  our  municipal  experience, 
of  the  principles  underlying  the  framework  of 
the  commission  government.  Of  course  many 
people  believe  that  municipal  efficiency  is  not  to 
be  found  in  any /orw  of  government,  that  it  is  the 
type  of  men  in  charge  of  the  government  and 
not  the  form  of  government  that  determines  the 
character  of  the  administration.     Excellent  ad- 

49 


50  Municipal  Freedom 

ministration,  these  people  say,  has  been  ob- 
tained under  a  poor  system,  and  poor  adminis- 
tration under  an  excellent  system;  therefore 

For  forms  of  government  let  fools  contest, 
What's  best  administered  is  best. 

The  protest  is  itself  an  admission.  If  the 
form  is  unimportant,  why  such  violent  oppo- 
sition to  a  change  in  the  form?  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  although  the  character  of  the  public  officials 
is  an  essential  factor  in  the  success  or  failure  of  a 
municipal  administration,  the  type  of  political 
organization  under  which  the  officials  work  is 
also  important.  That  inefficient  officials  will 
fail  to  give  good  government,  no  matter  how 
excellent  the  system  under  which  they  work,  is 
plainly  borne  out  by  American  experience;  and 
it  is  equally  apparent  that  efficient  public 
servants  will  not  be  able  to  secure  the  maximum 
of  efficiency,  and,  indeed,  will  be  very  apt  to 
obtain  a  minimum  of  efficiency,  if  handicapped 
by  a  system  of  government  which  is  ill-adapted 
to  the  work  to  be  performed. 

Moreover,  the  system  exerts  an  important  in- 
fluence in  determining  the  character  of  the  men 
who  are  attracted  to  the  public  service.     If  it 


Democracy  and  Efficiency  51 

is  so  organized  as  to  discourage  the  candidature 
of  able  men,  an  inferior  type  of  elective  official 
will  result,  and  the  subordinate  administrative 
service  will  suffer  accordingly.  The  inquiry  into 
the  efficiency  of  the  commission  plan,  then,  may 
be  resolved  into  two  questions :  (i )  Will  the  new 
system  serve  to  attract  competent  men  into  the 
elective  offices  ?  (2)  Is  the  new  system  condu- 
cive to  the  application  of  approved  methods  to  the 
public  administration?  In  other  words,  is  it  so 
constructed  as  to  provide  for  the  performance 
of  the  actual  administrative  work  by  men  of 
technical  training  and  experience? 

That  a  higher  grade  of  municipal  official  has 
been  secured  under  commission  government  is 
obvious  from  the  higher  standard  of  public 
service,  which  even  opponents  of  the  new  govern- 
ment concede  has  obtained  under  the  new  plan. 
It  would  be  difficult  to  assign  any  one  cause  for 
this.  No  doubt  the  method  of  electing  the 
commissioners  at  large,  instead  of  by  wards,  has 
been  largely  responsible;  for  the  municipal 
election  is  thereby  made  less  susceptible  to 
control  by  the  ward  boss.  Thus,  under  election 
at  large,  the  political  leader  who  is  known  and 
recognized  by  the  general  electorate  has  an  im- 
measurable advantage  in  the  election  over  the 


52  Municipal  Freedom 

ward  leader  who  is  without  support  outside  the 
confines  of  his  own  ward — an  advantage  which 
tends  to  eliminate  the  latter  type  from  the  con- 
test. Log-rolling  is  commonly  regarded  as  the 
pernicious  accompaniment  of  the  ward  plan  of 
election,  but  log-rolling  in  itself  is  a  lesser  evil 
than  the  ward  type  of  municipal  candidate:  the 
domination  of  the  election  by  ward  politicians 
has  frequently  shut  out  the  higher  type  of 
political  leader  from  municipal  politics. 

However  important  a  factor  the  general  ticket 
plan  of  election  has  been  in  bringing  a  better 
grade  of  men  into  the  city's  service,  the  con- 
spicuous character  of  the  commissioner's  office 
has  probably  been  more  important;  for,  if  the 
elective  officer  under  the  commission  plan  had 
been  wrapped  in  the  same  obscurity  which 
gathered  around  the  old  municipal  officer,  it  is 
extremely  doubtful  whether  the  character  of  the 
pubHc  official  would  have  been  perceptibly 
changed.  On  this  point  the  experience  of 
American  cities  speaks  decisively.  Nothing 
has  been  more  influential  in  keeping  competent 
men  from  the  public  service  than  the  curtail- 
ment of  the  powers  of  municipal  officers  which 
took  place  during  the  latter  half  of  the  last 
century.     In  some  instances  these  powers  were 


Democracy  and  Efficiency  53 

juggled  by  the  state  legislature  in  the  interests  of 
the  dominant  party  in  the  state;  in  others  they 
were  distributed  among  a  number  of  newly 
created  officials,  no  one  of  whom  was  con- 
spicuous for  his  power  to  accomplish  results  in 
the  public  service — a  situation  likewise  dictated 
by  party  interests.  The  result  was  the  same  in 
either  case:  whether  the  powers  were  usurped  by 
the  state  legislature  or  divided  among  numerous 
municipal  officials,  the  individual  office  became 
less  important  and  the  type  of  incumbent  less 
efficient.  Thus  the  experience  of  these  3^ears 
proves  that  the  character  of  a  public  office  rises 
or  declines  according  as  the  powers  associated 
with  it  are  increased  or  curtailed.  It  is  this  fact 
which  furnishes  the  key  to  the  success  of  the 
commission  plan  in  attracting  worthier  men  into 
the  public  service. 

In  the  commission  government  the  public 
official  has  not  been  made  conspicuous  so  much 
because  of  any  cession  of  power  to  the  munici- 
pality by  the  legislature  as  because  of  the  con- 
centration in  a  small  governing  body  of  the 
powers  already  possessed  by  the  municipality, 
and  hitherto  exercised  by  a  large  number  of 
officials.  The  distinction  which  attaches  to 
the  commissioner's  office,  together  with  the  con- 


54  Municipal  Freedom 

sciousness  that  due  credit  for  individual  achieve- 
ment will  not  be  unnoted,  gives  to  the  position 
an  attractiveness  which  is  all  the  more  effective 
because  allegiance  to  the  ward  machine  is  not 
necessary  to  obtain  it.  "I  should  never  have 
presented  myself  as  a  candidate  for  city  office 
under  the  old  government  with  its  divided 
powers  and  doubtful  honors,"  declared  one  of 
the  commissioners  of  a  New  England  city.  Such 
men  are  not  anxious  to  hold  office  where  positive 
achievement  is  so  difficult  and  credit  for  what- 
ever is  accomplished  goes  to  nobody  in  particu- 
lar. 

It  must  not  be  inferred  from  what  has  been 
said  that  the  popular  political  leader  has  been 
eliminated  from  municipal  government  under 
the  commission  plan.  This  mistaken  inference 
has  been  the  ground  for  much  faulty  reasoning 
about  the  new  system,  and  has  probably  done 
more  than  anything  else  to  obscure  the  real  issue 
in  the  movement  for  commission  government. 
Thus  honest  political  leaders  and  their  followers 
are  frequently  prejudiced  against  the  new  sys- 
tem because  of  their  belief  that  its  object  is  to 
banish  the  popular  leader  from  municipal 
politics  and  to  substitute  for  him  the  so-called 
"  high-brow,"  or  "  silk-stocking,"  type.    Govern- 


Democracy  and  Efficiency  55 

ment  by  real  representatives  of  the  people  is  to 
be  superseded  by  government  by  the  "intel- 
lectual "  members  of  the  community.  The  same 
opinion  is  reflected  in  comments  upon  those 
commission-government  elections  in  which  a 
popular  political  leader  or  ex-official  has  been 
successful;  the  result  in  nine  cases  out  often  is 
regarded  as  a  "  reaction,"  a  sign  of  the  decay  of  a 
hitherto  promising  new  system. 

It  cannot  be  too  emphatically  stated  that  the 
assumption  of  those  who  believe  that  commission 
government  means  the  elimination  of  the  popu- 
lar poHtical  leader  is  as  mistaken  as  their  fears 
are  groundless.  Ever^rwhere  the  elections  in 
commission-governed  cities  bear  testimony  to 
the  truth  that  the  political  leader  will  be  elected 
under  a  system  of  universal  suffrage  regardless 
of  the  form  of  government.  The  most  widely 
known  and  most  successful  type  of  the  new  gov- 
ernments have  been  in  charge  of  men  of  this  type. 
Thus  the  people  of  Des  Moines,  in  the  first 
election  held  under  the  new  charter,  rejected 
the  slate  of  the  reform  element  which  had  been 
back  of  the  charter  movement,  and  placed  the 
new  government  in  charge  of  popular  leaders, 
who  had  been  opposed  to  the  new  system.  The 
people  of  Houston,  in  a  recent  election,  placed 


56  Municipal  Freedom 

on  the  commission  two  popular  politicians.  A 
majority  of  the  members  of  the  Haverhill  com- 
mission are  political  leaders  who  have  served 
under  the  old  government  in  that  city. 

These  cases  are  sufficiently  typical.  Commis- 
sion government  has  drawn  its  elective  officials 
from  the  class  of  sympathetic  political  leadership 
as  well  as  from  the  "reform"  or  "intellectual" 
elements  of  the  community.  It  would  perhaps  be 
accurate  to  say  that  the  new  system  has  generally 
meant  a  higher  grade  of  politicians  in  the  pubHc 
service.  "All  this  goes  to  show,"  writes  a 
Houston  citizen,  "that  such  a  thing  as  lifting 
municipal  government  from  the  level  of  politics 
is  an  iridescent  dream."  Perhaps  it  is  best  that 
this  should  be  so;  if  commission  government  can 
make  the  popular  leader  a  careful,  responsible 
supervisor  of  the  city's  business  it  will  do  what 
the  aldermanic  system  has  never  succeeded  in 
doing. 

The  logical  result  of  the  persistence  of  this 
political  habit  of  the  people  to  elect  the  popular 
poHtical  leader  to  public  office  has  been  usually 
the  intrusting  of  the  commission  governments  to 
men  of  sound  but  ordinary  ability.  Here  again 
we  encounter  the  mistaken  impression  which 
has  had  wide  currency  among  those  interested 


Democracy  and  Efficiency  57 

in  the  new  form  of  government,  that  the  com- 
mission governments  have  been  run  by  men  of 
extraordinary  personal  powers,  by  experts  in  ad- 
ministration. A  review  of  the  personnel  of  the 
new  governments  does  not  reveal  the  grounds 
for  this  assumption.  Even  the  commissions 
which  have  had  the  greatest  success  in  admin- 
istration— for  example,  Galveston,  Houston,  Des 
Moines,  Cedar  Rapids,  Salt  Lake  City,  and 
Haverhill — have  not  been  made  up  of  men  of 
unusual  attainments. 

An  appreciation  of  the  deep-rooted  tendency 
of  our  voters  to  place  their  cities  in  charge  of 
men  of  ordinary  ability  has  led  some  practical 
students  of  the  question  to  assert  that  the  com- 
mission plan  is  foreordained  to  failure  because 
it  provides  for  the  popular  election  of  the  city's 
administrative  department  heads.  "The  rock 
upon  which  American  cities  have  split  is  the 
popular  election  of  administrative  officials,"  a 
critic  observes.  The  objection  touches  on  the 
vital  problem  of  the  commission  government — 
what  the  exact  function  of  the  elected  com- 
missioner should  be. 

But,  in  the  present  stage  of  the  development 
of  commission  government,  it  is  not  possible  ac- 
curately to  designate  the  commissioner's  function 


58  Municipal  Freedom 

as  uniformly  supervisory  or  administrative.  In 
some  cities  he  is  in  effect  an  active  superintendent 
devoting  his  entire  time  to  the  details  of  his  de- 
partment; in  others  he  acts  in  a  supervisory, 
rather  than  administrative,  capacity,  and  the 
actual  work  of  the  department  is  carried  on  by 
subordinate  officials  of  technical  training  and  ex- 
perience. The  varying  charter  provisions,  some 
requiring  the  commissioner,  as  an  active  manager, 
to  devote  all  of  his  time  to  the  work  of  his  office, 
and  others  permitting  him,  as  a  supervisor,  to 
devote  but  a  part  of  his  time,  show  plainly  that 
the  real  nature  of  the  commissioner's  function 
is  not  quite  clear  even  in  the  minds  of  the  pro- 
ponents of  the  new  system. 

Still,  it  is  eminently  important  to  the  success 
of  the  new  system  that  the  nature  of  the  com- 
missioner's function  as  head  of  one  of  the  city's 
administrative  divisions  should  be  clearly  de- 
fined and  understood.  This  necessity  results 
from  the  experience  of  American  cities  with  the 
problem  of  administration.  Few  will  deny 
that  the  method,  prevalent  in  every  American 
state,  of  selecting  municipal  administrative  and 
technical  officials  by  popular  vote,  has  been  a 
stumbling  block  in  the  path  of  our  unfortunate 
cities.     The   most   vicious   legacy  which   Jack- 


Democracy  and  Efficiency  59 

sonian  Democracy  bequeathed  to  American 
politics,  profoundly  influencing  the  political 
ideas  and  methods  of  our  people  during  the 
first  half  of  the  last  century,  was  the  belief  that 
the  selection  of  administrative  officials  by  ap- 
pointment and  for  a  permanent  tenure  meant 
the  growth  of  a  class  of  office-holding  bureau- 
crats, and  that  the  democratic  doctrine  of  equal 
opportunity  demanded  that  all  should  have  a 
turn  or  a  chance  at  public  office.  This  then 
novel  application  of  the  democratic  principle, 
exemplified  in  the  Federal  service  by  the  spoils 
system,  led,  in  the  state  and  local  governments, 
to  the  popular  election  for  short  terms  of  purely 
administrative  officials.  It  is  a  curious  fact 
that  the  state  governments,  which  imitated  the 
Federal  system  in  most  respects,  have  often  de- 
parted from  it  in  one  of  its  most  important  fea- 
tures— the  centralization  of  the  administrative 
service  in  the  hands  of  the  chief  executive. 

In  application  this  principle  did  not  lead  to 
the  expected  results.  Experience  proved  that 
to  exercise  intelligence  and  discrimination  m 
the  selection  of  numerous  officials  was  beyond 
the  power  of  the  voters;  especially  was  a  wise 
selection  of  expert  administrative  officials  im- 
practicable in  view  of  the  natural  inability  of 


6o  Municipal  Freedom 

the  ordinary  voter  to  judge  of  the  technical 
qualifications  of  the  different  candidates  for  the 
place.  The  logical  result  followed:  the  voter, 
in  his  confusion  and  helplessness,  came  to  de- 
pend upon  the  party  organization,  which  now 
assumed  the  selective  function  supposed  to  be 
exercised  by  the  voters — an  excellent  illustration 
of  the  soundness  of  the  political  maxim  that  a 
system  of  government  which  gives  to  the  voters 
a  power  which  they  are  not  able  to  exercise 
takes  from  them  that  powder. 

Popular  selection  meant  party  selection  in  such 
a  case,  and  party  selection  was  based  upon  con- 
siderations oi  availability y  not  of  efficiency.  The 
best  candidate  for  the  office  requiring  technical 
skill  and  trainingwas,  from  the  point  of  viewof  the 
politicians,  not  the  man  whose  experience  fitted 
him  for  the  place,  but  the  party  worker  whose 
usefulness  to  the  "organization"  might  be  con- 
veniently recognized  and  retained  by  giving  him 
the  office.  Essentially,  the  failure  of  the  Jack- 
sonian  political  builders  in  thus  modifying  the 
earlier  political  system  was  a  failure  to  distin- 
guish between  political  functions  and  functions 
of  a  purely  administrative  or  technical  nature: 
in  its  willingness  to  sacrifice  efficiency  to  de- 
mocracy, the  method  secured  neither;  effective 


Democracy  and  Efficiency  6i 

popular   control   of  public   officials   became   as 
impracticable  as  administrative  efficiency. 

The  municipal  needs  of  the  present  day  are 
stronger  than  ever  in  their  demand  for  a  system 
which  will  insure  administration  by  experts. 
The  increasing  social  and  economic  complexity 
of  modern  urban  life  has  entailed  burdens  and 
obligations  hitherto  unknown  to  local  govern- 
ment, and  if  the  work  of  meeting  these  needs 
is  not  carried  on  with  the  assistance  of  per- 
manent experts  the  cities  must  fail  in  their  ob- 
ligations. At  the  same  time  it  is  plain  that 
government  by  experts  alone  is  undesirable  and 
out  of  harmony  with  American  political  ideas. 
A  staff  of  permanent  officials  which  is  out  of 
touch  with  the  electorate  tends  to  develop  into  a 
professional  bureaucracy  tied  up  with  red  tape 
and  unresponsive  to  the  popular  will  and  needs. 
It  is  therefore  necessary  that  the  expert  should 
be  under  the  constant  supervision  of  the  layman, 
who  will  thus  form  a  connecting  link  between 
the  professional  staff  and  the  people.  In  this 
\yay  the  permanent  official  will  be  brought  into 
contact  with  the  needs  of  the  people,  and  the 
people,  through  their  elected  supervisors,  will 
possess  the  means  of  controlling  the  permanent 
official.     As  President  Lowell,  of  Harvard,  put 


62  Municipal  Freedom 

it    at    a    meeting    of  the   National   Municipal 
League: 

"The  current  management,  and,  for  the  most 
part,  the  suggestion  of  improvements  ought  to 
lie  with  the  expert,  but  he  ought  to  work  under 
the  constant  supervision  and  control  of  unpro- 
fessional men  representing  the  community  at 
large.  The  expert  ought  to  devote  his  whole 
time  to  the  business  and  receive  a  salary  high 
enough  to  pay  for  the  whole  time  of  a  man  with 
the  capacity  required.  The  person  who  over- 
sees him  ought  to  be  expected  to  give  far  less 
of  his  time.  If  he  gives  much  it  is  because  he 
undertakes  to  do  himself  what  had  better  be 
left  to  experts.  .  .  .  His  duty  is  not  to 
administer,  but  to  supervise  and  direct  the 
administration." 

It  is  precisely  this  adjustment  between  the 
professional  and  lay  elements  in  the  government 
which  has  been  responsible  for  the  marked  suc- 
cess of  the  English  borough  governments.  As 
in  the  commission  plan,  the  legislative  and 
administrative  powers  of  the  English  borough 
are  vested  in  the  council,  which  is  the  sole  gov- 
erning authority.  The  actual  work  of  admin- 
istration is  carried  on  by  a  permanent  staff  of 
experts  acting  under  the  supervision  and  control 


Democracy  and  Efficiency  63 

of  standing  committees  of  the  council.  Thus 
the  watch  committee  supervises  the  poHce  ad- 
ministration of  the  Enghsh  borough.  In  the 
same  manner  the  hbrary  and  school  boards  of 
American  cities  have  been  for  several  years  su- 
pervising, with  distinct  success,  the  permanent 
corps  of  experts  in  charge  of  the  public  libraries 
and  schools.  We  are  not  compelled,  therefore, 
to  subscribe  to  any  new  or  untried  principle  in 
advocating  municipal  administration  by  a  per- 
manent staff  of  experts  working  under  the  di- 
rection of  elective  laymen. 

The  principle  of  an  elective  supervisor}^  official 
is  clearly  in  harmony  with  what  American  and 
English  experience  has  shown  to  be  the  most 
effective  working  principle  that  may  be  applied 
to  the  government  of  cities  in  a  democracy. 
The  member  of  the  governing  council  in  the 
commission  city,  being  an  elective  official,  can- 
not be  expected  to  be  an  expert  official.  Indeed, 
experts  will  never  accept  an  office  of  such  un- 
certain tenure  as  that  subject  to  the  fluctuating 
influence  of  politics.  The  commissioner  may  be 
an  efficient,  unprofessional,  supervisory  official, 
however,  acting  in  the  same  capacity  as  the 
English  council  committee:  and  in  such  a  capac- 
ity he  will   reach   his  maximum   efficiency.     It 


64  Municipal  Freedom 

is  its  clear  recognition  of  this  truth  that  makes 
the  commission-manager  plan  a  constructive 
modification  of  the  commission  system.  Under 
such  clearly  defined  distribution  of  functions 
between  the  elective  and  the  permanent  official, 
each  official  will  exercise  that  kind  of  function 
for  which  he  is  best  fitted.  This  proposition, 
clearly  understood,  settles  the  crucial  point  in 
the  problem  of  commission  government. 

If  the  commissioner's  function  is  defined  as 
supervisory  with  respect  to  his  relation  to  the 
administrative  service,  the  question  may  arise: 
Will  it  not  now  become  necessary  to  have  a  per- 
manent expert  department  head  working  under 
the  supervising  commissioner?  This  question 
must  be  decided  with  reference  to  the  charac- 
ter of  the  commissioner's  duties.  In  the  small 
city,  where  the  affairs  of  the  different  divisions 
of  the  department  are  left  to  the  charge  of  the 
subordinate  officials,  these  duties  would  be  com- 
paratively light,  and  only  the  general  direction 
of  the  activities  should  rest  with  the  commis- 
sioner. Under  such  circumstances  the  commis- 
sioner would  be  able  to  direct  the  work  without 
the  aid  of  a  permanent  head.  It  is  probable, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  the  work  of  directing 
one  of  the  great  departments  of  the  large  city 


Democracy  and  Efficiency  65 

would  be  too  onerous  and  too  complex  for  the 
layman  to  discharge  without  the  aid  of  a  per- 
manent administrative  head,  in  which  case  it 
would  be  found  necessary  to  institute  the  per- 
manent official. 

/)Vhen  it  has  become  definitely  understood 
tnat  the  proper  functions  of  the  commission 
should  be  legislative  and  supervisory,  and  not 
administrative,  charter  framers  desiring  to  con- 
struct upon  the  commission  model  will  have  a 
well-understood  basis  upon  which  to  work,  and 
questions  which  frequently  perplex  them  at  the 
present  time  will  take  care  of  themselves.  For 
example,  one  of  the  mooted  questions  at  present 
is  whether  the  commissioner  should  be  required 
to  give  his  whole  time  or  only  a  part  of  it.  If 
by  the  charter  expected  to  spend  his  whole  time 
in  the  public  service,  obviously  he  is  to  become 
an  active  superintendent,  attending  to  the  nu- 
merous details  of  his  department,  so  that  any 
other  occupation  than  that  of  the  city  would 
entail  negligence  and  inefficiency.  The  present 
tendency  toward  the  high-salaried  commissioner, 
devoting  all  his  time  to  the  office,  would  seem 
to  indicate  that  the  elective  department  head  is 
coming  to  be  looked  upon  as  an  active  superin- 
tendent, rather  than  a  supervisory  head.     But 


66  Municipal  Freedom 

to  pay  him  a  high  salary  and  require  all  his  time 
practically  prevents  the  use  of  a  highly  paid  sub- 
ordinate, upon  whom  the  success  of  the  adminis- 
tration primarily  depends.  The  commission  can 
attain  its  maximum  efficiency  only  by  assuming 
a  supervisory  attitude  toward  the  administra- 
tive service. 
w1  /With  the  development  of  the  commission  plan 
\\r  t/nto  a  more  distinctly  supervisory  character,  the 
\  American  people  will  have  worked  out  a  system 
of  city  government  which  does  not  differ  in 
essential  principles  from  that  with  which  they 
started  out,  the  council  plan.  The  machinery 
of  the  commission  government  is  more  central- 
ized and  more  responsive,  but  the  relation  be- 
tween the  elective  official  and  the  permanent 
administrative  staff  is  common  to  both  systems. 
It  is  upon  these  principles  that  the  permanent 
efficiency  of  the  commission  government  must 
rest,  just  as  it  was  a  disregard  of  these  principles 
that  caused  in  a  large  measure  the  failure  of  the 
reform  municipal  systems  of  the  past  thirty 
years.  If  the  commission  plan  is  made  to  con- 
form strictly  to  these  principles,  there  is  reason 
to  believe  that  it  will  not  become,  as  some  be- 
lieve, the  subject  of  a  tale  "full  of  sound  and 
fury,  signifying  nothing." 


CHAPTER   IV 

FIXING  RESPONSIBILITY 

No  ONE  will  deny  that  the  present  municipal 
awakening  is  bearing  fruit  in  constructive  munic- 
ipal effort.  There  have  been  stirrings  of  the 
municipal  conscience  before,  but  always  the 
registering  of  a  political  protest  was  the  only 
result;  the  political  machinery  of  the  city  would 
be  patched  up  and  a  respectable  set  of  men 
placed  in  charge  of  the  bolstered-up  mechanism, 
which  would  now  be  expected  automatically  to 
insure  good  government.  The  present  awaken- 
ing is  more  than  a  protest;  it  is  a  protest  com- 
bined with  a  constructive  policy.  This  time 
there  is  no  mere  patching  of  the  machinery, 
tempered  with  care  not  to  molest  the  sacred 
principle  of  checks  and  balances  on  which  it  was 
built;  rather  is  there  the  constructing  of  a  new 
machine  on  a  new  principle. 

That  new  principle  is  centralization.  All 
legislative  powers  in  the  commission  government 
are  lodged  in  a  small  council;  and  the  organiza- 

67 


68  Municipal  Freedom 

tion  of  each  of  the  administrative  departments 
is  centraHzed  under  the  authority  of  a  single 
council  member,  who  in  turn  is  subject  to  the 
supervision  of  the  council.  It  is  this  centralized 
character  that  has  inspired  the  highest  praise  of 
the  advocates,  as  well  as  the  bitterest  attacks  of 
the  opponents  of  the  new  system. 

No  one  familiar  with  the  practical  working  of 
the  ordinary  city  government  in  the  United 
States  would  deny  that  its  greatest  weakness 
lies  in  its  senseless  division  of  powers  among 
numerous  authorities.  Glancing  at  the  history 
of  American  municipal  development,  one  is 
struck  with  the  fidelity  with  which  the  principle 
of  divided  powers  has  remained  the  underlying 
basis  of  that  development.  Regarded  as  the 
most  efficient  political  principle  making  for  in- 
dividual liberty,  this  tenet  of  eighteenth-century 
French  political  philosophy,  already  thriving  in 
many  of  the  colonial  governments,  was  seized 
upon  by  the  framers  of  our  Federal  Constitu- 
tion and  made  the  basic  principle  of  that  great 
charter.  That  the  same  principle  should  be  ap- 
plied in  the  reorganization  of  the  state  govern- 
ments after  the  formation  of  the  Union  does  not 
arouse  wonder,  since  the  states  were  then  re- 
garded as  small  nations,  as  far  as  the  character 


Fixing  Responsibility  69 

of  their  functions  was  concerned.  Neither  is 
it  to  be  regarded  as  phenomenal  that  the  same 
principle  should  have  speedily  found  its  way 
into  the  rapidly  developing  sphere  of  municipal 
government,  since  the  character  of  the  municipal 
problemwasnot  then  clear.  Long  yearsofdearly 
bought  experience  were  to  intervene  before  the 
mistake  of  building  a  municipal  system  on  this 
principle  was  to  become  clear  to  the  people.  In- 
deed, the  lesson  is  not  at  this  late  date  fully 
grasped  by  a  majority  of  our  urban  population. 
It  can  never  be  said  of  the  American  people 
that  they  have  not  had  full  faith  in  the  principle 
which  they  made  the  foundation  of  their  Fed- 
eral system.  They  carried  that  principle  into 
their  state  governments;  and  at  last  they  made 
it  the  foundation  of  their  municipal  structures. 
Like  the  National  Government,  the  city  was 
given  its  legislature,  its  executive,  and  its  ju- 
diciary; like  the  National  Government,  it  re- 
ceived its  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives, 
though  under  different  names;  like  the  Federal 
executive,  its  executive  could  not  exercise  his 
powers  of  appointment  without  the  consent  of 
a  legislative  chamber;  like  the  Federal  legisla- 
ture, it  could  not  exercise  its  legislative  powers 
without  the  cooperation  of  the  executive. 


JO  Municipal  Freedom 

It  is  plain  that  the  thought  never  occurred  to 
the  framers  of  our  early  city  governments  that 
there  might  be  a  difference  in  nature  between 
Federal  and  municipal  functions;  a  clearer  under- 
standing of  the  functions  of  the  municipalitywould 
have  revealed  the  need  for  a  system  organized 
primarily  with  a  view"  to  administrative  rather 
than  legislative  efficiency.  "The  Americans," 
wrote  Mr.  Bryce,"  failed  to  adapt  their  institutions 
to  conditions  in  their  municipal  development." 

Experience  soon  proved  that  the  principle  of 
checks  and  balances,  under  the  conditions  of 
American  urban  life,  was  efficient  neither  as  a 
basis  for  a  legislative  organ  nor  as  a  foundation 
for  an  administrative  organ.  A  decentralized 
machinery,  designed  to  prevent  arbitrary  and 
ill-advised  action,  only  served  to  make  im- 
possible positive  and  effective  action  when  the 
interests  of  the  people  demanded  it.  Thus  the 
system  failed  to  prevent  the  arbitrary  granting 
away  of  the  most  valuable  properties  of  the 
people  in  the  form  of  franchises;  an  adequate 
sanitary  system,  a  sound  financial  policy,  and  a 
constructive  policy  of  public  improvements  were 
equally  visionary.  The  expected  "god-out-of- 
the-machine"  failed  to  appear  to  rescue  the  city 
from  its  difficulties. 


Fixing  Responsibility  71 

And  since  the  concomitant  of  divided  au- 
thority is  divided  responsibility,  it  became  im- 
possible to  fix  the  blame  for  legislative  corruption 
and  incompetency.  So  glaring  became  the  in- 
efficiency of  municipal  legislative  bodies  that 
the  system  was  modified  in  the  closing  quarter 
of  the  last  century  by  the  creation  of  the  so- 
called  Board  System.  Functions  which  had 
been  misused  by  the  executive  and  legislative 
branches  were  now  intrusted  to  separate  boards, 
which  became  in  a  large  measure  independent 
authorities.  The  defects  of  the  principle  of  dis- 
tributed powers  were  to  be  cured  by  a  further 
appUcation  of  the  same  principle!  What  was 
sorely  needed  was  a  centralization  of  municipal 
machinery;  what  was  got  was  a  further  decentral- 
ization. Division  among  a  few  became  division 
among  a  multitude  of  semi-independent  branches, 
no  one  of  which  could  accomplish  anything  with- 
out the  cooperation  of  the  others. 

As  an  administrative  organ  the  defects  of  this 
decentralized  system  have  been  not  less  pal- 
pable. If  the  mayor  jobbed  his  patronage  and 
filled  the  administrative  offices  with  incompetent 
officials,  he  could  excuse  himself  by  saying  that 
the  confirming  branch  would  not  have  approved 
his  selections;  if  he  failed  to  maintain   a   high 


72  Municipal  Freedom 

standard  in  the  city's  departments,  he  could  com- 
plain that  the  legislative  branches  had  refused 
to  support  him  with  the  necessary  supplies. 
Even  a  competent  official  was  powerless  to 
accomplish  anything  in  the  public  service  with- 
out the  cooperation  of  other  authorities,  and 
these  could  refuse  to  cooperate.  Mr.  Bryce 
found  that  in  Philadelphia  seven  different 
authorities  had  the  power  to  tear  up  the  pave- 
ments, and  no  one  of  these  possessed  the  specific 
duty  to  put  them  down  again.  Similar  examples 
may  be  found  in  almost  any  city  that  has  been 
governed  under  the  senseless  system  of  dis- 
tributed powers. 

Of  course  it  would  not  be  correct  to  attribute 
the  whole  of  our  municipal  misrule  to  the  in- 
adequate system  which  has  been  described.  It 
may  not  be  unreasonable  to  say  that  if  we  had 
possessed  a  perfect  form  of  municipal  organi- 
zation Mr.  Bryce  might  still  have  been  able  to 
write  of  "the  one  conspicuous  failure."  The 
conditions  of  American  politics  would  doubtless 
have  rendered  any  municipal  system  partly  in- 
effective. The  full  significance  of  the  municipal 
problem  had  not  dawned  on  the  political  con- 
sciousness of  the  people;  their  political  energies 
were   centred   in  the  field  of  national  politics, 


Fixing  Responsibility  73 

where  the  great  problems  of  the  nation's  develop- 
ment occupied  the  centre  of  the  stage. 

It  was  not  without  the  tacit  assent  of  the 
people  that  the  national  political  parties  ex- 
ploited the  municipalities  to  strengthen  their 
own  organizations;  there  was  a  general  feeling 
that  anything  w^s  justified  which  contributed  to 
the  fighting  strength  of  these  great  organizations 
which  were  endeavoring  to  work  out  the  tre- 
mendously serious  problems  of  our  national  life. 
The  important  point,  so  far  as  the  question  of 
municipal  system  is  concerned,  is  that  the  plan 
of  checks  and  balances,  then  as  now,  played  into 
the  hands  of  the  most  sinister  influences  of 
American  politics,  facilitating  municipal  misrule, 
and  rendering  insurmountably  difficult  the  efforts 
of  those  who  were  striving  for  permanent  im- 
provement. 

Moreover,  because  of  the  popular  belief  that  a 
decentralized  system  was  self-acting  in  its  pro- 
tection of  the  democratic  principle,  this  system 
served  to  prolong  the  apathy  of  the  municipal 
electorate  and  to  postpone  realization  of  the 
truth  that  "no  charter  is  a  self-executing  in- 
strument of  righteousness,"  and  that  eternal 
vigilance  is  always  the  price  of  good  govern- 
ment.    If  its  plan  of  shifting  the  responsibility 


74  Municipal  Freedom 

for  municipal  misrule  upon  the  voters  of  the 
city,  making  an  eternal  demand  upon  their 
vigilance,  were  the  sole  merit  of  the  commission 
government,  it  would  still  deserve  the  admira- 
tion of  all  friends  of  good  government. 

But  its  refusal  automatically  to  insure  good 
administration  without  the  aid  of  a  wholesome 
public  sentiment  is  not  the  sole  merit  of  the  new 
system.  It  creates  an  efficient  mechanism  for 
the  administration  of  municipal  business.  The 
small  size  of  the  governing  council  permits  a 
rapidity  of  action  and  thoroughness  of  execution 
that  are  sorely  needed  in  the  management  of 
the  affairs  of  a  city.  The  centralization  of  ma- 
chinery, characteristic  of  the  organization  of 
each  of  the  departments,  obviates  the  necessity 
for  the  cooperation  of  numerous  officials  in 
order  to  get  anything  done.  Before  the  adop- 
tion of  the  commission  plan  in  Cedar  Rapids  it 
took  a  real-estate  dealer  six  months  to  get  a 
plat  of  a  new  subdivision  approved  for  his  firm; 
under  the  subsequently  installed  commission 
government  it  took  the  same  dealer  one  day  to 
get  a  similar  plat  approved.  This  is  but  one  of 
a  hundred  instances  that  could  be  cited  in 
illustration  to  show  the  superiority  of  the  com- 
mission government  as  an  administrative  organ. 


Fixing  Responsibility  75 

Well  did  a  publicist  declare  that  "administrative 
skill,  to  be  effective,  must  be  centralized." 

But  efficiency  not  only  arises  from  the  power 
of  effective  action;  it  flows  also  from  the  stimulus 
to  effective  action,  and  this  stimulus  is  furnished 
in  the  new  plan,  by  the  definite  centring  of 
responsibility.  The  elective  members  of  the 
council,  according  to  experience,  are  spurred  to 
their  best  effort  by  the  consciousness  that  public 
attention  is  centred  on  them,  and  that  they  will 
be  held  to  render  an  account  of  their  steward- 
ship. So  effective  an  incentive  has  this  central- 
ization proved  in  commission-governed  cities 
that  politicians  of  mediocre  ability,  elected  to 
office  under  the  commission  plan,  have  de- 
veloped unexpected  efficiency.  "  If  I  find  when  I 
start  to  my  work  in  the  morning  that  the  streets 
are  unclean,  I  know  who  is  responsible,"  declares 
a  Galveston  citizen.  I^The  fact  of  this  citizen's 
knowledge  is  not  nearly  so  important  as  the  fact 
that  the  Commissioner  of  Streets  and  Public 
Property  is  aware  that  the  citizen  knows  who  is 
responsible.  "We  went  to  Commissioner  Ha- 
mery,"  writes  a  DesMoines  citizen,"  and  told  him 
he  was  responsible  for  the  red-light  district,  and 
that  district  was  v/iped  out."  ^The  commission 
government  has  been  sensitive  to  public  opinion. 


76  Municipal  Freedom 

Doubt  has  been  expressed  by  some  excellent 
people  whether  the  small  governing  body 
created  by  the  commission  charter  will  furnish 
a  genuine  representation  of  the  interests  of  the 
city,  and,  in  the  light  of  our  hitherto  accepted 
theories  of  representation,  the  question  is  deserv- 
ing of  consideration.  Nevertheless,  it  is  to  be 
remembered  in  this  connection  that  a  small 
council  has  generally  been  found  from  experience 
to  be  more  genuinely  representative  than  a  large 
council.  A  governing  body  is  to  be  declared 
representative,  not  on  a  basis  of  its  size,  but  on  a 
basis  of  its  acts,  its  responsiveness  to  the  pop- 
ular will.  It  is  not  the  size  of  the  council,  but 
the  size  of  the  men  who  constitute  it  and  the 
position  in  which  they  are  placed,  that  deter- 
mines whether  the  government  will  be  really 
representative  of  the  people  on  whom  it  operates. 
.  And,  finally,  the  element  of  simplicity  is  em- 
bodied in  the  commission  plan.  Perhaps  one  of 
the  greatest  dangers  to  democratic  government 
arises  from  the  inherent  tendency  of  all  govern- 
ment to  become  increasingly  complex.  As  long 
as  the  government  is  simple  of  operation  there 
is  good  reason  to  believe  that  democracy  may 
be  made  to  endure,  for  the  people  will  be  able 
themselves  to  control  it.     But  when  the  mechan- 


Fixing  Responsibility  77 

ism  of  government  becomes  so  complex  as  to 
require  a  class  of  political  specialists  tooperateit, 
the  function  of  the  people  becomes  extinct,  and 
with  the  passing  of  the  means  of  control  will 
pass  the  control  itself.  The  great  problem,  then, 
is  how  to  organize  the  machinery  of  government 
so  as  to  provide  for  the  efficient  administration 
of  the  increasingly  complex  public  business,  and 
at  the  same  time  preserve  for  the  people  the 
function  of  controlling  that  machinery. 
|/ The  commission  plan  appears  to  oflFer  an  effec- 
tive solution  as  far  as  municipal  government  is 
concerned.  If  the  government  outlined  in  this 
charter  is  efficient  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
administrative  official,  who  is  no  longer  harassed 
by  checks  and  balances,  but  is  given  ample 
power  to  accomplish  something  for  the  public 
interest,  it  is  also  simple  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  citizen  who  is  no  longer  bewildered  by 
the  tanglewoodof  machinery  which  has  been  mis- 
called "democratic."  IxThe  citizen's  function  is 
simple:  it  is  to  choose  at  stated  times  a  few  men 
to  direct  the  administration,  and  to  keep  himself 
informed  as  to  the  manner  in  which  these  trustees 
are  performing  their  work.  He  will  be  able  to 
choose  these  officers  intelligently  because  there 
are  but  few  to  choose;  and  he  will  be  able  to 


78  Municipal  Freedom 

know  whether  they  are  doing  the  task  set  for 
them  because  of  the  small  numberto  be  watched, 
the  definiteness  of  their  duties,  and  the  methods 
of  publicity  which  the  charter  enforces  upon 
them. 


CHAPTER  V 

CHANGING  MUNICIPAL  ORGANIZA- 
TION TO  PRESERVE  MUNICIPAL 
DEMOCRACY 

*PThe  commission  plan  of  city  government  is 
un-American  and  un-democratic;  it  is  a  revolu- 
tionary departure  from  American  political  ideals 
that  can  be  justified  only  on  the  ground  that  an 
absolute  oligarchy  is  the  best  form  of  govern- 
ment on  earth."  This  striking  sentiment  was 
expressed  at  a  recent  hearing  by  the  joint  com- 
mittee of  a  New  England  legislature  on  a  per- 
missive bill  giving  certain  cities  of  the  state 
power  to  adopt  the  commission  form  of  govern- 
ment. The  author  of  the  statement  was  a 
politician  known  throughout  the  state  in  whose 
assembly  he  serves;  but  the  same  sentiment  has 
been  expressed  by  a  profound  student  of  politics 
and  law  at  present  occupying  a  professor's  chair 
in  a  famous  law  school.  Ever\'Avhere  the  ques- 
tion of  adopting  the  new  form  of  government 
comes  up  it  meets  the  eternal  objection  of  being 

79 


8o  Municipal  Freedom 

un-American  and  out  of  harmony  with  our  politi- 
cal ideals,  and  everywhere  this  objection  recruits 
votes  for  the  opposition. 

What  weight  should  be  given  to  this  charge? 
How  does  the  foremost  municipal  tendency  of 
the  decade  square  with  the  American  political 
tradition?  Is  the  new  plan  oligarchical,  un- 
representative, and  dangerous,  as  its  enemies 
assert?  The  question,  although  it  has  received 
little  or  no  consideration  from  the  proponents 
of  the  new  government,  is  nevertheless  a  fair  one 
among  a  people  committed  to  democratic  insti- 
tutions. 
/  >^What  is  the  basis  of  the  indictment  against 
the  commission  government?  Fundamentally, 
it  is  that  the  new  government  is  not  built  on 
the  principle  of  the  division  of  powers;  any  sys- 
tem of  government  which  concentrates  all 
powers  in  a  small  number  of  persons,  it  is  as- 
serted, is  oligarchical.  But,  it  may  be  observed, 
that  the  first  requisite  of  an  oligarchical  system 
is  that  absolute  powers  shall  be  vested  in  the 
governing  body.  Now,  the  commission  plan 
does  not  lodge  absolute  power  in  the  governing 
organ.  By  the  Des  Moines  charter  all  admin- 
istrative powers  are  vested  in  the  governing 
council,  but  all  legislative  powers  are  lodged  in 


Changing  Municipal  Organization        8i 

the  council  a^id  the  people,  by  means  of  the  in- 
itiative and  referendum.  A  significant  and  vital 
feature  of  the  commission  system  is  that  the 
people  may  exercise  directly  any  legislative 
power,  and  that  the  council  is  permitted  to 
exercise  an  important  legislative  power  only 
when  it  is  supported  in  its  action  by  public  senti- 
ment. An  oligarchy  does  not  rest  upon  the 
people.  In  one  sense,  the  commission  plan  is 
a  government  of  divided  powers;  the  important 
legislative  powers  are  divided  between  the  coun- 
cil and  the  people.  But  there  is  no  division  of 
powers  as  in  the  aldermanic  system. 

The  charge  that  the  centralized  character  of 
the  commission  government  stamps  it  as  oli- 
garchical is  further  weakened  by  the  fact  that  it 
has  many  times  been  recognized  in  American 
government  that  where  power  is  centralized  in 
responsible  hands  there  is  no  danger  of  tyranni- 
cal rule.  The  New  England  town-meeting 
system,  which  has  been  called  the  most  perfect 
form  of  democracy  ever  practised,  lodges  all 
important  municipal  powers  in  a  small  board  of 
selectmen  between  the  annual  meetings  of  the 
voters;  the  important  powers  of  the  present 
New  York  government  are  vested  in  a  single 
board — the  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportion- 


82  Municipal  Freedom 

ment;  and  the  broad  powers  vested  in  the  presi- 
dency of  the  nation  led  the  eminent  publicist, 
Henry  Jones  Ford,  to  call  that  office  "an  elective 
kingship."  The  principle  of  centralized  power 
in  the  United  States  is  older  than  the  commission 
government,  and  will  probably  outlive  it. 

Those  who  criticise  the  commission  system 
of  city  government  because  of  its  centralized 
character  forget  that  a  legal  distribution  of 
power  among  different  authorities,  such  as 
obtains  in  the  ordinary  American  municipality, 
by  no  means  insures  a  real  distribution  of  power. 
Who  will  deny  that  in  most  American  cities  the 
real  power  has  been  exercised  by  a  few  self- 
constituted  rulers,  who  generally  have  had  no 
official  connection  with  the  government.^  Ex- 
perience tells  us  that,  though  the  power  may  be 
divided  in  the  government,  it  will,  nevertheless, 
be  concentrated  outside  the  government;  the 
traditional  American  system  designed  to  insure 
government  by  the  many,  inevitably  under 
American  municipal  conditions,  means  govern- 
ment by  the  few. 

And  yet  it  is  not  the  idea  of  concentration 
that  is  at  fault;  the  weakness  of  the  present 
system  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  power  is  concen- 
trated in  irresponsible  hands.     American  experi- 


Changing  Municipal  Organization        83 

ence  would  seem  to  say  that  city  government 
by  the  few  is  inevitable,  and  that  the  question 
to  consider  is  whether  those  few  who  do  the 
governing  shall  be  made  responsible  officials 
under  popular  control,  or  irresponsible  politicians 
not  under  popular  control.  The  commission 
government  rests  upon  the  theory  that  the 
governing  few  should  be  responsible,  that  mu- 
nicipal power  should  be  concentrated — but  not 
in  an  irresponsible  Cox,  Ruef,  or  "Bathhouse 
John." 

The  charge  that  the  commission  plan  is  un- 
representative rests  upon  the  smallness  of  the 
governing  body  and  the  provision  for  the  elec- 
tion at  large  of  the  members.  A  genuinely  rep- 
resentative council,  it  is  said,  must  contain  more 
than  five  members,  and  the  members  must 
be  chosen  by  wards.  How  can  the  different 
municipal  interests  be  represented  by  such  a 
small  council  as  that  created  by  the  commission 
charter.^ 

"It  will  be  found  that  the  greater  the  number 
of  legislators,  the  fewer  will  be  the  number  of 
those  who  actually  direct  and  control  the  pro- 
ceedings," wrote  Alexander  Hamilton,  in  the 
"Federalist."  Our  municipal  experience  has 
proved   the  wisdom   of  this   observation    made 


84  Municipal  Freedom 

more  than  a  century  ago.  The  large  legislative 
body,  instead  of  being  more  representative,  is 
even  less  representative  than  the  small  one,  for 
it  does  not  feel  that  responsibility  which  weighs 
upon  the  small  body,  holding  its  members  to  a 
keener  sense  of  duty.  It  is  not  the  size,  but  the 
acts  of  the  council  that  determine  whether  it 
is  representative  or  unrepresentative. 

And  it  is  rather  late  in  the  day  to  assert  the 
superiority  of  the  ward  plan  of  election.  If  our 
political  experience  proves  anything,  it  proves 
that  the  ward  system  of  election  means  legisla- 
tion in  the  interest  of  particular  wards  rather 
than  legislation  in  the  general  interests  of  the 
city.  The  ward  plan  encourages  the  councilman 
to  demand  from  the  city  all  he  can  get  for  his 
own  ward,  regardless  of  the  effect  on  the  in- 
terests of  the  city  as  a  whole.  The  plan  of  elec- 
tion at  large  encourages  him  to  act  in  the 
interest  of  the  city  as  a  whole  without  regard 
to  the  selfish  desires  of  any  particular  ward. 
Under  the  ward  system  municipal  legislation 
becomes  a  matter  of  barter  and  trade  and  the 
municipal  legislature  an  arena  for  the  contend- 
ing, selfish  interests  of  local  districts. 

Again  the  domination  of  the  municipal  elec- 
tion by  the  ward  politicians  has  been  an  effective 


Changing  Municipal  Organization        85 

preventive  to  the  participation  on  any  extensive 
scale  of  the  higher  type  of  poHtical  leader  in 
municipal  politics.  The  ward  system  of  election 
in  city  government  means  the  ward  type  of 
official  in  city  office.  To  the  truth  of  this  prop- 
osition the  higher  grade  of  officials  which  has 
been  attracted  to  the  commission  governments 
under  the  general  ticket  plan  of  election  abun- 
dantly attests.  It  would  be  incorrect  to  say 
that  the  plan  of  election  at  large  accounted  for 
the  success  of  the  commission  government;  it 
would  be  equally  incorrect  to  say  that  it  was 
not  an  element  in  that  success. 

That  a  small  municipal  governing  body, 
elected  at  large,  should  be  inherently  unrep- 
resentative is  further  disproved  by  the  whole 
trend  of  contemporary  political  experience. 
Time  and  time  again  a  single  elective  officer  has 
reflected  public  opinion  more  faithfully  than  a 
large  body  of  elective  representatives.  Who 
would  contend  that  the  New  York  legislature  in 
recent  years  expressed  more  accurately  the 
popular  desire  than  Charles  E.  Hughes?  Who 
would  say  that  the  legislature  of  Missouri  was 
more  representative  of  the  people  of  Missouri 
than  Joseph  Folk.?  Did  President  Roosevelt  or 
the  ninety-two  Federal  senators  express  the  will 


86  Municipal  Freedom 

of  the  American  people  during  the  years  1901-8? 
The  whole  trend  of  contemporary  American  poli- 
tics points  to  a  growing  recognition  of  the  ef- 
ficiency of  a  single  political  principle:  the  cen- 
tralization of  power  in  responsible  hands.  And 
municipal  experience,  like  national  and  state 
experience,  has  contributed  to  the  proof  of  this 
proposition. 

But  if  the  charges  of  oligarchy  and  failure  to 
provide  a  genuine  representation  of  the  electorate 
have  had  a  conspicuous  place  in  commission- 
charter  campaigns  and  written  discussions  of  the 
question,  they  have  not  approached  in  influence 
the  accusation  that  the  new  system  makes  a 
dangerous  departure  from  American  political 
theory  in  fusing  the  appropriating  and  expend- 
ing authorities.  "No  feature,"  declares  Commis- 
sioner MacVicar,  of  Des  Moines,  "arouses  more 
discussion  than  the  fusion  of  these  two  authori- 
ties. 

It  may  be  observed  that  while  the  principle 
of  separating  these  important  functions  has  re- 
ceived wide  application  in  our  national,  state, 
and  municipal  governments,  it  has  not  always 
been  universally  recognized  as  the  opponents  of 
commission  government  generally  assume.  Our 
earliest  city  governments  vested  both  functions 


Changing  Municipal  Organization        87 

in  the  council  after  the  manner  of  the  English 
Borough  system,  and  it  was  not  until  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Federal  principle  of  the  division  of 
powers  began  to  make  itself  felt  that  the  council 
was  divested  of  its  power  to  spend  the  city  funds. 
Again,  the  county  governments  in  most  of  the 
states  have  embodied  this  principle  of  fusion, 
and  the  majority  of  the  school  committees  at  the 
present  time  both  appropriate  and  spend  the 
school  funds.  Likewise  state  appointive  com- 
missions have  frequently  been  given  power  both 
to  appropriate  and  spend  public  funds. 

Nevertheless,  it  must  be  admitted  that,  de- 
spite these  apparent  exceptions,  the  principle  of 
division  has  been  very  generally  regarded  in  this 
country  as  a  proper  safeguard  against  waste- 
fulness and  corruption.  The  fact  that  the 
county  governments  are  commonly  referred  to 
as  proof  of  the  failure  of  the  plan  of  intrusting 
these  two  functions  to  the  same  body  is  signifi- 
cant as  showing  the  cause  for  the  deep-rooted 
distrust  of  this  method.  The  county  govern- 
ments built  on  this  plan  have  not  been  success- 
ful; they  generally  merit  all  the  condemnation 
which  they  receive  from  those  who  are  shocked 
at  their  wastefulness  and  extravagance.  Indeed, 
some  states,  especiall}^  Indiana,  gave  legal  expres- 


88  Municipal  Freedom 

sion  to  their  dissatisfaction  with  the  plan  by 
creating  a  county  council,  with  exclusive  power  of 
appropriation  to  act  as  a  check  on  the  county 
commission  which  hitherto  had  exercised  both 
functions. 

It  is  not  unnatural,  then,  in  view  of  county 
experience  with  the  plan,  that  the  proposal  to 
give  the  governing  council  of  the  commission- 
governed  city  the  power  to  appropriate  and 
disburse  public  funds  should  arouse  immediate 
opposition.  And  yet  the  failure  of  the  county 
government  does  not  afford  a  sound  reason  for 
condemning  the  principle  as  applied  in  the  com- 
mission system  of  city  government.  The  county 
commission  has  never  operated  under  conditions 
favorable  to  its  success.  It  has  never  stood,  for 
instance,  in  the  limelight  of  publicity  which 
surrounds  the  commission  government.  "Even 
in  the  South,"  wrote  James  Bryce,  "it  has  con- 
tinued to  be  an  artificial  entity,  and  has  drawn 
to  itself  no  great  part  of  the  interest  or  affections 
of  the  citizens.  It  is  too  large  for  the  personal 
interest  of  the  citizens;  that  goes  to  the  township. 
It  is  too  small  to  have  traditions  which  command 
the  respect  or  touch  the  affections  of  its  inhabi- 
tants; these  belong  to  the  state."  In  other  words, 
our  county  governments  do  not  perform  functions 


Cha-nging  Municipal  Organization        89 

that  attract  effective  public  attention.  It  may 
be  added  that  the  county  government  has  never 
been  subjected  to  such  popular  checks  as  the 
initiative,  referendum,  and  recall.  It  lacks  the 
popular  character  without  which  wastefulness 
and  extravagance  are  apt  to  thrive  under  any 
system  of  administration. 

Likewise  the  experience  of  the  appointive  com- 
missions and  of  the  early  city  councils  fails  to 
throw  any  light  on  the  question  of  fusion.  The 
state-appointed  commissions,  being  a  part  of  a 
decentralized  and  complicated  machinery,  never 
enjoyed  any  considerable  measure  of  public  in- 
terest or  attention.  Again,  the  municipal  councils 
which  exercised  these  powers  were  large  and  un- 
wieldy, worked  through  clumsy  committees  and 
rested  upon  ward  representation.  To  discredit 
the  principle  of  the  fusion  of  appropriating  and 
expending  power  in  a  single  body  it  is  necessary 
to  show  that  the  principle  has  failed  under  the 
circumstances  and  conditions  similar,  at  least,  to 
those  which  surround  it  in  the  commission  govern- 
/  ment.  All  that  can  be  inferred  from  past  ex- 
perience is  that  it  is  unwise  to  lodge  appropriating 
andexpendingpowers  in  a  single  organ  which  does 
not  rest  upon  a  genuinely  popular  basis  and  does 
not  receive  the  effective  interest  of  the  public. 


1/ 


90  Municipal  Freedom 

Not  only  does  our  limited  experience  (outside 
of  the  commission  governments)  with  the  plan  of 
fusion  fail  to  furnish  adequate  argument  against 
it;  the  great  bulk  of  experience  with  the  plan  of 
separated  functions  tends  even  to  favor  the  fusion 
of  these  functions. 

A  few  incidents  drawn  from  the  experience  of 
Indianapohs  under  a  government  in  which  the 
appropriating  and  expending  powers  have  been 
carefully  separated  will  illustrate  the  practical 
working  of  this  system  which  has  been  regarded 
as  possessing  a  peculiar  virtue.  A  few  years  ago 
there  was  an  epidemic  of  diphtheria  among  the 
school  children  of  Indianapolis,  and  the  health 
board  decided  on  a  policy  of  medical  inspection 
in  the  public  schools.  An  appropriation  of  ^4,000 
with  which  to  carry  on  the  work  was  requested  of 
the  council,  which  is  the  appropriating  authority, 
but  that  bodydecHned  to  make  the  appropriation, 
the  real  reason  apparently  being  that  the  son  of  a 
councilman  had  been  discharged  by  the  health 
board.  It  was  only  through  persistent  public 
agitation  that  the  appropriation  was  finally  ob- 
tained. The  health  board  has  since  secured  a 
law  from  the  legislature  which  provides  a  special 
tax  for  medical  inspection,  the  money  to  be  avail- 
able by  the  health  board  without  appropriation  by 


Changing  Municipal  Organization         91 

the  council.  The  principle  of  separated  functions 
must  give  way  to  the  principle  of  fusion  when  the 
vital  interests  of  the  people  demand  it! 

The  health  board  for  several  years  begged  the 
council  for  money  to  build  a  much-needed  con- 
tagious disease  hospital  and  other  buildings,  but 
without  success.  Likewise,  the  board  has  had 
endless  difficulties  in  obtaining  the  needed  appro- 
priation for  the  city  hospital.  What  is  the  cause 
of  these  difficulties  ?  Not  a  shortage  of  funds,  not 
a  lack  of  bonding  power,  but  presumably  because 
the  health  board  and  the  hospital  were  out  of 
politics  and  little  could  be  gained  by  giving  them 
the  requested  appropriations.* 

Indianapolis  is  not  the  only  city  which  has 
suffered  from  the  separation  of  the  appropriating 
and  expending  authorities,  but  her  experience  is 
strikingly  typical.  How  often  have  the  interests 
of  a  city  or  the  health  of  the  people  of  an  entire 
state  been  placed  in  jeopardy  by  the  failure  of 
these  two  authorities  to  cooperate  when  there  was 
a  vital  need  of  cooperation !  And  who  is  to  blame 
for  the  lamentable  consequences  that  frequently 
follow:     Each  authority  shifts  the  responsibility 


*As  this  volume  goes  to  press  fresh  proofs  of  the  breakdown  of 
the  system  of  checks  and  balances  in  Indianapolis  is  offered  by  a 
bitter  struggle  between  the  mayor  and  council  for  control  of  the 
city's  finances. 


92  Municipal  Freedom 

upon  the  other,  and,  in  the  end,  both  escape  the 
popularwrath  which  cannot  concentrate  upon  the 
culpable  authority.  Is  the  mayor  accused  of  fail- 
ing to  maintain  a  proper  standard  of  adminis- 
tration in  one  of  the  city's  departments?  He 
excuses  himself  by  declaring  that  the  appropriat- 
ing authority,  the  council,  refused  to  grant  the 
necessary  funds.  Is  the  council  accused  of  with- 
holding necessary  supplies.?  It  answers  that  the 
money  would  have  been  misapplied  by  the  exec- 
utive. Thus  is  created  a  vicious  circle  in  which 
extravagance  and  inefficiency  take  refuge  in  a 
hopeless  division  of  official  responsibility. 

After  all,  the  most  conclusive  answer  to  the 
charge  that  the  fusion  of  appropriating  and  spend- 
ing authorities  encourages  arbitrary  and  extrava- 
gant administration  is  written  in  the  record  of  the 
commission-governed  cities.  For  the  facts  of 
this  record  standing  out  in  boldest  relief  are  the 
responsiveness  of  the  commission  councils  to  the 
popular  will,  and  their  tendency  toward  economi- 
cal administration  of  the  pubhc  business. 

Is  the  commission  government  a  violation  of 
the  traditional  American  doctrine  of  democratic 
rule.''  An  analysis  of  the  new  system  would 
seem  to  say  that  it  is  not.  The  commission  gov- 
ernment represents  a  departure  from  the  forms 


Changing   Municipal  Organization  93 

of  municipal  democracy  which  evolved  under  the 
influence  of  the  federal  analogy;  it  does  not  rep- 
resent a  departure  from  the  spirit  of  municipal 
democracy  which  was  erroneously  supposed  to 
be  embodied  in  these  forms. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  COMING  OF  THE  BURGOMASTER 

A  PREDICTION  that  the  professional,  non-politi- 
cal burgomaster  was  destined  one  day  to  appear 
in  American  city  government  would  have  made 
its  author,  a  few  years  ago,  a  prophet  without 
honor.  Nevertheless,  he  would  have  been  a 
prophet;  for,  strange  as  it  may  seem  to  those 
familiar  with  the  political  habits  and  prejudices 
of  our  people,  the  Burgomaster  has  appeared, 
and  at  the  present  time  over  half  a  million  Ameri- 
cans, living  in  some  forty  cities,  are  governed 
in  the  manner  of  the  Germans.  "The  City 
Manager"  is  the  name  which  these  cities  have 
bestowed  upon  the  new  official;  but  he  is  the 
same  German  burgomaster  transplanted  and  re- 
named. 

The  idea  of  having  a  professional  manager 
to  transact  the  administrative  business  of  a  city 
originated  in  Staunton,  Virginia,  where,  six 
years  ago,  the  city  council  created  the  office  of 

94, 


The  Coming  of  the  Burgomaster         95 

general  manager,  and  invested  him  with  the 
administration  of  the  various  city  departments. 
A  state  constitutional  provision,  requiring  cities 
to  maintain  their  mayor  and  bicameral  council, 
prevented  the  people  of  Staunton  from  further 
simplifying  and  centralizing  their  city  adminis- 
tration. But  in  191 1  the  Board  of  Trade  of 
Lockport,  New  York,  submitted  to  the  legisla- 
ture at  Albany  a  municipal  plan  which  central- 
ized legislative  powers  in  a  small  commission, 
at  the  same  time  providing  for  the  centralization 
of  all  administrative  and  executive  powers  in  a 
controlled  "city  manager."  The  New  York 
legislature  defeated  the  Lockport  measure;  but 
in  the  following  year  the  South  Carolina  legisla- 
ture gave  to  the  city  of  Sumter  (population 
8,109)  a  special  charter  embodying  the  Lockport 
plan,  and  on  January  i,  1913,  a  burgomaster 
appeared  in  that  city.  During  the  year  191 3 
the  city-manager  plan  was  adopted  by  Hickory, 
North  Carolina  (population  3,176),  and  Mor- 
gantown,  North  Carolina  (population  2,712); 
Dayton,  Ohio  (population  116,577);  Springfield, 
Ohio  (population  46,921);  La  Grande,  Oregon 
(population  4,843);  Phoenix,  Arizona  (popula- 
tion 11,134);  Morris,  Minnesota  (population 
1,885);  Terrell,  Texas  (population  7,050);  Ama- 


g6  Municipal  Freedom 

rilla,  Texas  (population  9,957).*  A  general  op- 
tional state  law  permits  any  city  of  Ohio  to 
adopt  the  plan. 

A  centralization  of  legislative  and  administra- 
tive powers  characterizes  the  commission-man- 
ager plan,  though  not  in  the  same  sense  in  which 
it  characterizes  the  straight  commission  plan. 
There  is  a  single  elective,  representative  com- 
mission, or  council,  invested  with  legislative  and 
supervisory  functions,  chosen  in  a  non-partisan 
election,  either  by  wards  or  at  large,  its  members 
giving  only  a  part  of  their  time  to  the  municipal 
work  and  receiving  nominal  salaries  or  none. 
The  members  of  this  governing  body  are  sub- 
ject to  popular  discharge  through  the  recall,  and 
their  official  acts  are  subject  to  popular  repeal 
or  revision  through  the  initiative  and  referendum. 

*To  this  list  should  be  added  the  following:  f  Norwood,  Mass- 
(8,000  population);  Niagara  Falls,  N.  Y.  (30,445);  Grove  City, 
Pa.  (4,000);  Titusville,  Pa.  (9,000);  fFrostburg,  Md.;  f  Bristol, 
Va.  (6,000);  t  Charlottesville,  Va.  (7,000);  Lakeland,  Fla.  (3,719); 
tLargo,  Fla.;  Ashtabula, Ohio  (18,266);  Sandusky, Ohio  (19,999); 
t  Glencoe,  111.  (3,000);  t  River  Forest,  111.;  Big  Rapids, 
Mich.  (112,521);  Cadillac,  Mich.  (8,375);  Jackson,  Mich.  (31,433); 
Manistee,  Mich.  (12,381);  fClarinda,  Iowa  (4,000);  t  Chariton, 
Iowa  (4,000);  Iowa  Falls,  Iowa  (3,000);  f  Abilene,  Kan.  (4,118); 
t  Mulberry,  Kan.;  Collinsville,  Okla.  (1,324);  Denton,  Texas 
(4,732);  Taylor, Texas  (5,3 14) ;  Montrose, Col.  (3,252);  La  Grande, 
Ore.  (4,843);  Alhambra,  Cal.  (5,021);  Bakersfield,  Cal.  (12,727); 
Inglewood,  Cal.,  2,000);  Maissonvieuve,  P.  Q.  (37,000);  Port 
Arthur,  Ont.  (u,20o);  Westmount,  Ont. 

t  indicates  city  manager  grafted  upon  existing  form  of  govern- 
ment. 


The  Coming  of  the  Burgomaster         97 

The  administrative  and  executive  powers  of 
the  city  are  lodged  in  a  city  manager,  who  is 
hired  by  the  commission  from  any  place  in  the 
countr}',  is  under  its  supervisory  control,  and 
holds  office  at  its  pleasure.  This  "controlled 
manager,"  as  Mr.  Richard  S.  Child  has  aptly 
called  him,  controls  the  remaining  city  em- 
ployees, subject  to  adequate  civil-service  provi- 
sions. He  is  to  the  elective  council  what  the 
ordinary  American  school  superintendent  is  to  the 
elective  school  board. 

As  an  important  modification  of  the  commis- 
sion government,  the  commission-manager  plan 
has  aroused  an  active  interest  among  charter 
reformers.  The  new  plan  savors  sufficiently  of 
the  characteristics  of  the  straight  commission 
plan  to  commend  it  to  those  who  have  been  im- 
pressed with  the  record  of  that  system;  and  it 
contains  enough  added  improvements  to  interest 
those  who  have  thought  the  Des  Moines  plan 
to  be  an  inadequate  makeshift.  In  its  central- 
ized machinery,  it  resembles  the  Des  Moines 
type;  but  in  its  investment  of  the  elective  coun- 
cil with  supervisory,  rather  than  active  admin- 
istrative, powers,  and  in  its  further  unification 
of  the  administrative  establishment  it  consti- 
tutes an  important  departure  from  the  recent 


98  Municipal  Freedom 

tendency  of  the  commission  government  to 
make  the  elective  member  of  the  council  an  ac- 
tive managerial  department  head. 

The  question  of  differentiating  between  legis- 
lative and  administrative  functions  raises  one  of 
the  most  vital  among  the  problems  of  munici- 
pal organization.  Constructive  municipal  think- 
ers are  practically  unanimous,  at  the  present 
time,  in  their  acceptance  of  the  small  repre- 
sentative governing  body;  the  unsettled  ques- 
tion is  whether  legislative  and  administrative 
powers  can  safely  be  intrusted  to  an  elective 
body,  without  militating  against  the  highest 
administrative  efficiency.  lyAt  one  time  fear  of 
political  tyranny  raised  advocates  of  the  doc- 
trine of  separated  powers;  to-day  fear  of  pohtical 
inefficiency  moves  men  to  oppose  the  same  doc- 
trine. Guarding  against  municipal  inefficiency 
has  become  of  greater  moment  than  guarding 
against  municipal  tyranny. 

From  the  foregoing  description,  it  will  be  ob- 
served that  there  is  not  the  same  kind  of  differ- 
entiation between  legislative  and  administrative 
powers  in  the  commission-manager  plan  that 
there  is  in  the  old  mayor  and  council  plan.  In 
the  latter,  the  administrative  powers  are  lodged 
in  authorities  which  are  in  a  large  measure  in- 


The  Coming  of  the   Burgomaster         99 

dependent  of  the  legislative  body,  or,  at  least, 
not  under  its  effective  control.  In  the  commis- 
sion-manager system,  the  administrative  powers 
are  centred  in  a  single  official,  the  city  manager, 
who,  however,  is  under  the  exclusive  control 
of  a  single  elective  body.  He  is,  in  truth,  a  co«- 
^ro//f  J  manager,  transacting  the  city's  administra- 
tive business  w4th  the  consent  of  the  supervising 
council. 

Out  of  this  well-defined  relation  between  the 
administrative  service  and  the  legislative  branch 
arises  the  well-founded  claim  of  the  commission- 
manager  plan  to  superiority  over  the  Des  Moines 
type.  In  the  chapter  entitled  "Democracy  and 
Efficiency,"  an  effort  was  made  to  show^  what 
the  writer  conceives  to  be  a  maladjustment  of 
the  lay  and  expert  elements  in  the  American 
municipal  system  which  evolved  under  the  in- 
fluence of  Jacksonian  political  doctrines.  It  was 
pointed  out  that  the  tendency  of  commission 
charters  of  the  Des  Moines  type  to  invest  the 
elective  official  with  active  managerial  functions 
is  an  unwise  inclination  toward  the  Jacksonian 
doctrine  of  the  popular  election  of  administra- 
tive officials. 

A  wiser  conception  of  the  function  of  the 
elective  lavman  underlies  the  machmerv  of  the 


lOO  Municipal  Freedom 

commission-manager  plan.  For  the  commission- 
manager  charter  abandons  all  attempts  to  secure 
administrators  by  popular  vote,  and  lodges  exec- 
utive and  administrative  powers  in  a  controlled 
manager,  leaving  the  legislative  and  supervisory 
functions  to  the  elective  council.  This  arrange- 
ment contributes  both  to  administrative  and 
legislative  efficiency.  By  giving  the  work  of 
actual  management  to  a  permanent  adminis- 
trative expert,  it  secures  technical,  administra- 
tive skill  at  the  place  where  it  is  most  needed; 
namely,  at  the  head.  By  removing  all  require- 
ments of  technical  or  administrative  ability  in 
elective  officials,  the  plan  broadens  the  field  of 
popular  choice  and  leaves  the  people  free  to 
follow  their  instinct,  which  is  to  choose  men 
primarily  with  reference  to  their  representative 
character;  laboring  men,  for  example,  can  freely 
elect  their  own  men  to  the  council,  without  at 
the  same  time  imposing  upon  them  the  active 
management  of  a  more  or  less  technical  depart- 
ment. It  is  exactly  this  adjustment  of  the  ex- 
pert and  lay  elements  in  municipal  organization 
that  explains  the  efficacy  of  the  German  and  Eng- 
lish city  governments. 

Another  relative  advantage  of  the  commission- 
manager  charter  over  the  Des  Moines  plan  lies 


The  Coming  of  the  Burgomaster       loi 

in  its  more  thorough  unification  of  the  admin- 
istrative estabHshment.  By  the  Des  Moines 
charter,  each  of  the  administrative  departments 
is  under  the  immediate  control  of  the  elective 
member  of  the  council  who  has  been  assigned  to 
that  department  by  the  collective  action  of  the 
council,  or  by  the  voters.  In  theory,  the  de- 
partment heads  being  subject  to  the  ultimate 
supervision  of  the  council,  acting  as  a  body, 
administrative  harmony  between  the  several 
departments  is  insured;  in  practice,  however, 
it  has  not  always  worked  out  in  this  way.  The 
member  of  the  council  in  charge  of  a  specific 
department  may  not  be  sympathetic  with  the 
policy  which  has  been  imposed  upon  his  depart- 
ment by  the  council.  In  such  a  case,  especially 
if  he  has  received  his  department  assignment  by 
being  elected  to  that  specific  department,  he 
may  choose  to  regard  himself  as  responsible  to 
the  people  rather  than  to  the  council,  and  refuse 
to  carry  out  sympathetically  the  latter's  policy. 
In  such  a  situation,  the  elective  department 
head  becomes  invested  with  a  certain  indepen- 
dence, which  is  inconsistent  with  the  theory  of 
undivided  responsibility.  Evidence  is  not  want- 
mg  in  the  experience  of  the  commission  govern- 
ments to  show  that  this  danger  is  more  than 


I02  Municipal  Freedom 

theoretical,  though  the  new  governments  on  the 
whole  have  worked  harmoniously. 

The  commission-manager  plan  clearly  is  bet- 
ter organized  to  secure  administrative  unity, 
for,  under  this  system,  responsibihty  for  the 
effective  execution  by  any  department  of  the 
council's  policy  rests  upon  the  city  manager, 
who  is  the  appointee  of  the  council,  concerned 
solely  with  carrying  out  its  declared  policy.  No 
department  can  refuse  sympathetically  to  co- 
operate with  the  other  departments,  because  the 
controlling  head  of  one  is  the  controlling  head  of 
all.  The  several  departments,  therefore,  must 
work  in  harmony  with  each  other;  they  take  their 
orders  from  a  common  administrative  head,  the 
city  manager,  who  hears  only  the  collective  voice 
of  the  council,  which  is  the  collective  voice  of 
citizenship. 

It  is  a  distinct  merit  of  the  commission- 
manager  plan  that  it  offers  an  opportunity  to 
secure  a  much-needed  administrative  central- 
ization without  incurring  the  danger  of  the  one- 
man  power  seen  in  the  strong  executive  plan. 
The  city  manager,  unlike  the  administrative 
head  of  the  old  system,  is  not  an  independent 
executive,  but  works  under  the  control  of  the 
representative  council,  by  whom  he  is  subject  to 


The  Coming  of  the  Burgomaster       103 

instant  correction.  Thus  the  city  will  be  in  no 
danger  of  suffering  from  the  personal  whims  or 
prejudices  of  an  opinionated  executive,  for  the 
administrative  head  of  the  city  will  now  be  a 
controlled,  not  an  independent,  executive.  The 
way  would  thus  be  opened  to  a  greater  extension 
of  municipal  powers,  unhampered  by  checks  and 
balances. 

In  this  connection,  a  provision  of  the  Dayton 
commission-manager  charter,  providing  for  the 
popular  recall  of  the  city  manager,  deserves 
mention.  Such  a  provision  can  only  be  regarded 
as  a  violation  of  the  central  principle  of  this  type 
of  municipal  organization.  If  the  city  manager 
were  a  pohtical  official,  having  to  do  with  the  de- 
termination of  municipal  policy,  he  might  very 
logically  be  subjected  to  recall  by  direct  popular 
action.  But,  by  the  theory  of  the  commis- 
sion-manager system,  he  is  a  permanent,  non- 
political  official,  in  no  way  concerned  with  the 
determination  of  city  policy,  but  intrusted  solely 
with  the  execution  of  the  expressed  will  of  the 
representative  body  to  whom  he  is  exclusively 
responsible.  Any  argument,  then,  which  would 
demand  the  subjection  of  the  city  manager  to 
the  popular  recall,  would  demand  likewise  the 
election  of  the  same  official  by  popular  vote. 


I04  Municipal  Freedom 

Moreover,  the  application  of  the  principle  of 
the  recall  to  the  city  manager  might  well  tend  to 
invest  that  official,  in  the  popular  mind,  with  an 
independent  political  character,  and  thus  weaken 
or  destroy  his  effective  responsibility  to  the 
council.  To  the  extent  that  his  responsibility  to 
the  council  is  weakened,  just  to  that  extent  is 
the  centralized  responsibility  of  the  government 
impaired. 

Moreover,  the  political  character  of  the  city 
manager  could  be  enhanced  only  at  the  expense 
of  the  representative  character  of  the  council; 
for,  if  the  people  should  come  to  look  upon  the 
former  as  the  political  head  of  the  city,  he  would 
soon  lose  his  character  of  permanent  adminis- 
trative expert,  and  the  council  would  develop 
into  a  mere  automaton  for  registering  the  pop- 
ular choice  of  a  city  manager.  Such  a  result 
would  entail,  on  the  one  hand,  a  lower  grade 
of  administrative  manager,  and,  on  the  other, 
a  lower  grade  of  legislative  representative.  It 
is  difficult  to  see  how  the  system,  thus  per- 
verted, would,  in  practical  effect,  be  essentially 
different  from  the  old  form  of  government  with  its 
strong  executive  and  weak  council.  To  preserve 
the  responsible  character  of  the  representative 
council,  or  commission,  in  the  commission-man- 


The  Coming  of  the  Burgomaster       105 

ager  plan,  it  is  necessary  to  preserve  the  non- 
political  character  of  the  city  manager,  and  this 
can  be  best  achieved  by  emphasizing  his  sole 
accountability  to  the  council. 

Should  the  cities  which  adopt  the  commission- 
manager  plan  preserve  the  distinctive,  non- 
political  character  of  the  city  manager,  the  de- 
velopment in  the  United  States  of  a  new  pro- 
fession of  city  managership  may  be  anticipated, 
which,  by  permitting  the  substitution  of  the 
permanent,  expert  administrator  for  the  tran- 
sient, amateur  executive,  would  aid  tremen- 
dously in  the  solution  of  the  city's  problems. 
Germany  has  been  able  to  meet  successfully  the 
perplexing  problems  of  her  urban  life  largely 
because  of  the  presence  of  available  burgo- 
masters, trained  in  the  technical  science  of  mu- 
nicipal administration. 

Moreover,  the  existence  of  a  class  of  expert 
city  managers  may  be  counted  upon  to  develop 
an  interpolity  now  practically  unknown,  but 
vitally  needed,  in  American  cities.  At  present, 
a  noteworthy  effort  toward  this  end  is  being 
made  by  private  reform  organizations,  like  the 
National  Municipal  League  and  the  American 
League  of  MunicipaUties,  and  by  central  legis- 
lative and  municipal  reference  bureaus,  which 


lo6  Municipal  Freedom 

undertake  to  disseminate  practical  information 
on  municipal  questions.  The  city  manager  mi- 
grating, like  the  German  burgomaster,  from  city 
to  city,  would  furnish  an  exceptionally  valuable 
vehicle  for  this  interchange  of  municipal  experi- 
ence. 

And,  finally,  the  commission-manager,  like 
the  Des  Moines  plan,  simplifies  the  task  of  the 
voter.  A  representative  organ,  the  council,  is 
provided  for  the  expression  of  the  popular  will 
on  questions  of  municipal  policy,  and  to  that 
organ  is  given  control  of  the  administrative  au- 
thority, the  city  manager,  to  whom  is  intrusted 
the  execution  of  that  will.  The  voting  citizen, 
therefore,  is  not  saddled  with  the  perplexing  task 
of  selecting  by  ballot  a  large  number  of  inde- 
pendent administrative  authorities  who  can  be 
rehed  upon  to  carry  out  the  policy  which  his  rep- 
resentatives on  the  council  enact.  It  is  enough 
that  he  obtain  a  council  that  stands  for  the 
policy  he  wants,  for  that  council  will  be  able, 
through  its  servant,  the  city  manager,  itself  to 
secure  the  execution  of  its  orders.  In  other 
words,  the  commission-manager  plan  embodies 
the  principle  of  the  short  ballot. 


CHAPTER  VII 

IS  THE  PARTY  SYSTEM  PASSING  FROM 

THE  CITY? 

A  NEW  idea  is  abroad  in  American  cities — that 
city  governments  can  get  along  without  the  as- 
sistance of  national  political  parties.  Within  a 
very  few  years  this  idea  has  taken  root  in  almost 
ever}^  section  of  the  country,  has  led  to  the 
adoption  of  the  most  drastic  charter  provisions 
for  the  expulsion  of  the  party  from  city  politics; 
in  short,  has  declared  uncompromising  war  on 
the  extra-legal  machinery  which  has  hereto- 
fore been  the  mainspring  of  municipal  adminis- 
tration. The  "Organization,"  whose  preroga- 
tive it  has  been  to  "read  out  of  the  party" 
members  who  had  proved  unfaithful  to  its 
interests,  is  itself  being  "read  out"  of  the  sphere 
in  which  it  has  long  been  supreme.  And  all  this 
has  come  about  because  the  national  political 
party  does  not  fit  in  with  the  new  conception  of 
city  government  which  has  lately  gripped  Amer- 
ican cities. 

107 


io8  Municipal  Freedom 

Is  the  party  system  passing  from  our  cities? 
The  question  should  be  of  interest  to  the  student 
of  the  rise  and  fall  of  institutions;  but  more  im- 
portant still,  it  should  be  of  interest  to  the 
political  builder  intrusted  with  the  practical 
task  of  municipal  reconstruction.  What  causes 
he  at  the  bottom  of  the  present  movement 
against  the  party  system  in  city  government? 
Is  the  movement  justified? 

To  appreciate  the  causes  of  the  present 
tendency  against  party  rule  in  city  government 
some  understanding  of  the  historical  part  which 
political  parties  have  played  in  our  municipal 
development  is  necessary.  At  once  the  most 
striking  and  most  significant  fact  of  our  mu- 
nicipal history  has  been  the  government  of  the 
cities  by  national  political  parties,  formed  on 
issues  having  no  relation  to  the  interests  of  the 
cities  which  they  ruled;  for  in  this  country  the 
development  of  municipal  government  was  not 
accompanied  by  the  development  of  parties 
formed  on  questions  of  local  policy.  Instead, 
the  great  national  parties. entered  the  sphere  of 
city  government  and  assumed  the  function  of 
governing  the  cities,  frankly  confessing  to  no 
program  of  municipal  policy.  Thus  the  cities 
came  to  be  governed  by  men  whose  position  on 


Is  the  Party  System  Passing?  109 

the  tariff,  slavery,  reconstruction,  or  some  ques- 
tion of  state  or  national  policy  was  the  unusual 
cause  of  their  selection.  Why  did  the  cities  thus 
come  under  the  control  of  extra-legal  organiza- 
tions whose  membership  w^as  in  no  manner  deter- 
mined by  their  attitude  toward  local  questions? 
The  answer  is  found  in  the  legal  conditions 
surrounding  the  American  city  and  in  the  facts 
of  our  early  political  and  economical  develop- 
ment. In  the  first  place,  as  Professor  Goodnow 
has  pointed  out,  although  the  municipality  was 
an  agent  of  the  state  government  for  the  per- 
formance of  certain  state  functions,  a  decentral- 
ized state  administrative  system  left  it  practically 
uncontrolled  in  the  exercise  of  these  functions. 
Thus  the  municipality  enforced  state  liquor  laws, 
state  education  laws,  collected  the  state  taxes, 
and  had  charge  of  the  elections  in  the  cities  for 
state  officials.  This  freedom  from  administrative 
control  in  the  execution  of  state  laws,  so  charac- 
teristic of  the  Anglo-American  political  tradition, 
worked  'very  well  when  the  sentiment  of  the  city 
coincided  with  that  of  the  legislative  majority 
which  made  the  state  laws,  but  it  produced 
entirely  different  results  when  local  sentiment 
was  hostile  to  that  which  prevailed  in  the  state 
at  large.     Suppose,  for  example,  that  one  of  the 


no  Municipal  Freedom 

national  parties  should  obtain  control  of  the  state 
government  on  a  platform  which  pledged  it  to  a 
restrictive  liquor  policy.  Fidelity  to  its  pledges 
made  in  the  campaign  would  demand  that  it 
enact  into  law  the  policy  for  which  it  stood  in  the 
campaign,  and  that  it  use  every  effort  to  secure 
the  enforcement  of  the  law  thus  enacted. 

The  performance  of  the  first  duty  would  be 
a  simple  matter,  for  the  party  would  have  con- 
trol of  the  law-making  power  of  the  state,  the 
legislature.  The  discharge  of  the  second  and 
equally  important  obHgation  would  not  be  so 
simple,  for  it  would  not  have  control  of  the  ma- 
chinery intrusted  with  the  important  function 
of  executing  the  liquor  laws  of  the  state,  the 
police  authorities  of  the  cities.  In  order  to 
fulfil  its  pledges,  therefore,  the  party  would  be 
compelled  to  enter  the  field  of  local  government 
and  seize  the  organs  which  controlled  the  local 
poUce  administrations  by  the  election  of  officers 
pledged  to  carry  out  state  policies. 

If  the  state  executive  authorities  had  pos- 
sessed a  control  or  supervision  over  the  municipal 
authorities  intrusted  with  the  execution  of  the 
state  laws,  there  would  clearly  have  been  no 
excuse  for  the  intervention  of  the  national  party 
in  the  above  instance.     But  the  absence  of  the 


Is  the  Party  System  Passing?         iii 

means  of  constitutional  control  or  supervision 
made  necessary  a  resort  to  extra-constitutional 
means.  The  defect  might  have  been  remedied 
by  the  establishment  of  a  system  of  state  ad- 
ministrative supervision  of  local  officers  exer- 
cising state  functions,  thereby  insuring  that  the 
state  laws  would  be  enforced.  A  failure  to 
understand  the  real  relation  existing  between 
the  city  and  the  state,  however,  combined  with 
an  ingrained  dislike  of  any  proposal  which  was 
thought  to  encroach  upon  the  right  of  local 
self-government  to  prevent  any  constructive 
legislation  of  this  kind,  and  the  motive  for  inter- 
vention continued  to  act,  in  a  greater  or  lesser 
degree,  on  the  national  parties  interested  in  the 
execution  of  state  policies. 

A  far  more  potent,  if  less  justifiable,  cause  for 
the  interference  of  the  national  parties  in  munic- 
ipal affairs  was  the  desire  of  these  organiza- 
tions to  strengthen  themselves  for  the  national 
and  state  contests  in  which  they  were  engaged. 
Municipal  government,  with  its  large  official 
patronage  and  valuable  franchise  privileges,  af- 
forded rich  opportunities  to  the  national  part}' 
which  could  get  control  of  its  machinery,  and 
city  elections  degenerated  into  mere  struggles 
for  the  possession  of  the  means  wherewith  to 


112  Municipal  Freedom 

increase  the  fighting  strength  of  the  contending 
parties.  Moreover,  the  exploitation  of  the  city's 
resources  was  greatly  facilitated  by  a  municipal 
organization  marked  by  inefficiency  and  divided 
responsibility. 

The  result  of  all  this  was  a  reversal  of  the 
proper  relation  between  the  political  party  and 
the  city  government;  party  welfare  became  an 
end  in  itself  and  the  city  a  means  for  the  attain- 
ment of  that  end;  instead  of  the  party  serving 
the  city,  the  city  came  to  serve  the  party. 

This  situation,  however,  could  not  have 
evolved  without  the  tolerant  acquiescence  of  the 
American  people,  and  it  is  in  the  effort  to  explain 
this  tolerance  that  we  discover  the  extra-legal 
conditions  which  lie  at  the  bottom  of  our  munic- 
ipal failure.  Our  people  have  been  engrossed 
in  their  national  problems,  and  the  political 
conscience  and  intelligence,  until  a  compara- 
tively recent  date,  have  been  given  unreservedly 
to  what  has  appeared  to  them  to  be  the  more 
important  questions  of  national  development. 
National  problems  got  an  early  grip  on  the 
people,  largely  because  the  city  did  not  assume 
any  great  importance  in  American  political  and 
economic  life  prior  to  1850.  After  that  time 
slavery  and  reconstruction  diverted  the  atten- 


Is  the  Party  System  Passing?         113 

tion  of  the  people.-  Read  in  the  intense  light 
which  the  problems  of  slavery,  and  of  political 
and  economic  reconstruction  shed  upon  the 
political  horizon,  the  story  of  the  exploitation  of 
the  cities  by  national  parties  is  not  inexplicable. 
In  this  popular  preoccupation  may  be  detected 
a  note  of  tolerant  acquiescence. 

The  growing  appreciation  of  the  importance 
of  city  government  in  our  political  life  led  to  a 
clearer  understanding  of  the  evils  of  national- 
party  domination  of  municipal  affairs,  and  a 
movement  appeared  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
past  century  which  had  for  its  object  the  elimi- 
nation of  this  influence.  This  movement,  it 
should  be  noted,  did  not  purport  to  exclude  the 
political  party  as  an  institution  from  municipal 
government,  but  merely  to  eliminate  the  influ- 
ence of  national  and  state  politics  from  the  local 
sphere.  Its  hope  was  either  to  bring  about  the 
formation  of  local  parties  or  to  force  the  national 
parties  to  take  a  stand  on  questions  of  local 
policy  when  they  entered  into  a  municipal  con- 
test. 

The  methods  adopted  to  achieve  this  result 
were  intended  to  remove  both  the  opportunity 
and  the  temptation  for  national-party  interven- 
tion.    Thus  amendments  were  added  to  state 


114  Municipal  Freedom 

constitutions  prohibiting  special  legislation  in 
the  hope  of  withdrawing  the  opportunity  for 
intervention  possessed  by  the  party  in  control 
of  the  state  legislature;  laws  establishing  thecivil- 
service  method  of  appointment  and  limiting  the 
granting  of  public  franchises  and  contracts  were 
put  on  the  state  statute  books,  and  even  in  the 
state  constitutions,  as  a  means  of  withdrawing 
the  municipal  patronage  from  the  control  of  the 
party  organizations;  and  municipal  elections 
were  separated  from  state  and  national  elections 
that  the  voter  might  be  encouraged  to  discrim- 
inate between  issues  pertaining  to  the  city  and 
those  pertaining  to  the  state  and  nation. 

But  although  some  of  these  measures,  es- 
pecially that  separating  municipal  from  general 
elections,  brought  about  a  distinct  improvement, 
the  cities  continued,  for  the  most  part,  to  be 
governed  in  the  interests  of  national  and  state 
politics.  Party  loyalty  was  too  strongly  rooted 
in  the  mind  of  the  electorate  to  permit  the  sum- 
mary exclusion  of  the  old  parties  from  the  local 
domain;  moreover,  no  great  difficulty  was  found 
in  nulHfying  the  legal  provisions  which  have  been 
adopted  to  free  the  cities  from  the  yoke  of  the 
national  parties.  Thus  the  legislatures  continued 
to  enact  special  legislation  under  the  mask  which 


Is  the  Party  System  Passing?         115 

the  "classification"  system  offered,  and  the  civil- 
service  and  franchise  limitations  were  set  aside 
in  various  ways.  Even  the  voters,  blinded  by 
party  loyalty, contributed  to  the  result,  and  could 
not  be  persuaded  on  election  day  to  render  to  the 
city  the  things  which  were  the  city's  and  to  the 
state  the  things  which  were  the  state's. 

A  widespread  conviction  that  these  efforts  to 
eUminate  national-party  influence  from  city  poli- 
tics havenot  succeeded,  has  joined  with  a  changed 
conceptionof  thenature  of  municipal  government 
to  produce  the  present  demand  for  the  entire  ex- 
clusion of  the  party  system  from  city  elections. 
The  new  conception  regards  city  government  as  a 
business,  or  administrative,  problem.  City  gov- 
ernment, according  to  this  conception,  is  merely 
business  management,  and  political  parties  have 
no  proper  place  in  business  management. 

The  organic  development  of  American  city  gov- 
ernment during  the  past  three  decades  reflects  in 
a  striking  manner  this  change  of  view.  At  first 
the  prevailingnotionwasthat  municipal  functions 
were  political,  and  the  municipal  structure  was 
accordingly  fashioned  after  the  Federal  and  state 
governments.  Then  came  the  "executive"  sys- 
tem, in  which  the  administrative  character  of  the 
municipality  was  recognized  through  the  creation 


Ii6  Municipal  Freedom 

of  an  all-powerful  executive  who  existed  alongside 
the  legislative  council.  This  system  recognized 
the  political  character  of  the  municipality,  but 
gave  greater  emphasis  to  the  administrative  side. 
And  finally  came  the  type  represented  by  the 
commission  system,  which  rests  upon  the  idea 
that  city  government  is  primarily  a  business 
problem,  requiring  for  its  proper  solution  a  dis- 
tinctively administrative  type  of  organization. 
Thus  the  city  government,  at  first  looked  upon 
as  primarily  a  political  organization,  has  come  to 
be  regarded  by  a  substantial  part  of  the  popula- 
tion as  primarily  an  administrative  organization. 
And  the  important  corollary  has  followed  that 
parties  have  no  legitimate  place  in  the  municipal 
sphere. 

How  completely  the  administrative  conception 
of  city  government,  in  its  relation  to  the  party 
system,  has  taken  possession  of  the  present 
movement  for  charter  reform  is  clear  from  a 
glance  at  recent  charter  provisions.  The  pres- 
ent Boston  charter,  regarded  as  among  the  most 
constructive  yet  to  be  applied  to  a  large  city, 
provides  for  a  non-partisan  method  of  nomination 
and  election.  The  Alameda,  California,  charter 
requires  that  nothing  shall  be  permitted  to  go  on 
the  municipal  ballot  "indicative  of  the  nomina- 


Is  the  Party  System  Passing?  117 

tion  or  support  of  any  candidate."  The  Iowa  law 
provides  for  a  non-partisan  primary  and  election. 
The  Haverhill,  Massachusetts,  charter  provides 
that  the  ballot,  both  in  the  prehminary  and  final 
elections,  shall  be  without  party  designation,  "or 
any  mark  showing  how  the  candidate  was  nomi- 
nated or  indicating  his  views  or  opinions";  that 
of  San  Diego  forbids  any  mark  whatever  on  the 
ballot,  and  the  Grand  Junction,  Tacoma,  and 
numerous  other  charters,  require  all  candidates 
for  city  office  to  swear  that  they  represent  no 
political  party,  committee,  or  convention  acting 
for  any  party  organization.  Thus  we  read  in  the 
most  progressive  charter  legislation  of  the  day 
a  conscious  effort  toward  non-partisanship  in 
municipal  affairs;  non-partisanship,  not  in  the 
sense  of  government  without  the  aid  of  national 
parties,  but  in  the  sense  of  government  without 
the  aid  of  any  parties  whatever,  national  or  local. 
Is  this  movement  justifiable.^  Will  it  be  suc- 
cessful.'* Is  the  party  system  destined  to  pass 
from  American  city  government  ?  It  goes  with- 
out saying,  in  the  light  of  American  experience, 
that  in  so  far  as  the  most  progressive  municipal 
effort  of  to-day  is  directed  toward  the  exclusion 
from  city  affairs  of  the  influence  of  national  and 
state  politics,  it  is  justified.     Enough  has  been 


ii8  Municipal  Freedom 

said  to  indicate  the  pernicious  effect  of  city  rule 
in  the  interest  of  national  parties  which  have 
never  borne  an  honorable  relation  to  local  gov- 
ernment in  this  country.  It  may  be  observed, 
however,  that  the  mere  removal  of  artificial  aids 
to  the  national  parties  in  winning  city  elections, 
such  as  is  sought  for  in  provisions  for  the  removal 
of  party  designations  from  the  ballot,  and  in 
provisions  requiring  candidates  for  local  office  to 
swear  that  they  represent  no  party  organization, 
or  association,  may  not  prove  entirely  effective 
unless  supplemented  by  the  granting  of  broad 
powers  of  home  rule  to  the  municipalit^^  The 
national  party  may  inject  its  virus  into  the  local 
government  as  well  through  the  channel  of  state 
legislation  dealing  with  purely  local  affairs  as 
through  the  current  of  the  municipal  elections, 
and  the  first  method  of  approach  should  be  made 
as  impossible  as  the  second.  Thus  the  movement 
for  the  exclusion  of  national  and  state  politics 
from  municipal  affairs  is  inextricably  bound  up 
with  the  movement  for  municipal  home  rule. 

But  what  of  the  avowed  purpose  of  the  move- 
ment which  we  have  been  describing  to  ehminate 
from  city  elections  all  political  parties,  municipal 
as  well  as  national  and  state  .^ 

An  examination  of  the  functions  of  the  munici- 


Is  the  Party  System  Passing?         119 

pality  will  show  them  to  be  of  two  kinds:  those 
having  to  do  with  the  determination  of  policies, 
and  those  having  to  do  with  the  carrying  out 
of  policies  which  have  been  determined.  The 
first  class  deals  with  such  subjects  as  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  municipal  park  system,  a  city 
gymnasium,  the  appropriation  of  money,  or  a 
municipal  water-works.  They  may  be  called 
policy-determining  or  legislative  functions,  and 
are  similar  to  the  functions  of  the  national  and 
state  governments,  the  only  difference  being  in 
the  kind  and  extent  of  the  subjects  covered  and 
in  the  geographical  area  affected.  Thus,  while 
the  national  government  might  be  called  upon 
to  decide  upon  the  establishment  of  a  currency 
or  tariff  policy,  the  municipality  might  be  called 
upon  to  decide  upon  the  establishment  of  a  mu- 
nicipal electric  plant  or  water-works. 

Indeed,  in  some  instances  the  municipal  re- 
semble national  and  state  functions  in  kind;  for 
the  municipality  may  consider  the  establishment 
of  a  city  hospital  for  the  insane  just  as  the 
state  government  considers  the  establishment 
of  a  state  institution  for  the  insane;  or,  the  mu- 
nicipality may  consider  the  building  of  a  boule- 
vard, just  as  the  national  government  may 
consider  the  construction  of  a  national  highway. 


I20  Municipal  Freedom 

Thus  the  municipality  exercises  functions  as  gen- 
uinely political  as  those  of  the  state  and  Federal 
governments. 

Now  when  the  municipality,  as  a  result  of 
the  exercise  of  its  political  functions,  has  decided 
upon  a  policy,  it  becomes  necessary  to  provide 
for  the  execution  of  that  policy;  and  here  arises 
the  second  class  of  functions  referred  to  above, 
the  administrative  functions.  But  these  cannot 
be  called  strictly  political  inasmuch  as  there 
cannot  be  any  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the 
way  in  which  they  should  be  exercised.  Voters 
may  differ  as  to  the  advisability  of  establishing 
a  water-works,  but  they  will  all  agree  that,  if  the 
city  decides  to  establish  a  water-works,  the  plant 
should  be  built  and  operated  in  but  one  way:  the 
most  economical  and  efficient  way.  Obviously 
the  people  of  the  city  are  not  going  to  divide  into 
two  parties,  one  favoring  the  operation  of  the 
water-works  on  a  basis  of  economy  and  efficiency, 
and  the  other  advocating  its  operation  on  a  basis 
of  wastefulness  and  inefficiency.  Administra- 
tive functions,  then,  do  not  furnish  a  legitimate 
basis  for  party  division. 

But  it  is  otherwise  with  regard  to  the  political 
functions.  When  public  officers  exercise  powers 
which  arouse  a  difference  of  opinion,  voters  will 


Is  the  Party  System  Passing?         121 

naturally  unite  to  secure  the  election  of  the  can- 
didates whose  views  coincide  with  theirs,  and 
out  of  these  forces  working  for  union  among  the 
voters  evolves  the  political  party.  Thus,  as  long 
as  to  municipal  officers  are  left  the  determina- 
tion of  political  or  legislative  functions  there  will 
be  a  division  of  the  voters  on  municipal  candi- 
dates representing  different  views  on  questions  of 
municipal  policy.  And  such  divisions  will  be  le- 
gitimate. 

But  does  not  this  method  of  reasoning  con- 
demn the  present  efforts  to  eliminate  the  politi- 
cal party  from  municipal  elections  as  being 
unintelligent  and  unjustified.^  Let  us  withhold 
judgment  until  we  examine  further  into  contem- 
porary municipal  tendencies. 

We  have  seen  that  as  long  as  to  municipal 
officers  is  left  the  determination  of  political,  or 
legislative,  functions  there  will  be  a  division  of 
the  voters  upon  municipal  candidates.  True, 
but  is  not  the  well-defined  tendency  toward 
direct  legislation  in  municipal  government  to 
take  from  municipal  officers  their  political  func- 
tions and  give  these  over  to  the  people  at  large.? 
Will  not  the  initiative  and  referendum,  which 
are  being  widely  adopted  by  cities,  transform 
completely  the  character  of  the  municipal  officer, 


122  Municipal  Freedom 

making  him  an  administrative  rather  than  a  po- 
htical  officer? 

Just  how  far  direct  legislation  will  be  actively 
applied  in  American  cities  it  is  impossible  to  say. 
But,  assuming  that  this  new  principle  will  re- 
ceive such  complete  application  as  to  transfer 
the  determination  of  municipal  policy  from  the 
city  officers  to  the  people,  the  division  of  the 
voters  into  political  parties  will  still  persist. 
The  only  difference  will  be  that  the  division  will 
now  take  place  in  the  referendum  election  in- 
stead of  in  the  election  for  choosing  city  officers. 
Should  this  situation,  then,  come  about,  the  mu- 
nicipal parties  of  the  future  would  be  transitory 
coalitions  of  different  city  interests  held  together 
for  the  time  by  their  common  support  of  or  op- 
position to  whatever  measure  formed  the  subject 
of  the  referendum;  and  the  personal  adminis- 
trative ability  of  the  candidate,  who  would  now 
be  deprived  of  his  political  character,  would  be 
the  only  consideration  to  figure  in  the  municipal 
election. 

On  the  other  hand,  these  parties  of  the  future 
might  conceivably  take  on  a  permanent  charac- 
ter, and  become  either  organizations  for  the 
promotion  of  definite  municipal  policies  through 
direct  legislation,  or  organizations  for  the  pro- 


Is  the  Party  System  Passing?         123 

motion  of  policies  through  the  election  of  their 
duly  selected  candidates.  This  development 
likewise  cannot  be  predicted  with  any  certainty. 
It  will  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  municipal 
issues  of  the  future — whether  they  are  perma- 
nent or  transitory.  Judging  from  our  past  mu- 
nicipal experience,  in  which  questions  of  policy 
have  generally  been  settled  by  the  state  legis- 
lature, one  might  say  that  no  issues  of  a  per- 
manent nature  would  ever  appear  in  city 
government.  On  the  other  hand,  should  the 
state  grant  to  the  city  broader  powers  of  tax- 
ation and  municipal  ownership  than  it  now 
possesses,  these  subjects  might  furnish  perma- 
nent issues  to  city  politics. 

Our  brief  examination  of  contemporary  mu- 
nicipal tendencies,  then,  would  indicate  that, 
despite  the  sweeping  charter  provisions  against 
the  party  system,  divisions  of  the  voters  on  ques- 
tions of  municipal  policy  will  persist.  Whether 
these  divisions  will  take  the  form  of  temporary 
coalitions  of  voters,  called  into  existence  by  each 
issue  as  it  arises,  or  of  permanent  groups  crys- 
tallized into  permanent  party  organizations, 
time  only  can  tell.  It  is  obvious  that  any  per- 
manent-charter provisions  which  would  militate 
against  the  organization  of  voters  around  munic- 


124  Municipal  Freedom 

ipal  issues  would  not  be  consistent  with  a  con- 
structive program  of  municipal  reform. 

For  the  present,  however,  the  legal  provisions 
for  the  elimination  of  parties  in  city  elections  is 
unquestionably  justified  as  a  means  of  ridding 
the  city  of  the  yoke  of  national  and  state  politics. 
Organization  controlled  nominations  and  party- 
labeled  ballots  are  neither  necessary  nor  con- 
ducive to  healthy  party  activity,  as  English 
experience  shows.  It  was  frequently  charged 
that  the  new  system,  with  its  large  powers  cen- 
tralized in  a  small  body,  would  increase  the 
influence  of  party  organs,  and  that  the  latter 
would  redouble  their  efforts  to  control  it.  Ex- 
perience, however,  has  failed  to  sustain  this 
prediction;  for  few  will  deny  that  partisanship, 
in  the  sense  of  adherence  to  national-party  lines, 
has  practically  disappeared  from  the  commission- 
governed  cities.  The  removal,  by  means  of  the 
non-partisan  ballot  and  merit  system,  of  all 
artificial  aids  to  party  control,  and  the  provi- 
sions requiring  candidates  to  swear  that  they  rep- 
resent no  political  party  or  organization,  have 
been  effective  in  minimizing,  if  not  in  exclud- 
ing, national-party  influence  from  the  municipal 
campaigns.  If,  after  the  separation  of  city  from 
national   and   state  politics   is  completely   and 


Is  the  Party  System  Passing?         125 

permanently  established,  there  should  develop 
permanent  party  organizations  formed  on  prin- 
ciples of  municipal  policy,  it  will  be  found  neces- 
sary to  discriminate  in  favor  of  local  parties  by 
striking  out  those  present  charter  provisions 
which  prohibit  a  candidate  from  representing 
any  party  organization  whatever. 

No  one  can  deny  the  present  growing  tendency 
among  voters  to  discriminate  between  legislative 
policy  and  administration.  May  we  not  reason- 
ably hope  that  in  time  the  city  may  be  controlled 
by  a  politically  chosen  council  which  recognizes 
that  politics  has  no  place  in  the  administrative 
side  of  their  work.^  This  is  the  case  now  in  the 
English  city  government — a  condition  enforced 
by  public  opinion  and  sound  municipal  tradi- 
tions. Commission-government  experience,  es- 
pecially in  the  case  of  the  commission-manager 
plan,  affords  striking  evidence  that  the  same 
condition  is  rapidly  coming  about  in  the  United 
States. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

VITALIZING  THE  BALLOT 

The  French  monarch  whose  motto  was  "Divide 
and  rule,"  would  have  been  a  genius  among  the 
leaders  of  present-day  machine  politics,  for  he 
understood  thoroughly  the  key  to  machine  con- 
trol. "Let  the  majority  divide  and  we  rule," 
calmly  predicts  the  genius  of  municipal  politics, 
and  his  prophecy  is  fulfilled  by  the  ensuing 
phenomenon  of  a  small  but  united  minority 
defeating  a  large  but  divided  majority.  Gen- 
erally, the  machine  boss  is  not  put  to  the  trouble 
of  dividing  the  enemy;  he  can  devote  himself 
to  the  task  of  perfecting  the  organization  of  the 
ridiculously  small  minority,  confident  that  a 
number  of  anti-machine  candidates  will  patri- 
otically present  themselves  against  him.  The 
candidate  of  the  machine  stripe  beats  the  candi- 
dates of  the  good-citizen  type,  and  the  result 
is  officially  called  a  "plurality"  election.  **De- 
feat  the  two  anti-organization  candidates  who 
are  running  against  me.^"     Why,  I  could  beat  a 

126 


Vitalizing  the  Ballot  127 

dozen  if  that  many  were  running  against  me," 
humorously  remarked  the  machine  candidate 
in  a  race  for  a  primary  nomination  in  which 
the  opposition  to  him  was  divided  between  two 
candidates. 

How  often  has  the  individual  citizen,  desiring 
a  higher  brand  of  pubhc  administration,  longed 
for  some  means  of  insuring  that,  if  his  choice 
among  the  good  candidates  is  not  successful  in 
the  election,  the  bad  candidate  will  not  be 
successful!  How  can  the  minority,  which  is 
organized,  be  prevented  from  defeating  the 
majority  which  is  not  organized?  To  put  the 
question  more  concretely:  how  can  the  machine 
candidate,  who  represents  the  anti-public  in- 
terest, be  kept  from  winning  when  the  great 
majority  of  the  voters,  though  divided  in  their 
preferences  among  a  number  of  candidates  of 
their  own  kind,  are  united  in  their  antagonism  to 
the  machine  man?  Upward  of  twenty  Amer- 
ican cities,  containing  more  than  a  million  and  a 
quarter  people,  beheve  that  they  have  found  the 
answer  to  this  question  in  the  preferential  sys- 
tem of  voting. 

Though  not  unknown  to  students  of  political 
science,  the  preferential  voting  plan  possessed 
only  an  academic  interest  in  this  country  until 


128  Municipal  Freedom 

Mr.  James  W.  Bucklin,  of  Grand  Junction, 
Colorado,  secured  its  incorporation  into  the  new 
commission  charter  of  that  city  in  1909.  About 
the  same  time  Prof.  Lewis  Jerome  Johnson,  of 
Harvard,  whose  versatiHty  led  him  from  the 
building  of  the  Harvard  stadium  to  the  building 
of  a  new  municipal  system,  began  to  advocate 
preferential  voting  for  municipal  elections,  and 
largely  because  of  his  influence  the  new  system 
went  into  the  new  charter  of  Spokane  in  1910, 
and  into  the  proposed  Cambridge  charter,  which, 
though  defeated  at  the  polls,  has  had  a  wide  in- 
fluence as  a  model  charter.  During  the  year 
191 1,  Pueblo,  Colorado,  adopted  the  new  voting 
plan,  and  by  the  close  of  1913*  the  cities  of 
Duluth,  Minnesota;  New  Iberia,  Louisiana; 
Denver,  Colorado  Springs,  and  Fort  Collins, 
Colorado;  Portland  and  La  Grande,  Oregon; 
Nashua, t  New  Hampshire;  and  Cleveland,! 
Ohio,  were  choosing  their  city  officers  by  the 
preferential  plan  of  selection.  Meanwhile  the 
states  of  Idaho*,  North  Dakota,  Washington, 
Wisconsin,  and  Minnesota  have  adopted  prefer- 


*The  following  cities  are  to  be  added  to  the  list:  Cadillac, 
Mich.;  St.  Petersburg,  Fla.;  Lethbridge,  Alberta;  and  the  com- 
mission-governed cities  of  New  Jersey,  which  are  granted  the 
preferential  plan  by  an  act  of  the  legislature  passed  April  7, 1914. 

t  Non-commission  charters. 


Vitalizing  the  Ballot  129 

ential  voting  in  one  form  or  another  as  an  in- 
cident to  their  state  primary  laws.  The  rapid 
spread  of  preferential  voting  denotes  not  only  a 
willingness  on  the  part  of  the  people  to  try  new 
political  methods,  but  a  widespread  and  deep- 
seated  dissatisfaction  with  the  present  method 
of  plurality  election  with  its  attendant  minority 
choice. 

The  principle  of  the  preferential  plan  is  simple, 
despite  the  politicians'  charge  that  it  is  com- 
plicated. The  preferential  ballot,  a  good  ex- 
ample of  which  is  the  proposed  Cambridge  ballot 
shown  herewith,  differs  from  the  ordinary 
Australian  ballot  only  in  having  three  columns 
for  crosses  at  the  right  of  the  candidates'  names 
instead  of  one.  The  voter  registers  his  first 
choice  for  the  office  to  be  filled  by  placing  a 
cross  opposite  his  first-choice  candidate's  name, 
and,  if  he  has  a  second  choice,  by  a  similar 
cross  in  the  second  column.  He  may  mark 
as  many  other  choices  as  he  desires  by  placing 
crosses  in  the  third,  or  right-hand,  column.  The 
various  candidates  are  placed  on  the  ballot  by 
petition.* 


*The  number  of  signatures  required  is  generally  low,  ranging 
from  fifty  to  one  hundred,  although  in  Cleveland  twenty-five 
hundred  signatures  are  required  of  a  mayoralty  and  two  hundred 
of  an  aldermanic  candidate. 


130  Municipal  Freedom 

It  is  in  the  method  of  counting  the  votes  that 
the  distinctive  character  of  the  preferential  plan 
is  revealed.  If  any  candidate  receives  a  majority 
of  all  the  first-choice  votes  cast,  he  is  elected. 
If  no  one  has  received  a  majority  of  the  first- 
choice  votes,  the  second-choice  votes  of  each 
candidate  are  added  to  his  first.  If  any  can- 
didate now  has  a  majority,  he  is  elected; 
if  not,  all  three  choices  for  each  candidate 
are  added  and  the  highest  man  wins,  whether 
he  has  a  majority  or  not,  for  he  is  the  can- 
didate behind  whom  the  greatest  number  of 
voters  have  automatically  gathered  after  each 
voter  has  specified  all  whom  he  wants  to  sup- 
port. 

The  practical  working  of  the  preferential  plan 
as  it  has  been  applied  in  American  cities  is  well 
illustrated  by  the  results  of  the  first  election 
in  Grand  Junction,  the  first  American  city  to 
adopt  it.  The  following  table  shows  the  results 
of  the  vote  for  mayor  in  the  election  of  Novem- 
'  ber  2,  1909.  The  starred  men  in  the  list  were 
the  anti-charter  and  minority  candidates,  the 
others  were  the  pro-charter  and  majority  candi- 
dates. An  examination  of  subsequent  prefer- 
ential elections  shows  this  case  to  be  typ- 
ical. 


Vitalizing  the  Ballot 


131 


RESULT  OF  THE  VOTES  FOR  MAYOR 


1st 
Choice 

2d 

Choice 

Other 
Choices 

Com 

Mned 

Ist's  and 
2d's 

Ist's,  zd's. 
Others 

D.  W.  Aupperle 

465 

143 

145 

608 

753 

*W.  H.  Bannister 

603 

93 

43 

696 

739 

N.  A.  Lough 

99 

231 

328 

330 

658 

*E.  B.  Lutes 

41 

114 

88 

155 

243 

E.  M.  Slocomb 

229 

3S7 

326 

586 

912 

Thomas  H.  Todd 

362 

293 

396 

655 

1,051 

(Elected) 

1,799 

1,231 

1,326 

The  above  recorded  vote  showed  that  no 
candidate  on  the  hst  was  the  first  choice  of  a 
majority  of  the  voters,  although  Bannister,  a 
minority  candidate,  was  in  the  lead.  Accord- 
ingly the  first  and  second  choices  were  added  to- 
gether. But  here,  too,  the  result  showed  no 
majority,  and  the  additional  choices  w^ere  added 
to  the  combined  first  and  second  choices.  Todd, 
the  highest  man,  now  won  because  he  was  the 
candidate  who  was  acceptable  to  the  greatest 
number  of  voters. 

One  feature  of  the  Grand  Junction  plan  has 
been  ignored  in  the  foregoing  description — the 
dropping  from  the  race  of  the  lowest  man  as  the 
count  proceeds.  Thus,  by  the  Grand  Junction 
method.  Lutes  being  the  man  who  got  the  small- 
est  number  of  first-choice  votes,  was  dropped 


132  Municipal  Freedom 

from  the  race  after  the  counting  of  the  first 
choices,  and  Lough,  being  the  man  who  received 
the  smallest  number  of  first  and  second  choices 
was  excluded  after  the  counting  of  the  combined 
first  and  second  choice  votes.  The  objection  to 
this  modification  of  the  Cambridge  plan  is  that 
candidates  are  excluded  from  the  race  before 
they  have  had  the  opportunity  of  receiving  their 
later-choice  votes.  This  provision  is  really  a 
system  of  weighted  preferences,  since  it  assumes 
that  a  voter's  first  choice  deserves  greater  weight 
than  his  later  choices.  It  successfully  prevents 
a  "dark  horse"  from  winning;  but  a  "dark 
horse"  may  sometimes  be  the  choice  of  the 
greatest  number.  The  Grand  Junction  modi- 
fication has  not  been  followed  by  other  cities, 
and  since  it  has  no  material  effect  on  the  above 
recorded  Grand  Junction  election  it  may  be  dis- 
regarded in  studying  the  results.* 

The  superiority  of  the  preferential  plan  over 
the  familiar  plurality  system  lies  in  the  greater 
accuracy  with  which  it  gauges  the  popular  will. 
It  cannot  be  claimed  for  the  new  plan  that  it 
guarantees  that  the  winner  shall  be  the  choice  of 
a  majority  of  the  voters;  the  majority  of  the 


*  See   author's  note  on  the "  Australian  System."  Appendix 
p.  219. 


Vitalizing  the  Ballot  133 

voters  may  not  have  a  common  choice  for  the 
office  to  be  filled.  Thus  in  a  recent  Denver 
election,  of  the  135  candidates  for  five  com- 
missionerships  and  one  auditorship,  no  one  got 
a  majority  even  by  a  combination  of  choices; 
and  in  the  first  Spokane  election  no  one  of  the 
five  victorious  candidates  out  of  the  field  of 
ninety-two  got  a  majority. 

BALLOT    ILLUSTRATING    PREFERENTIAL     VOTING 

As  embodied  in  the  Proposed  New  Charter 
for  Cambridge,   Mass. 

Instructions. — To  vote  for  a  candidate  make 
a  cross  (X)  in  the  appropriate  space. 

Vote  your  first  choice  in  the  first  column. 

Vote  your  second  choice  in  the  second 
column. 

Vote  ONLY  one  first  choice  and  only  one 
second  choice  for  any  one  office. 

Vote  in  the  third  column  for  all  the  other 
CANDIDATES  whom  vou  wish  to  support. 

do  not  vote  more  than  one  choice  for 
ONE  PERSON,  as  onlv  one  choice  will  count  for 
any  candidate. 

If  you  wrongly  mark,  tear,  or  deface  this 
ballot,  return  it  and  obtain  another. 


134  Municipal  Freedom 

ONE  MAN  TO  BE  ELECTED  FOR  EACH  OFFICE 


Supervisor  of 
Administration  (Mayor) 

First 
Choice 

Second 
Choice 

Other 
Choices 

Charles  E.  Hughes 

Champ  Clark 

John  A.  O'Gorman 

Nelson  W.  Aldrich 

Richard  Croker 

Robert  L.  Owen 

William  H.  Taft 

Joseph  W.  Folk 

X 

Robert  M.  LaFoUette 

X 

Woodrow  Wilson 

X 

William  J.  Bryan 

X 

Chauncey  M.  Depew 

Theodore  Roosevelt 

X 

Supervisor  of 
Finance 

Bourke  Cockran 

X 

Leslie  B.  Shaw 

X 

John  A.  Sullivan 

Nathan  Matthews 

X 

Vitalizing  the  Ballot 


135 


Supervisor  of 
PubHc  Works 

First 
Choice 

Second 
Choice 

Other 
Choices 

Guy  C.  Emerson 

X 

John  Mitchell 

X 

Stephen  O'Meara 

Supervisor  of 
Health 

H.  W.  Wiley 

X 

Supervisor  of 
Public  Property 

GifFord  Pinchot 

X 

Richard  A.  Ballinger 

X 

The  merit  of  the  preferential  ballot  is  that,  if 
there  is  a  majority  choice,  that  choice  will  be 
given  expression,  and  that,  if  the  majority  of  the 
voters  do  not  have  a  common  choice,  that  can- 
didate who  meets  with  the  approval  of  the  great- 
est number  of  voters  will  be  chosen.  The  pref- 
erential plan  will  not  in  all  cases  eliminate  the 
plurality  choice,  but  a  plurality  choice  in  an 
election  in  which  each  voter  has  had  the  oppor- 
tunity of  voting  for  every  candidate  to  his  liking 


136  Municipal  Freedom 

is  obviously  preferable  to  a  plurality  choice 
where  each  voter  had  the  opportunity  of  voting 
for  only  one  candidate.  If  the  preferential  plan 
does  not,  in  a  specific  instance,  give  a  majority 
choice,  it  is  because  there  is  no  candidate  on 
which  the  majority  are  united — a  result  which 
obviously  is  not  the  fault  of  the  system.  In  the 
Grand  Junction  election,  if  the  ordinary  plu- 
rality method  had  been  used,  Bannister,  the 
minority  candidate  whom  the  majority  of  the 
voters  did  not  want,  would  have  been  elected, 
because  he  was  the  first  choice  of  more  voters 
than  any  of  his  opponents — a  plain  case  of  the 
organized  minority  defeating  the  unorganized 
majority. 

The  prevailing  form  of  election  in  the  com- 
mission-governed cities  is  the  non-partisan  sys- 
tem of  second  elections.  This  method,  which 
was  early  adopted  by  Des  Moines,  provides  for 
a  non-partisan  primary,  or  preliminary  election, 
in  which  the  voter  casts  a  single  choice  for  the 
office  to  be  filled;  and  for  a  second  election, 
in  which  the  voter  must  choose  between  the 
two  candidates  who  received  the  highest  votes 
in  the  first,  or  primary,  election.  The  objection 
to  this  system  is  that  the  voter's  choice  is  limited, 
in  the  second  election,  to  two  men,  neither   of 


Vitalizing  the  Ballot  137 

whom  may  have  a  majority  of  the  voters  be- 
hind him.  Thus  in  the  Grand  Junction  elec- 
tion referred  to,  if  the  Des  Moines  plan  of  second 
elections  had  been  used,  Aupperle  and  Bannister, 
the  two  highest  candidates  on  first  choice,  would 
have  been  the  sole  contestants  in  the  second 
election,  although  neither  of  them  was  accepta- 
ble to  the  majority.  The  Des  Moines  plan  se- 
cures only  a  fictitious  majority,  for  its  so-called 
"majority"  vote  is  obtained  only  by  choking 
off  candidates  in  the  preliminary  election  who 
might  be  more  acceptable  to  the  majority  than 
the  two  who  were  carried  over  to  the  final  elec- 
tion. 

The  Des  Moines  plan  of  second  elections  is  in 
fact  a  defective  mode  of  preferential  voting: 
groups  of  voters  whose  first  choice  fails  to  qualify 
on  the  first  ballot  receive  a  subsequent  limited 
opportunity  to  express  a  second  choice.  The 
plan  at  best  accompHshes  nothing  that  cannot 
equally  well  be  accomplished  at  a  single  prefer- 
ential election.  Moreover,  it  is  subject  to 
serious  disadvantages  to  which  modes  of  prefer- 
ential voting  requiring  a  single  election  are  not 
subject.  It  is  more  expensive  to  the  state,  more 
laborious  to  the  voter,  more  exhausting  to  the 
candidate,  and   more  disturbing  to  the  public 


138  Municipal  Freedom 

peace.  It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  some 
commission  cities  should  have  discarded  the 
second  election  plan  for  the  preferential  voting 
system. 

No  one  will  doubt  that  it  frequently  becomes 
more  important  to  defeat  a  particular  candidate 
than  to  elect  any  one  of  his  competitors;  from 
this  fact  arises  a  distinct  advantage  of  the 
preferential  plan  of  voting;  for  the  new  sys- 
tem enlarges  the  political  power  of  the  individual 
voter;  it  permits  him  to  vote  for  all  the  candi- 
dates whom  he  wants,  and  to  vote  against  the 
candidate  whom  he  does  not  want.  It  is  a 
"voting  against"  system  as  well  as  a  ** voting 
for"  system;  for,  by  casting  a  second  and  other 
votes  for  anti-machine  candidates,  the  voter 
effectively  votes  against  the  machine  candidate. 
The  plurality  plan  gives  him  one  chance  to  get 
his  man  elected;  the  preferential  plan  gives  him 
several.  The  latter  system,  though  it  may  not 
offer  the  voter  a  better  chance  to  get  the  can- 
didate of  his  highest  preference  elected,  certainly 
offers  him  a  better  chance  to  get  a  candidate 
of  his  ideas  elected. 

Not  least  among  the  advantages  of  the  prefer- 
ential system  is  the  fact  that  it  serves  to  attract 
into  the  race  a  large  number  of  good  men,  with- 


Vitalizing  the  Ballot  139 

out  at  the  same  time  inviting  the  danger  of  the 
split  vote.  For  division  of  the  majority,  on  ac- 
count of  the  appearance  in  the  race  of  several 
good  candidates,  does  not  mean  the  rule  of 
the  minority,  as  it  does  under  the  plurality  sys- 
tem. 

Again,  the  preferential  ballot,  by  doing  away 
with  the  necessity  of  the  primary  election,  con- 
serves the  energies  of  both  voter  and  candidate. 
It  is  notorious  that  the  primary  election  does 
not  enlist  the  interest  of  the  great  bulk  of  the 
voters  who  appear  in  the  final  election — a  fact 
of  great  significance.  The  preferential  plan, 
then,  more  nearly  fits  the  political  habits  of  our 
voters  of  concentrating  their  interest  in  a  single 
election,  while  it  certainly  relieves  the  candidate 
of  a  large  expenditure  of  money,  time,  and  effort. 
"Sane  voting,"  as  H.  G.  Wells  calls  it,  is  thus 
achieved. 

Another  merit  of  the  new  system  of  selection, 
which  should  encourage  more  good  men  to  stand 
for  office,  is  its  tendency  to  elevate  the  char- 
acter of  the  campaign  by  the  elimination  of  mud- 
slinging  and  personal  abuse.  Wise  candidates 
in  preferential  elections  refrain  from  unjust  criti- 
cisms and  personal  abuse,  and  emphasize  issues 
rather  than  personalities.     In  a  recent  campaign 


140  Municipal  Freedom 

in  a  middle-western  city  in  which  the  writer  was 
a  candidate  for  mayor,  it  became  almost  im- 
possible to  secure  a  consideration  of  municipal 
issues,  so  intensely  personal  was  the  campaign. 
Under  the  preferential  plan  not  one  of  the  three 
candidates  in  this  race  would  have  abused  his 
opponents,  for  fear  of  driving  away  from  him 
the  second-choice  votes  of  his  opponents'  sup- 
porters. 

How  widely  can  preferential  voting  be  applied 
under  American  political  conditions  ?  Probably 
the  new  plan  would  cut  across  party  lines  and 
demoralize  normal  party  integrity  if  used  as  a 
substitute  for  the  party  convention  or  primary 
in  national  and  state  contests.  But  there  ap- 
pears no  reason  why  the  plan  should  not  be 
used  as  an  incident  of  the  direct  primary  in  the 
selection  of  party  nominees.  In  judicial,  county, 
and  municipal  elections,  where  the  contests 
should  be  either  non-partisan  or  local  partisan, 
it  furnishes  an  excellent  device  for  breaking  the 
power  of  the  minority.  Indeed,  its  anti-machine 
character  is  strongly  indicated  by  the  bitterness 
with  which  machine  politicians  have  fought 
against  its  introduction.  In  view  of  the  present 
tendency  in  city  government  toward  concen- 
tration of  powers  into  a  small  body,  it  becomes 


Vitalizing  the  Ballot  141 

more  important  than  ever  that  these  few  officers 
shall  represent  the  majority  instead  of  the 
minority  will.  As  an  effective  instrument  for 
accomplishing  this,  preferential  voting  may  well 
command  the  attention  of  our  political  builders. 


CHAPTER  IX 

MUNICIPAL  FREEDOM 

If,  as  Jefferson  prophesied,  the  final  test  of 
democracy  in  America  is  to  come  in  the  cities,  it 
would  seem  that  the  test  should  at  least  be  a 
fair  one.  Yet  the  municipal  machinery  of  the 
average  American  state  permits  anything  but 
a  fair  trial  of  the  democratic  principle.  For 
every  student  of  contemporaneous  municipal 
conditions  knows  that,  barring  those  progressive 
communities  that  have  adopted  some  form  of 
commission  government,  city  government  is 
still  under  the  curse  of  divided  responsibility,  is 
still  in  the  hands  of  men  who  cannot  apply  the 
rules  of  municipal  efficiency  because  they  are 
bound  by  the  rules  of  the  partisan  game.  In 
these  cities  men  are  still  elected  to  office  by 
national-party  organizations  without  regard  to 
questions  of  local  policy,  and  men  are  still  ap- 
pointed to  municipal  positions  because  of  what 
they  have  done  for  their  party  rather  than  be- 
cause of  anything  they  can  do  for  their  city. 

142 


Municipal  Freedom  143 

Deplorable  as  it  is,  the  worst  thing  about  this 
system  of  city  government  is  that  it  is  not 
generally  the  free  choice  of  the  cities  that  are 
the  victims  of  it,  but  an  imposition  by  an  out- 
side authority — the  state  legislature.  For  under 
the  ordinary  state  constitution,  the  city  is  not, 
in  theory  of  law,  a  self-governing  community, 
but  a  subject  province  exercising  its  limited 
powers  by  sufferance  of  the  state  legislature, 
and  having  this  or  that  form  of  government  as 
may  be  given  to  it  by  the  outside  sovereign. 
The  ordinary  municipality  does  not  even  possess 
the  right  to  its  own  existence;  it  exists  only  b}' 
grace  of  the  state  legislature,  which,  if  it  pleases 
to  do  so,  can  withdraw  its  lease  of  life  at  will. 

Thus  the  city  takes  its  right  to  existence, 
its  form  of  government,  and  its  governmental 
powers  from  the  state,  and  what  the  state  can 
give  the  state  can  take  away.  The  legal  va- 
lidity of  any  act  by  the  city,  such  as  the  issuing 
of  bonds,  the  contracting  for  a  municipal  water- 
works, or  the  granting  of  a  municipal  franchise, 
is  determined  not  by  the  expressed  desire  of  its 
citizens,  but  by  the  voice  of  the  legislature  as  set 
out  in  some  statute.  The  real  seat  of  municipal 
authority,  therefore,  is  not  in  the  citizens,  but 
in  the  state  legislature.     Sweep  away  the  Fed- 


144  Municipal  Freedom 

eral  Government  and  the  'state  government 
would  remain,  because  the  state  does  not  draw 
its  life  from  the  Federal  Government,  But 
destroy  the  state  government  and  you  destroy 
the  municipality;  for  the  municipality  lives  and 
moves  and  has  its  being  in  the  state. 

Under  this  system  of  constitutional  law  the 
cities  exercise  those  powers  that  are  enumerated 
in  the  state  legislative  grant,  and  only  those 
powers.  If  the  city  wants  to  exercise  a  specific 
power  of  local  government  for  the  satisfaction  of 
a  local  need,  it  must  search  the  statutes  for 
permission,  and  if  the  statutes  are  silent  on  the 
point,  it  must  appeal  to  the  state  legislature  for 
the  requisite  power.  Thus  if  an  Indiana  city, 
for  example,  wishes  to  furnish  ice  to  its  citizens 
in  the  heat  of  summer,  establish  a  pension  fund 
for  its  teachers,  or  institute  a  civil  service  test 
for  its  employees,  it  must  make  its  humiliating 
appeal  to  the  legislative  Caesar  at  Indianapolis; 
for  these  powers  are  not  nominated  in  the  bond 
whereby  the  city  lives.*  No  wonder  an  ex- 
asperated Indiana  city  official  was  once  led  to 
remark  that  "the  only  creatures  without  rights 
under  our  laws  are  outlaws,  wild  beasts,  and 
municipalities."      Yet  that   local  communities 


*In  Indiana  this  is  the  "Cities  and  Towns  Act." 


Municipal  Freedom  145 

shall  have  the  fullest  right  of  local  self-govern- 
ment is  a  maxim  of  American  institutions. 

Not  only  must  the  city  in  the  exercise  of  its 
enumerated  powers  keep  strictly  within  the 
limits  set  by  the  state  legislature,  it  must  follow 
only  such  administrative  methods  as  the  legis- 
lature has  prescribed.  Even  in  the  determi- 
nation of  the  fundamental  framework  of  their 
government  the  citizens  have  no  legal  voice.  A 
certain  city  may  desire  the  commission  plan  or 
the  city  manager  plan;  but,  of  its  own  action,  it 
cannot  get  what  it  wants.  It  must  take  what 
it  gets  from  the  State  House,  and  too  often  it 
gets  an  antiquated  form  of  city  organization 
that  renders  increasingly  difficult  the  municipal 
problem.  And  not  only  the  general  framework, 
but  the  minutest  detail  of  the  administrative 
machinery,  is  often  prescribed  by  legislative  act. 

Sometimes  the  legislature  groups  the  cities  in 
classes  according  to  their  population,  and  then 
imposes  a  detailed  plan  of  administrative  organi- 
zation and  powers  upon  each  class.  This  fre- 
quently means  that  a  particular  city  is  saddled 
with  an  administrative  machinery  ill-fitted  to 
its  local  conditions,  or  with  administrative 
methods  ill-adapted  to  its  local  needs.  Any  one 
who  is  familiar  with  municipal  conditions  knows 


146  Municipal  Freedom 

that  even  cities  of  the  same  general  size  often 
reveal  the  greatest  diversity  of  conditions  and 
needs,  and  that  what  is  good  for  one  city  is  often 
bad  for  another.  Moreover,  to  imprison  the 
city  in  the  straight  jacket  of  uniform  legislation 
checks  its  inventiveness,  for  it  deprives  it  of  the 
opportunity  of  wholesome  experiment  with 
municipal  methods.  It  impairs  its  individuality, 
for  it  takes  from  it  the  chance  to  shape  its  own 
life  and  development.  It  lessens  its  sense  of 
civic  responsibility,  for  it  relieves  it  of  the 
responsibility  of  working  out  its  own  civic  sal- 
vation. Common  sense  joins  with  the  principle 
of  local  self-government  in  the  demand  that 
local  institutions  be  permitted  to  conform  to 
local  conditions. 

To  meet  the  needs  of  modern  social  and 
economic  development  the  American  city  with- 
out right  of  self-government  is  compelled  by  the 
state  constitution  to  appeal  at  every  turn  to  the 
legislature  for  relief;  but  that  constitution  does 
not  guarantee  that  the  city's  prayer  shall  be 
answered,  or  that  it  shall  even  be  considered  on 
its  merits.  Who  can  deny  that  politics-ridden 
legislatures  have  often  refused  to  hear  the  appeal 
of  the  city  for  no  other  than  a  purely  partisan  , 
reason?     Who  will  deny  that,  just  as  burden- 


Municipal  Freedom  147 

some  laws  have  often  been  imposed  upon  the 
city  for  partisan  purpose,  so  needed  legislation 
has  often  been  denied  the  city  for  partisan  ad- 
vantage? The  legislative  history  of  every  state 
abounds  with  testimony  to  show  that  legislative 
dominion  over  municipal  affairs  has  been  as 
discreditable  to  the  state  as  it  has  been  un- 
healthy for  the  city.  Out  of  this  subjection  of 
the  city  have  come  the  darkest  chapters  of  our 
municipal  history. 

Not  only  does  the  partisan  character  of  the 
state  legislature  disqualify  it  for  the  function  of 
guiding  the  administrative  development  of  the 
cities,  but  the  individual  legislators  have  neither 
the  time  nor  the  knowledge  of  local  conditions 
nor  the  proper  sense  of  responsibility  to  the  ur- 
ban constituency  necessary  to  a  constructive 
treatment  of  the  municipal  problem.  Members 
of  the  legislature  are  largely  from  the  rural  dis- 
tricts and  cannot  in  reason  be  expected  to  un- 
derstand the  perplexing  problems  of  municipal 
government.  Yet,  to  these  men,  untrained  in 
the  intricacies  of  municipal  administration,  un- 
familiar with  actual  city  conditions  and  busy 
with  many  problems  of  state  policy,  has  been 
intrusted  the  tremendous  task  of  controlling  the 
city's  administrative  development.     It  is  no  re- 


148  Municipal  Freedom 

flection  upon  the  ability  or  intelligence  of  our 
legislators  to  say  that  they  are  ill-fitted  for  this 
task  of  absentee  law-making. 

Aside  from  making  impossible  an  effective 
solution  of  the  municipal  problem,  this  state- 
legislative  dominion  over  the  city  impairs  the 
efficiency  of  the  legislators  in  the  other  work 
which  they  have  to  do.  In  Indiana,  for  example, 
the  legislative  desks  for  years  have  groaned 
under  the  burden  of  bills  having  for  their  object 
to  grant  to  cities  relief  from  the  restrictive 
provisions  of  the  state  constitution  and  laws. 
During  the  past  few  sessions  a  perfect  flood  of 
measures  dealing  with  matters  of  a  purely  local 
nature  engrossed  legislative  time  and  energy 
that  should  have  been  put  upon  important  mat- 
ters of  general  state  policy.  We  have  eliminated 
by  a  Federal  constitutional  change  one  great  ob- 
stacle to  state  legislative  efficiency — the  indirect 
election  of  United  States  Senators;  it  now  re- 
mains to  sweep  away  by  state  constitutional 
change  another  great  obstacle — the  state  regu- 
lation of  municipal  aff'airs. 

It  was  not  so  much  an  appreciation  of  this  need 
as  it  was  an  awakening  to  the  more  flagrant  evils 
of  legislative  intervention  in  municipal  aff'airs 
that  gave  birth  in  the  closing  decades  of  the 


Municipal  Freedom  149 

nineteenth  century  to  the  demand  for  munic- 
ipal home  rule.  The  movement  received  great 
impetus  from  the  formation  of  the  National 
Municipal  League  which  advocated  a  construc- 
tive policy  of  constitutional  amendment  to  pro- 
tect the  city  from  legislative  encroachment. 
Partly  as  a  result  of  the  league's  efforts,  nine 
states*  have  adopted  constitutional  provisions 
giving  the  cities  the  right  to  frame  their  own 
charters  and  increasing  generally  the  sphere  of 
local  control.  And  the  sentiment  continues  to 
grow.  "Fundamentally  the  most  important 
development  in  charter  reform  is  the  growth  of 
public  sentiment  in  behalf  of  municipal  home 
rule,"  writes  Clinton  Rogers  Woodruff,  the  able 
secretary  of  the  National  Municipal  League. 
The  struggle  of  the  medieval  city  was  for  com- 
merce freedom;  the  struggle  of  the  modern 
American  city  is  for  political  freedom. 

What  does  "municipal  home  rule  mean?"  It 
means,  in  the  first  place,  a  reversal  of  the  exist- 
ing legal  presumption  against  the  powers  of  the 
city.  Instead  of  possessing  only  such  powers 
as  are  granted  to  it  by  the  state  legislature,  the 
city,  under  the  "home  rule"  system,  is  invested 


*They  are  Missouri,  California,  Washington,  Oregon,  Galorado, 
Minnesota,  Olclahoma,  Michigan,  and  Ohio. 


150  Municipal  Freedom 

by  the  constitution  with  all  powers  of  local 
government,  consistent  with  the  general  laws  of 
the  state.  In  this  way  is  created  an  unmolested 
sphere  of  local  self-government  in  which  the  city 
may  exercise  all  powers  necessary  to  its  own 
complete  development,  without  the  necessity  of 
recourse  to  any  outside  authority  and  without 
the  danger  of  interference  from  any  outside 
authority.  Municipal  home  rule  means,  further, 
that  the  city  may  determine  its  own  form  of 
government,  or,  as  Herbert  Bigelow  puts  it, 
"may  cut  out  its  own  municipal  suit  of  clothes." 
Thus  the  city  decides  for  itself,  by  means  of  a 
charter  convention  and  ratification  election, 
whether  it  will  have  the  commission  plan,  the 
city-manager  plan,  the  mayor-and-council  sys- 
tem, or  some  other  form  of  municipal  organi- 
zation. 

And  why  not?  Who  knows  better  than  the 
citizens  of  Indianapolis  the  needs  of  Indian- 
apolis and  the  administrative  agencies  that  are 
adapted  to  those  needs?  Who  can  determine 
better  than  the  citizens  of  Lexington,  Kentucky, 
the  activities  of  public  welfare  in  which  the 
government  of  Lexington  should  engage?  If 
Detroit  wants  a  non-partisan  form  of  city  govern- 
ment why  should  not  Detroit  have  that  form? 


Municipal  Freedom  151 

There  appears  to  be  no  reason  for  excepting 
cities  from  the  operation  of  the  principle  of  self- 
government  that  does  not  apply  with  equal 
force  against  the  principle  of  democracy  itself. 

Ours  are  the  only  Enghsh-speaking  cities  in 
the  world  that  are  denied  the  right  of  self- 
government.  One  cannot  imagine,  for  example, 
legislative  intermeddhng  in  the  affairs  of  an 
English  city,  which  is  permitted  by  parlia- 
ment to  develop  in  its  own  way  and  according 
to  its  own  ideas  of  administrative  organization. 
English  cities  since  1832  have  been  among  the 
best  governed  in  the  world,  and  American  cities 
have  been  among  the  worst  governed.  And  one 
reason  for  this  is  that  English  cities  are  self- 
governed  and  American  cities  are  state-governed. 
It  has  been  well  said  that  the  citizens  of  Bir- 
mingham govern  Birmingham,  but  that  the  leg- 
islature of  Indiana  governs  Indianapolis. 

Home  rule  for  cities  means  municipal  freedom, 
but  it  does  not  mean  municipal  freedom  in 
the  sense  that  there  are  created  independent 
sovereignties  within  the  state.  It  does  not 
mean  that  the  state  government  loses  its  control 
over  matters  that  concern  the  general  state  wel- 
fare. Thus  home  rule  does  not  require  that  the 
state  surrender  entirely  its  control  over  elections 


152  Municipal  Freedom 

in  which  state  officers  are  chosen;  for  the  people 
of  the  commonwealth  as  a  whole  are  vitally 
interested  in  maintaining  the  purity  of  the  ballot 
and  in  the  prevention  of  corrupt  and  fraudulent 
practices.  It  does  not  mean  that  the  state 
resigns  its  power  to  pass  laws  relative  to  the 
health,  safety,  and  general  welfare  of  its  citizens. 
The  state  at  large  is  vitally  interested  in  the 
prevention  of  crime  and  disease  and  in  the 
education  of  the  people,  and,  although  it  may 
leave  the  city  to  provide  its  own  administrative 
machinery  and  allow  a  wide  diversity  in  methods, 
it  must  maintain  a  general  supervisory  control 
over  these  subjects.  In  other  w^ords,  the  city 
government  is  not  only  an  organ  for  the  satis- 
faction of  local  needs,  but  an  agent  of  the  state 
for  the  performance  of  state  functions.  The 
doctrine  of  home  rule  recognizes  this.  It 
renders  to  the  city  the  things  that  are  the  city's, 
and  to  the  state  the  things  that  are  the  state's. 
But  what  has  the  movement  for  home  rule  to 
do  with  the  movement  for  commission  govern- 
ment.'' It  is  important  that  these  two  most 
important  municipal  tendencies  of  the  time 
should  not  be  confused.  Home  rule  seeks  an 
enlargement  of  the  powers  of  the  municipality; 
commission  government,  a  more  efficient  organi- 


Municipal  Freedom  153 

zation  to  exercise  these  powers.  The  city's  pow- 
ers are  inadequate,  according  to  the  first  move- 
ment; its  organization  is  inadequate,  according 
to  the  second. 

But  though  the  two  movements  are  distinctly 
separate  and  their  aims  different,  their  interests 
are  nevertheless  interwoven.  It  is  significant 
that  a  large  number  of  cities  have  obtained 
commission  government  by  adopting  home  rule 
charters,  notably  Denver,  Spokane,  Tacoma, 
Dayton,  and  Springfield.  And  manyof  the  com- 
mission charters  granted  by  the  state  legislatures 
have  been  drawn  by  citizens  of  the  city  affected, 
and  thus  have  had  their  origin  in  the  spirit  of 
home  rule. 

It  may  almost  be  said  of  the  movements  for 
commission  government  and  home  rule  that  the 
success  of  one  cannot  be  permanently  complete 
without  the  success  of  the  other.  For,  while 
the  acquisition  of  broad  powers  of  local  control 
by  the  municipality  might  work  a  distinct  im- 
provement in  city  conditions,  an  inadequately 
organized  government  would  not  permit  the  ef- 
fective exercise  of  those  powers  in  the  interests 
of  the  people.  On  the  other  hand,  the  excellently 
adapted  organization  of  the  commission  govern- 
ment would  not  permit  it  to  achieve  complete 


154  Municipal  Freedom 

results  if  it  was  without  the  necessary  powers. 
If,  for  example,  the  legislature,  instead  of  the 
council,  exercised  the  power  to  grant  franchises 
to  public-service  corporations,  there  would  be 
nothing  to  prevent  the  imposition  of  a  franchise 
♦inimical  to  the  people's  interest,  no  matter  how 
responsive  the  commission  council  might  be. 

Again,  the  development  of  a  permanent, 
active,  civic  spirit,  which  is  as  necessary  to  the 
success  of  commission  as  to  any  other  form  of 
government,  would  be  seriously  checked  if  the 
city  did  not  possess  ample  control  over  its  own 
affairs.  It  is  significant  that  those  cities  which 
have  shown  the  most  wholesome  public  senti- 
ment have  exercised  broad  powers  of  local  con- 
trol. The  right  of  self-government  encourages 
civic  patriotism  because  it  imposes  civic  respon- 
sibility. 

But,  however  clearly  the  success  of  home  rule 
may  appear  to  be  connected  with  the  success  of 
commission  government,  that  connection  has 
not  always  been  conceded  by  students  of  munici- 
pal reform.  Thus  there  has  been  a  tendency 
to  regard  the  commission  government  as  inimi- 
cal to  the  movement  for  freeing  the  cities  from 
the  yoke  of  the  state  legislature.  "If  large  mu- 
nicipal councils  are  eliminated  from  the  frame- 


Municipal  Freedom  155 

work  of  city  government,"  writes  a  leading 
authority  on  municipal  government,  "there 
would  seem  to  be  a  danger  that  state  legislatures 
would  be  tempted  to  assume  for  themselves 
some  of  the  broader  legislative  functions  which 
councils  have  been  accustomed  to  exercise." 
Others  have  maintained  that  the  commission 
plan  is  organized  solely  with  a  view  to  adminis- 
trative efficiency  and  assumes  that  the  legislative, 
or  policy-determining,  powers  will  be  exercised 
by  the  state  legislature.  Similarly  the  New  York 
charter  commission  of  1901  declared,  in  its  re- 
port, that  "there  must  be  constant  legislation 
by  the  state  legislature  as  to  city  affairs  unless 
there  is  an  adequate  city  legislative  body," 
which,  to  the  commission,  meant  a  numerous 
body. 

While  no  step  should  be  taken  in  municipal 
reconstruction  which  would  afford  an  incentive 
to  greater  inroads  upon  the  principle  of  civic 
autonomy,  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  the  adoption 
of  the  commission  plan  should  be  regarded  as  a 
step  in  this  direction.  It  is  true  that  state 
legislatures  in  the  past  have  shown  an  unwilling- 
ness to  intrust  municipal  boards  with  broad 
powers,  but  it  is  equally  true  that  these  boards 
did   not   rest   upon   a  genuinely   popular  basis. 


156  Municipal  Freedom 

Sometimes  elected,  more  often  appointed,  they 
were  generally  neither  responsible  nor  responsive 
to  the  popular  will,  and  they  richly  merited  the 
distrustful  attitude  which  the  legislature  assumed 
toward  them. 

Radically  different  are  the  conditions  sur- 
rounding the  elective  council  in  the  commission 
system;  for  here  is  a  small  governing  body 
resting  upon  a  genuinely  popular  basis.  Elected 
by  the  voters  at  large,  both  their  acts  and  their 
term  of  office  subject  to  popular  revocation 
through  the  initiative,  referendum,  and  recall,  the 
members  of  the  council  in  the  commission  s\'stem 
do  not  stand  in  the  situation  of  members  of  an 
appointive  or  even  elective  municipal  board 
which  is  a  branch  of  a  complicated  municipal 
machinery.  It  follows  that  if  it  is  the  irrespon- 
sible character  of  the  board  system  that  dis- 
courages the  granting  of  important  legislative 
powers  to  it,  the  responsible  council  in  the  com- 
mission plan  is  obviously  in  no  danger  of  receiv- 
ing like  treatment  from  the  legislature. 

On  the  contrary,  there  are  not  wanting  grounds 
for  believing  that  the  commission  plan  will  even 
discourage  legislative  intervention.  One  of  the 
outstanding  causes  of  state  interference  has  been 
the  inflexible  character  of  the  old  form  of  mu- 


Municipal  Freedom  157 

nicipal  organization,  which  made  it  necessary 
for  the  legislature  to  interfere  whenever  local 
conditions  required  a  change  in  the  adminis- 
trative organization  of  the  city.  Under  the 
commission  plan,  the  details  of  the  local  ad- 
ministrative machinery  being  entirely  under  the 
control  of  the  council,  there  is  no  excuse  for 
legislative  interference  in  this  sphere  of  local 
affairs.  On  the  other  hand,  the  efficiency  of  the 
commission  government  from  an  administrative 
standpoint  will  doubtless  encourage  the  granting 
of  broader  powers  of  municipal  ownership  and 
enterprise,  which,  under  the  old  system,  have 
been  withheld  largely  because  the  municipal 
organization  had  not  proved  itself  efficient  as 
an  administrative  organ.  It  is  significant  that 
no  tendencies  hurtful  to  municipal  home  rule 
have  appeared  so  far  in  the  commission-governed 
cities,  and  that  in  most  instances  the  state  legis- 
latures have  even  been  more  generous  than  usual 
in  their  grants. 

Thus  it  is  that  the  tendencies  toward  mu- 
nicipal home  rule  and  commission  government 
have  been  in  fact,  as  in  theory,  mutually  bene- 
ficial and  not  mutually  inimical;  and  together 
they  have  unquestionably  made  for  municipal 
betterment.     The  first  gives  to  the  city  the  right 


158  Municipal  Freedom 

to  work  out  its  own  civic  destiny;  the  second 
gives  to  the  people  of  the  city  the  right  to 
determine  what  that  destiny  shall  be.  With 
these  rights  secured,  the  city  may  become  the 
hope  where  it  has  been  the  despair  of  democ- 
racy. For  it  will  then  possess  municipal  free- 
dom. 


THE   END 


APPENDIX 


APPENDIX 

I.    THE  DES  MOINES  PLAN 

As  Provided  hy  the  Iowa  Commission 
Government  Act 

CITIES  AFFECTED 

Section  i.  That  any  city  of  the  first  or 
second  class,  or  with  special  charter,  now  or 
hereafter  having  a  population  of  7,000*  or  over, 
as  shown  by  the  last  preceding  state  census,  may 
become  organized  as  a  city  under  the  provisions 
of  this  act  by  proceeding  as  hereinafter  pro- 
vided. 

THE      SUBMISSION     OF     THE      QUESTION     OF 

COMMISSION   GOVERNMENT  TO  THE 

ELECTORS 

Section  2.  Upon  petition  of  electors  equal  in 
number  to  25  percentum  of  the  votes  cast  for  all 
candidates  for  mayor  at  the  last  preceding  city 
election  of  any  such  city,  the  mayor  shall,  by 
proclamation,  submit  the  question  of  organizing 
as  a  city  under  this  act  at  a  special  election  to  be 

*  Originally  this  figure  was  25,000.  It  was  amended  March 
30,  1909. 

161 


i62  Appendix 

held  at  a  time  specified  therein,  and  within  two 
months  after  said  petition  is  filed;  provided,  how- 
ever, that  in  case  any  city  is  located  in  two  or 
more  townships  said  petition  shall  be  signed  by 
25  percentum  of  the  qualified  electors  of  said 
city  residing  in  each  of  said  townships.  If  said 
plan  is  not  adopted  at  the  special  election  called, 
the  question  of  adopting  said  plan  shall  not  be 
resubmitted  to  the  voters  of  said  city  for  adop- 
tion within  two  years  thereafter,  and  then  the 
question  to  adopt  shall  be  resubmitted  upon  the 
presentation  of  a  petition  signed  by  electors  equal 
in  number  to  25  percentum  of  the  votes  cast  for 
all  candidates  for  mayor  at  the  last  preceding 
general  city  election.  At  such  election,  the  prop- 
osition to  be  submitted  shall  be,  "Shall  the  prop- 
osition to  organize  the  city  of  (name  the  city), 
under  chapter  fourteen-c  (14-c)  of  the  supple- 
ment to  the  code,  1907,  as  amended  by  the  acts  of 
the  thirty-third  general  assembly  be  adopted.''" 
and  the  election  thereupon  shall  be  conducted, 
the  vote  canvassed,  and  the  result  declared  in  the 
same  manner  as  provided  by  law  m  respect  to 
other  city  elections.  If  the  majority  of  the  votes 
cast  shall  be  in  favor  thereof,  cities  having  a 
population  of  25,0x50  and  over  shall  thereupon 
proceed  to  the  election  of  a  mayor  and  four  coun- 
cilmen,  and  cities  having  a  population  of  7,000 
and  less  than  25,000  shall  proceed  to  the  election 
of  a  mayor  and  two  councilmen,  as  hereinafter 
provided.     Immediately  after  such  proposition 


Appendix  163 

is  adopted,  the  mayor  shall  transmit  to  the 
governor,  to  the  secretary  of  state,  and  to  the 
county  auditor,  each  a  certificate  stating  that 
such  proposition  was  adopted.  At  the  next 
regular  city  election  after  the  adoption  of  such 
proposition  there  shall  be  elected  a  mayor  and 
councilmen.  In  the  event,  however,  that  the 
next  regular  city  election  does  not  occur  within 
one  year  after  such  special  election,  the  mayor 
shall,  within  ten  days  after  such  special  election, 
by  proclamation  call  a  special  election  for  the 
election  of  a  mayor  and  councilmen,  sixty  days' 
notice  thereof  being  given  in  such  call;  such 
election  in  either  case  to  be  conducted  as  herein- 
after provided.* 

APPLYING  THE   LAW  AND   EXISTING   ORDINANCES 
TO    COMMISSION-GOVERNED    CITIES 

Section  3.  All  laws  governing  cities  of  the  first 
and  second  classesf  and  not  inconsistent  with 
the  provisions  of  this  act,  and  sections  955,  956, 
959,  964,989,  1,000,  1,023,  '^^^  i'053  of  the  code 
now  applicable  to  special-charter  cities  and  not 
inconsistent  with  the  provisions  of  this  act, 
shall  apply  to  and  govern  cities  organized  under 
this  act.  All  by-laws,  ordinances,  and  resolu- 
tions lawfully  passed  and  in  force  in  any  such 
city  under  its  former  organization  shall  remain 
in  force  until  altered  or  repealed  by  the  council 

.    *As  amended  by  the  Act  of  March  30,  1909. 
tibid. 


164  Appendix 

elected  under  the  provisions  of  this  act.  The 
territorial  limits  of  such  city  shall  remain  the 
same  as  under  its  former  organization,  and  all 
rights  and  property  of  every  description  which 
were  vested  in  any  city  under  its  former 
organization  shall  vest  in  the  same  under 
the  organization  herein  contemplated,  and  no 
right  or  liability  either  in  favor  of  or  against 
it,  existing  at  the  time,  and  no  suit  or  prose- 
cution of  any  kind  shall  be  affected  by  such 
change,  unless  otherwise  provided  for  in  this 
act. 

TERMS     OF     ELECTIVE     OFFICE     AND     VACANCIES 

Section  4.  In  every  city  having  a  population 
of  25,000  and  over  there  shall  be  elected  at  the 
regular  biennial  municipal  election  a  mayor  and 
four  councilmen,  and  in  every  city  having  a 
population  of  7,000  and  less  than  25,000  there 
shall  be  elected  at  such  election  a  mayor  and 
two  councilmen.* 

If  any  vacancy  occurs  m  any  such  office  the 
remaining  members  of  said  council  shall  appoint 
a  person  to  fill  such  vacancy  during  the  balance 
of  the  unexpired  term. 

Said  officers  shall  be  nominated  and  elected 
at  large.  Said  officers  shall  qualify  and  their 
terms  of  office  shall  begin  on  the  first  Monday 
after  their  election.  The  terms  of  office  of  the 
mayor  and  councilmen  or  aldermen  in  such  city 

*As  amended  by  the  Act  of  March  30,  1909. 


Appendix  165 

in  office  at  the  beginning  of  the  terms  of  office  of 
the  mayor  and  councilmen  first  elected  under 
the  provisions  of  this  act  shall  then  cease  and 
determine,  and  the  terms  of  office  of  all  other 
appointive  officers  in  force  in  such  city,  except 
as  hereinafter  provided,  shall  cease  and  deter- 
mine as  soon  as  the  council  shall  by  resolution 
declare. 

NOMINATION    AND    ELECTION    OF    CANDIDATES 

Section  5.  Candidates  to  be  voted  for  at  all 
general  municipal  elections  at  which  a  mayor 
and  councilmen  are  to  be  elected  under  the  pro- 
visions of  this  act  shall  be  nominated  by  a 
primary  election,  and  no  other  names  shall  be 
placed  upon  the  general  ballot  except  those 
selected  in  the  manner  hereinafter  prescribed. 
The  primary  election  for  such  nomination  shall 
be  held  on  the  second  Monday  preceding  the 
general  municipal  election.  The  judges  of  elec- 
tion appointed  for  the  general  municipal  election 
shall  be  the  judges  of  the  primary  election,  and 
it  shall  be  held  at  the  same  place,  so  far  as  pos- 
sible, and  the  polls  shall  be  opened  and  closed  at 
the  same  hours,  with  the  same  clerks  as  are  re- 
quired for  said  general  municipal  election.  Any 
person  desiring  to  become  a  candidate  for  mayor 
or  councilman  shall,  at  least  ten  days  prior  to 
said  primary  election,  file  with  the  said  clerk  a 
statement  of  such  candidacy,  in  substantially 
the  following  form: 


1 66  Appendix 

State  of  Iowa County,  ss. 

I  ( )  being  first  duly  sworn,  say  that  I 

reside   at street,  city  of , 

county  of State  of  Iowa;  that  I 

am  a  qualified  voter  therein;  that  I  am  a  candi- 
date for  nomination  to  the  office  of  (mayor  or 
councilman)  to  be  voted  upon  at  the  primary 

election  to  be  held  on  the Monday  of 

19 ,  and  I  hereby  request  that  my 

name  be  printed  upon  the  official  primary  ballot 
for  nomination  by  such  primary  election  for  such 
office. 

{Signed) 

Subscribed  and  sworn  to  (or  affirmed)  before 

me  by on  this 

day  of 19 

(Signed) 

and  shall  at  the  same  time  file  therewith  the 
petition  of  at  least  twenty-five  qualified  voters 
requesting  such  candidacy.  Each  petition  shall 
be  verified  by  one  or  more  persons  as  to  the  qual- 
ifications and  residence,  with  street  number,  of 
each  of  the  persons  so  signing  the  said  petition, 


Appendix 


167 


and  the  said  petition  shall  be  in  substantially 
the  following  form: 

PETITION    ACCOMPANYING    NOMINATING 

STATEMENT 

The  undersigned,  duly  qualified  electors  of  the 

city  of and  residing  at  the  places 

set  opposite  our  respective  names  hereto,  do 
hereby  request  that  the  name  of  (name  of  candi- 
date) be  placed  on  the  ballot  as  a  candidate  for 
nomination  for  (name  of  office)  at  the  primary 

election  to  be  held  in  such  city  on  the 

Monday  of 19 We  further  state 

that  we  know  him  to  be  a  qualified  elector  of  said 
city  and  a  man  of  good  moralcharacterandquali- 
fied  in  our  judgment  for  the  duties  of  such  office. 


Names  of 
Qualified  Electors 

Number 

Street 

Immediately  upon  the  expiration  of  the  time 
of  fihng  the  statement  and  petitions  for  candi- 


i68  Appendix 

dacies,  the  said  city  clerk  shall  cause  to  be  pub- 
lished for  three  successive  days  in  all  the  daily 
newspapers  published  in  the  city,  in  proper  form, 
the  names  of  the  persons  as  they  are  to  appear 
upon  the  primary  ballot,  and  if  there  be  no  daily 
newspaper,  then  in  two  issues  of  any  other  news- 
papers that  may  be  published  in  said  city;  and 
the  said  clerk  shall  thereupon  cause  the  primary 
ballots  to  be  printed,  authenticated  with  a  fac- 
simile of  his  signature.  Upon  the  said  ballot  the 
names  of  the  candidates  for  mayor,  arranged 
alphabetically,  shall  first  be  placed,  with  a  square 
at  the  left  of  each  name,  and  immediately  be- 
low the  words,  "Vote  for  one."  Following  these 
names,  likewise  arranged  in  alphabetical  order, 
shall  appear  the  names  of  the  candidates  for 
councilmen,  with  a  square  at  the  left  of  each 
name,  and  below  the  names  of  such  candidates 
shall  appear  the  words,  "Vote  for  four,"  or  "Vote 
for  two,"  as  the  case  may  be.  The  ballot  shall 
be  printed  upon  plain,  substantial  white  paper, 
and  shall  be  headed: 

CANDIDATES    FOR    NOMINATION    FOR   MAYOR   AND 

COUNCILMEN    OF CITY   AT    THE 

PRIMARY    ELECTION 

but  shall  have  no  party  designation  or  mark 
whatever.  The  ballots  shall  be  in  substantially 
the  following  form: 


Appendix  169 

{Place  a  cross  in  the  square  preceding  the  names 
of  the  parties  you  favor  as  candidates  for  the 
respective  positions.) 

OFFICIAL  PRIMARY  BALLOT  CANDIDATES  FOR 
NOMINATION  FOR  MAYOR  AND  COUNCILMEN  OF 
CITY  AT  THE  PRIMARY  ELEC- 
TION. 

FOR    MAYOR 

Name  of  Candidate: 


{Vote  for  one) 

FOR  COUNCILMEN 
Names  of  Candidates: 


{Vote  for  four)  or  {Vote  for  two)  as  the  case  may  be. 

Official  Ballot  attest: 

{Signature) 


City  Clerk 

Having  caused  said  ballots  to  be  printed,  the 
said  city  clerk  shall  cause  to  be  delivered  at  each 
polling  place  a  number  of  said  ballots  equal  to 
twice  the  number  of  votes  cast  in  such  polling 
precinct  at  the  last  general  municipal  election  for 
mayor.    The  persons  who  are  qualified  to  vote  at 


lyo  Appendix 

the  general  municipal  election  shall  be  qualified 
to  vote  at  such  primary  election,  and  challenges 
can  be  made  by  not  more  than  two  persons,  to  be 
appointed  at  the  time  of  opening  the  polls  by 
the  judges  of  election;  and  the  law  applicable  to 
challenges  at  a  general  municipal  election  shall 
be  applicable  to  challenges  made  at  such  primary 
election.  Judges  of  election  shall,  immediately 
upon  the  closing  of  the  polls,  count  the  ballots 
and  ascertain  the  number  of  votes  cast  in  such 
precinct  for  each  of  the  candidates,  and  make 
return  thereof  to  the  city  clerk,  upon  proper 
blanks  to  be  furnished  by  said  clerk,  within  six 
hours  of  the  closing  of  the  polls.  On  the  day 
following  the  said  primary  election,  the  said  city 
clerk  shall  canvass  said  returns  so  received  from 
all  the  polling  precincts,  and  shall  make  and 
publish  in  all  the  newspapers  of  said  city,  at  least 
once,  the  result  thereof.  Said  canvass  by  the 
city  clerk  shall  be  publicly  made.  The  two  can- 
didates receiving  the  highest  number  of  votes 
for  mayor  shall  be  the  candidates  and  the  only 
candidates  whose  names  shall  be  placed  upon 
the  ballot  for  mayor  at  the  next  succeeding 
general  municipal  election,  and  in  cities  having 
a  population  of  25,000  and  over,  the  eight  candi- 
dates receiving  the  highest  number  of  votes  for 
councilman,  or  all  such  candidates  if  less  than 
eight,  and  in  cities  having  a  population  of  7,000 
and  less  than  25,000,  the  four  candidates  receiv- 
ing the  highest  number  of  votes  for  councilman,  or 


Appendix  171 

all  such  candidates,  if  less  than  four,  shall  be  the 
candidates  and  the  only  candidates  whose  names 
shall  be  placed  upon  the  ballot  for  councilman  at 
such  municipal  election.  All  electors  of  cities 
under  this  act  who  by  the  law^s  governing  cities 
of  the  first  and  second  class  and  cities  acting 
under  special  charter  would  be  entitled  to  vote  for 
the  election  of  officers  at  any  general  municipal 
election  in  such  cities,  shall  be  qualified  to  vote 
at  all  elections  under  this  act;  and  the  ballot  at 
such  general  municipal  election  shall  be  in  the 
same  general  form  as  for  such  primary  election, 
so  far  as  applicable,  and  in  all  elections  in  such 
city  the  election  precinct,  voting  places,  method 
of  conductmg  election,  canvassing  the  vote  and 
announcing  the  results,  shall  be  the  same  as  by 
law  provided  for  election  of  officers  in  such  cities, 
so  far  as  the  same  are  applicable  and  not  in- 
consistent with  the  provisions  of  this  act.* 

CORRUPT   PRACTICES 

Section  5-A.  Any  person  who  shall  agree  to 
perform  any  services  in  the  interest  of  any  candi- 
date for  any  office  provided  in  this  act,  in  con- 
sideration of  any  money  or  other  valuable  thing 
for  such  services  performed  in  the  interest  of  any 
candidate,  shall  be  punished  by  a  fine  not  ex- 
ceeding three  hundred  dollars  (^300),  or  be  im- 
prisoned in  the  county  jail  not  exceeding  thirty 
(30)  days. 

*As  amended  by  the  Act  of  March  30,  1909. 


172  Appendix 

BRIBERY  AND  ILLEGAL  VOTING 

Section  5-B.  Any  person  offering  a  bribe, 
either  in  money  or  other  consideration,  to  any 
elector  for  the  purpose  of  influencing  his  vote  at 
any  election  provided  in  this  act,  or  any  elector 
entitled  to  vote  at  any  such  election  receiving 
and  accepting  such  bribe  or  other  consideration; 
any  person  making  false  answer  to  any  of  the 
provisions  of  this  act  relative  to  his  qualifications 
to  vote  at  said  election;  any  person  wilfully 
voting  or  offering  to  vote  at  such  election  who 
has  not  been  a  resident  of  this  state  for  six 
months  next  preceding  said  election,  or  who  is 
not  twenty-one  years  of  age,  or  is  not  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States;  or  knowing  himself  not  to  be 
a  qualified  elector  of  such  precinct  where  he 
offers  to  vote;  any  person  knowingly  procuring, 
aiding,  or  abetting  any  violation  hereof  shall  be 
deemed  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor  and  upon  con- 
viction shall  be  fined  a  sum  not  less  than  one 
hundred  dollars  (^100)  nor  more  than  five 
hundred  dollars  (^500),  and  be  imprisoned  in  the 
county  jail  not  less  than  ten  (10)  nor  more  than 
ninety  (90)  days. 

CONSTITUTION     AND     COUNCIL 

Section  6.  Every  city  having  a  population 
of  25,000  and  over  shall  be  governed  by  a  council 
consisting  of  the  mayor  and  four  councilmen, 
and  every  city  having  a  population  of  7,000  and 
less  than  25,000  shall  be  governed  by  a  council 


Appendix  173 

consisting  of  the  mayor  and  two  councilmen, 
chosen  as  provided  in  this  act,  each  of  whom 
shall  have  the  right  to  vote  on  all  questions 
coming  before  the  council.  In  cities  having 
four  councilmen  three  members  of  the  council 
constitute  a  quorum,  and  in  cities  having  four 
councilmen  the  affirmative  vote  of  three  mem- 
bers, and  in  cities  having  two  councilmen  the 
affirmative  vote  of  two  members  shall  be  neces- 
sary to  adopt  any  motion,  resolution,  or  ordi- 
nance, or  pass  any  measure  unless  a  greater 
number  is  provided  for  in  this  act.* 

POWERS   AND   DUTIES    OF  THE    COUNCIL 

Section  7.  The  council  shall  have  and  possess 
and  the  council  and  its  members  shall  exercise 
all  executive,  legislative,  and  judicial  powers  and 
duties  now  had,  possessed,  and  exercised  by  the 
mayor,  city  council,  solicitor,  assessor,  treasurer, 
auditor,  city  engineer,  and  other  executive  and 
administrative  officers  in  cities  of  the  first  and 
second  class,  and  in  cities  under  special  charter, 
and  shall  also  possess  and  exercise  all  executive, 
legislative,  and  judicial  powers  and  duties  now 
had  and  exercised  by  the  board  of  public  works, 
park  commissioners,  board  of  water-works  trus- 
tees, and  board  of  library  trustees  in  all  cities 
wherein  a  board  of  public  works,  park  commis- 
sioners, board  of  police  and  fire  commissioners, 
board  of  water-works  trustees,  and   board   of 

*As  amended  by  the  Act  of  March  30,  1909. 


174  Appendix 

library  trustees  which  now  exist  or  may  be  here- 
after created.* 

The  executive  and  administrative  powers, 
authority,  and  duties  in  such  cities  shall  be  dis- 
tributed into  and  among  five  departments,  as 
follows : 

1.  Department  of  Public  Aff^airs. 

2.  Department   of  Accounts   and    Finance. 

3.  Department  of  Public  Safety. 

4.  Department  of  Streets  and  Public  Im- 
provements. 

5.  Department  of  Parks  and  Public  Property. 

The  council  shall  determine  the  powers  and 
duties  to  be  performed  by,  and  assign  them  to, 
the  appropriate  departments;  shall  prescribe  the 
powers  and  duties  of  officers  and  employees; 
may  assign  particular  officers  and  employees 
to  one  or  more  of  the  departments;  may  require 
an  officer  or  employee  to  perform  duties  in  two 
or  more  departments;  and  may  make  such  other 
rules  and  regulations  as  may  be  necessary  or 
proper  for  the  efficient  and  economical  conduct 
of  the  business  of  the  city. 

ORGANIZATION  OF   DEPARTMENTS 

Section  8.  The  mayor  shall  be  superintend- 
ent of  the  department  of  public  affairs,  and  the 
council  shall  at  the  first  regular  meeting  after 
election  of  its  members  designate  by  majority 

*As  amended  by  the  Act  of  March  30,  1909. 


Appendix  175 

vote  one  councilman  to  be  superintendent  of 
the  department  of  accounts  and  finances;  one 
to  be  superintendent  of  the  department  of  public 
safety;  one  to  be  superintendent  of  the  depart- 
ment of  street  and  public  improvements;  and  one 
to  be  superintendent  of  the  department  of  parks 
and  public  property;  provided,  however,  that  in 
cities  having  a  population  of  less  than  25,000 
there  shall  be  designated  to  each  councilman  two 
of  said  departments.  Such  designation  shall  be 
changed  whenever  it  appears  that  the  public 
service  would  be  benefited  thereby.  The  coun- 
cd  shall,  at  said  first  meeting,  or  as  soon  as  prac- 
ticable thereafter,  elect  by  majority  vote  the 
following  officers:  A  city  clerk,  solicitor,  assessor, 
treasurer,  auditor,  civil  engineer,  city  physician, 
marshal,  chief  of  fire  department,  market  mas- 
ter, street  commissioner,  three  library  trustees, 
and  such  other  officers  and  assistants  as  shall  be 
provided  for  by  ordinance  and  necessary  to  the 
proper  and  efficient  conduct  of  the  affairs  of  the 
city;  provided,  however,  that  in  cities  having  a 
population  of  less  than  25,000  such  only  of  the 
above-named  officers  shall  be  appointed  as  may, 
in  the  judgment  of  the  mayor  and  councilmen, 
be  necessary  for  the  proper  and  efficient  trans- 
action of  the  affairs  of  the  city.  In  those  cities 
of  the  first  class  not  having  a  superior  court,  the 
council  shall  appoint  a  police  judge.  In  cities 
of  the  second  class  not  having  a  superior  court 
the  mayor  shall  hold  police  court,  as  now  pro- 


176  Appendix 

vided  by  law.  Any  officer  or  assistant  elected 
or  appointed  by  the  council  may  be  removed 
from  office  at  any  time  by  vote  of  a  majority 
of  the  members  of  the  council,  except  as  other- 
wise provided  for  in  this  act.* 

CREATION   AND   ABOLITION    OF    OFFICES 

Section  9.  The  council  shall  have  power 
from  time  to  time  to  create,  fill,  and  discontinue 
offices  and  employmients  other  than  herein  pre- 
scribed, according  to  their  judgment  of  the  needs 
of  the  city;  and  may  by  majority  vote  of  all  the 
members  remove  any  such  officer  or  employee, 
except  as  otherwise  provided  for  in  this  act; 
and  may  by  resolution  or  otherwise  prescribe, 
limit,  or  change  the  compensation  of  such  officers 
or  employees. 

SALARIES 

Section  10.  The  mayor  and  councilmen  shall 
have  an  office  at  the  city  hall,  and  their  total 
compensation  shall  be  as  follows:  In  cities  hav- 
ing by  the  last  preceding  state  or  national  cen- 
sus a  population  of  7,000  and  less  than  10,000 
the  mayor's  annual  salary  shall  be  $600,  and 
each  councilman  $450.  In  cities  having  by  such 
census  a  population  of  10,000  and  less  than 
15,000,  the  mayor's  annual  salary  shall  be  $1,200 
and  each  councilman  $900.  In  cities  having 
by  such  census  a  population  of  15,000  and  less 

*As  amended  by  the  Act  of  March  30,  1909. 


Appendix  177 

than  25,000,  the  mayor's  annual  salary  shall  be 
^1,500,  and  each  councilman  ^1,200.  In  cities 
having  by  such  census  a  population  of  25,000 
and  less  than  40,000,  the  mayor's  annual  salary 
shall  be  ^2,500,  and  each  councilman  ^1,800. 
In  cities  having  by  such  census  a  population  of 
40,000  and  less  than  60,000,  the  mayor's  annual 
salary  shall  be  ^3,000,  and  each  councilman 
$2,500,  and  in  cities  having  by  such  census  a 
population  of  60,000  or  more,  the  mayor's  an- 
nual salary  shall  be  $3,500,  and  that  of  council- 
man $3,000.* 

Any  increase  in  salary  occasioned  under  the 
provisions  of  this  scale  by  increase  in  population 
in  any  city  shall  commence  with  the  month  next 
after  the  official  publication  of  the  census  show- 
ing such  increase  therein. 

Every  other  officer  or  assistant  shall  receive 
such  salary  or  compensation  as  the  council  shall 
by  ordinance  provide,  payable  in  equal  monthly 
instalments. 

The  salary  or  compensation  of  all  other  em- 
ployees of  such  city  shall  be  fixed  by  the  council 
and  shall  be  payable  monthly  or  at  such  shorter 
periods  as  the  council  shall  determine. 

MEETINGS    OF   THE    COUNCIL 

Section  11.  Regular  meetings  of  the  council 
shall  be  held  on  the  first  Monday  after  the  elec- 
tion of  councilmen,  and  thereafter  at  least  once 

*As  amended  by  the  Act  of  March  30,  1909. 


178  Appendix 

each  month.  The  council  shall  provide  by  or- 
dinance for  the  time  of  holding  regular  meet- 
ings, and  special  meetings  may  be  called  from 
time  to  time  by  the  mayor  or  two  councilmen. 
All  meetings  of  the  council,  whether  regular  or 
special,  at  which  any  person  not  a  city  officer  is 
admitted,  shall  be  open  to  the  public. 

The  mayor  shall  be  president  of  the  council 
and  preside  at  its  meetings,  and  shall  super- 
vise all  departments  and  report  to  the  council 
for  its  action  all  matters  requiring  attention  in 
either.  The  superintendent  of  the  department 
of  accounts  and  finances  shall  be  vice-president 
of  the  council,  and  in  case  of  vacancy  in  the  office 
of  mayor,  or  the  absence  or  inability  of  the 
mayor,  shall  perform  the  duties  of  the  mayor. 

ORDINANCES,    RESOLUTIONS,  AND    FRANCHISES 

Section  12.  Every  ordinance  or  resolution 
appropriating  money  or  ordering  any  street  im- 
provement or  sewer,  or  making  or  authorizing 
the  making  of  any  contract,  or  granting  any 
franchise  or  right  to  occupy  or  use  the  streets, 
highways,  bridges,  or  public  places  in  the  city 
for  any  purpose,  shall  be  complete  in  the  form 
in  which  it  is  finally  passed,  and  remain  on  file 
with  the  city  clerk  for  public  inspection  at  least 
one  week  before  the  final  passage  or  adoption 
thereof.  No  franchise  or  right  to  occupy  or 
use  the  streets,  highways,  bridges,  or  public 
places  in  any  city  shall  be  granted,  renewed,  or 


Appendix  179 

extended,  except  by  ordinance,  and  every  fran- 
chise or  grant  for  interurban  or  street  railways, 
gas  or  water-works,  electric  light  or  power  plants, 
heating  plants,  telegraph  or  telephone  systems, 
or  other  public-service  utilities  within  said  city, 
must  be  authorized  or  approved  by  a  majority 
of  the  electors  voting  thereon  at  a  general  or 
special  election,  as  provided  in  section  'j'j^  of  the 
code. 

RESTRICTION   ON   OFFICERS  AND   EMPLOYEES 

Section  13.  No  officer  or  employee  elected 
or  appointed  in  any  such  city  shall  be  interested, 
directly  or  indirectly,  in  any  contract  or  job  for 
work  or  materials,  or  the  profits  thereof,  or  ser- 
vices to  be  furnished  or  performed  for  the  city; 
and  no  such  officer  or  employee  shall  be  inter- 
ested, directly  or  indirectly,  in  any  contract  or 
job  for  work  or  materials,  or  the  profits  thereof, 
or  services  to  be  furnished  or  performed  for  any 
person,  firm,  or  corporationoperating  interurban 
railway,  street  railway,  gas  works,  water-works, 
electric  light  or  power  plant,  heating  plant, 
telegraph  line,  telephone  exchange,  or  other 
public  utility  within  the  territorial  limits  of  said 
city.  No  such  officer  or  employee  shall  accept 
or  receive,  directly  or  indirectly,  from  any  per- 
son, firm,  or  corporation  operating  within  the 
territorial  limits  of  said  city,  any  interurban 
railway,  street  railway,  gas  works,  water-works, 
electric  light  or  power  plant,  heating  plant,  tele- 


i8o  Appendix 

graph  line  or  telephone  exchange,  or  other  busi- 
ness using  or  operating  under  a  public  franchise, 
any  frank,  free  ticket  or  free  service,  or  accept 
or  receive,  directly  or  indirectly,  from  any  such 
person,  firm,  or  corporation,  any  other  service 
upon  terms  more  favorable  than  is  granted  to 
the  public  generally.  Any  violation  of  the  pro- 
visions of  this  section  shall  be  amisdemeanor,and 
every  such  contract  or  agreement  shall  be  void. 
Such  prohibition  of  free  transportation  shall 
not  apply  to  policemen  or  firemen  in  uniform; 
nor  shall  any  free  service  to  city  officials  hereto- 
fore provided  by  any  franchise  or  ordinance  be 
affected  by  this  section.  Any  officer  or  employee 
of  such  city  who,  by  solicitation  or  otherwise, 
shall  exert  his  influence,  directly  or  indirectly, 
to  influence  other  officers  or  employees  of  such 
city  to  adopt  his  political  views  or  to  favor  any 
particular  person  or  candidate  for  office,  or  who 
shall  in  any  manner  contribute  money,  labor, 
or  other  valuable  thing  to  any  person  for  election 
purposes,  shall  be  guilty  of  a  misdemeanor,  and 
upon  conviction  shall  be  punished  by  a  fine  not 
exceeding  three  hundred  dollars  ($300)  or  by 
imprisonment  in  the  county  jail  not  exceeding 
thirty  (30)  days. 

POWERS     AND     DUTIES     OF     CIVIL-SERVICE     COM- 
MISSION 

Section   14.     In  cities  having  a  population  of 
twenty-five  thousand  and  over,  the  council  shall. 


Appendix  i8i 

and  in  cities  having  a  population  of  7,000  and 
less  than  25,000;  the  council  may,  immediately 
after  organizing,  by  ordinance  appoint  three 
civil-service  commissioners  who  shall  hold  office, 
one  until  the  first  Monday  in  April  of  the  second 
year  after  his  appointment,  one  until  the  first 
Monday  in  April  of  the  fourth  year  after  his 
appointment,  and  one  until  the  first  Monday 
in  April  of  the  sixth  year  after  his  appointment; 
provided,  however,  that  in  all  cases  in  which  no 
civil-service  commissioners  are  appointed  by  the 
council,  the  council  shall  have  the  same  powers 
and  shall  exercise  and  perform  all  the  duties 
devolving  upon  such  commissioners,  as  provided 
for  in  this  act.  In  cities  wherein  civil-service 
commissioners  have  been  appointed  under  the 
provisions  of  this  act  each  succeeding  council 
shall,  as  soon  as  practicable  after  organizing, 
appoint  one  commissioner  for  six  years,  who 
shall  take  the  place  of  the  commissioner  whose 
term  of  office  expires.* 

No  person  while  on  the  said  commission  shall 
hold  or  be  a  candidate  for  any  office  of  public 
trust.  Two  of  said  members  shall  constitute 
a  quorum  to  transact  business.  The  commis- 
sioners must  be  citizens  of  Iowa  and  residents  of 
the  city  for  more  than  three  years  next  preceding 
their  appointment. 

The  council  may  remove  any  of  said  com- 
missioners during  their  term  of  office  for  cause, 


*As  amended  by  the  Act  of  March  30,  1909. 


i82  Appendix 

four  councilmen  voting  in  favor  of  such  removal, 
and  shall  fill  any  vacancy  that  may  occur  in  said 
commission  for  the  unexpired  term.  The  city 
council  shall  provide  suitable  rooms  in  which  the 
said  civil-service  commission  may  hold  its  meet- 
ings. They  shall  have  a  clerk,  who  shall  keep  a 
record  of  all  its  meetings,  such  city  to  supply  the 
said  commission  with  all  necessary  equipment  to 
properly  attend  to  such  business. 

OATH   OF   OFFICE 

(a)  Before  entering  upon  the  duties  of  their 
office,  each  of  said  commissioners  shall  take  and 
subscribe  an  oath,  which  shall  be  filed  and  kept 
in  the  office  of  the  city  clerk,  to  support  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  and  of  the  State  of 
Iowa,  and  to  obey  the  laws,  and  to  aim  to  secure 
and  maintain  an  honest  and  efficient  force,  free 
from  partisan  distinction  or  control,  and  to  per- 
formthedutiesof  hisofficetothebestof  hisability. 

EXAMINATIONS 

(b)  Said  commission  shall,  on  the  first 
Monday  of  April  and  October  of  each  year,  or 
oftener  if  it  shall  be  deemed  necessary,  under 
such  rules  and  regulations  as  may  be  prescribed 
by  the  council,  hold  examinations  for  the  purpose 
of  determining  the  qualifications  of  applicants 
for  positions,  which  examination  shall  be  practi- 
cal and  shall  fairly  test  the  fitness  of  the  persons 
examined  to  discharge  the  duties  of  the  position 


Appendix  183 

to  which  they  seek  to  be  appointed.  Said  com- 
mission shall,  as  soon  as  possible  after  such  ex- 
amination, certify  to  the  council  double  the 
numberof  persons  necessary  to  fill  vacancies,  who, 
according  to  its  records,  have  the  highest  stand- 
ing for  the  position  they  seek  to  fill  as  a  result 
of  such  examination,  and  all  vacancies  which 
occur,  that  come  under  the  civil  service  prior  to 
the  date  of  the  next  regular  examination,  shall  be 
filled  from  said  list  so  certified;  provided,  how- 
ever, that  should  the  list  for  any  cause  be  re- 
duced to  less  than  three  for  any  division,  then 
the  council  or  the  head  of  the  proper  depart- 
ment may  temporarily  fill  a  vacancy,  but  not  to 
exceed  thirty  days. 

REMOVALS    AND    DISCHARGES 

(c)  All  persons  subject  to  such  civil-service 
examinations  shall  be  subject  to  removal  from 
office  or  employment  by  the  council  for  mis- 
conduct or  failure  to  perform  their  duties  under 
such  rules  and  regulations  as  it  may  adopt,  and 
the  chief  of  police,  chief  of  the  fire  department, 
or  any  superintendent  or  foreman  in  charge  of 
municipal  work,  may  peremptorily  suspend  or 
discharge  any  subordinate  then  under  his  di- 
rection for  neglect  of  duty  or  disobedience  of 
his  orders,  but  shall,  within  twenty-four  hours 
thereafter,  report  such  suspension  or  discharge, 
and  the  reason  therefor,  to  the  superintendent 
of  his  department,  who  shall  thereupon  affirm 


184  Appendix 

or  revoke  such  discharge  or  suspension,  accord- 
ing to  the  facts. 

Such  employee  (or  the  officer  discharging  or 
suspending  him)  may,  within  five  days  of  such 
ruHng,  appeal  therefrom  to  the  council,  which 
shall  fully  hear  and  determine  the  matter. 

POWER     TO     SUMMON     WITNESSES.      RULES     AND 
REGULATIONS 

(b)  The  council  shall  have  the  power  to 
enforce  the  attendance  of  witnesses,  the  pro- 
duction of  books  and  papers,  and  power  to  ad- 
minister oaths  in  the  same  manner  and  with  like 
effect,  and  under  the  same  penalties,  as  in  the 
case  of  magistrates  exercising  criminal  or  civil 
jurisdiction  under  the  statutes  of  Iowa. 

Said  commissioners  shall  make  annual  report 
to  the  council,  and  it  may  require  a  special  report 
from  said  commission  at  any  time;  and  said 
council  may  prescribe  such  rules  and  regulations 
for  the  proper  conduct  of  the  business  of  said 
commission  as  shall  be  found  expedient  and 
advisable,  including  restrictions  on  appointment, 
promotions,  removal  for  cause,  roster  of  em- 
ployees, certification  of  records  to  the  auditor, 
and  restrictions  on  payment  to  persons  im- 
properly employed. 

PENALTIES 

(e)  The  council  of  such  city  shall  have  power 
to  pass  ordinances  imposing  suitable  penalties 


Appendix  185 

for  the  punishment  of  persons  for  violating  any 
of  the  provisions  of  this  act  relating  to  the  civil- 
service  commission. 

APPLICATION    OF    THE    ACT 

(/)  The  provisions  of  this  section  shall  apply 
to  all  appointive  officers  and  employees  of  such 
city,  except  those  especially  named  in  section  8 
of  this  act,  commissioners  of  any  kind  (laborers 
whose  occupation  requires  no  special  skill  or  fit- 
ness), election  officials,  and  mayor's  secretary 
and  assistant  solicitor,  where  such  officers  are 
appointed;  provided,  however,  that  existing  em- 
ployees heretofore  appointed  or  employed  after 
competitive  examination  or  for  longservice  under 
the  provisions  of  chapter  31,  acts  of  the  Twenty- 
ninth  General  Assembly,  and  subsequent  amend- 
ments thereto,  shall  retain  their  positions  without 
further  examination  unless  removed  for  cause. 

All  officers  and  employees  in  any  such  city 
shall  be  elected  or  appointed  with  reference  to 
their  qualifications  and  fitness,  and  for  the  good 
of  the  public  service,  and  without  reference  to 
their  political  faith  or  party  affiliations. 

It  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  candidate  for 
office,  or  any  officer  in  any  such  city,  directly  or 
indirectly,  to  give  or  promise  any  person  or 
persons  any  office,  position,  employment,  bene- 
fit, or  anything  of  value,  for  the  purpose  of 
influencing  or  obtaining  the  political  support, 
aid,  or  vote  of  any  person  or  persons. 


1 86  Appendix 

Every  elective  officer  in  any  such  city  shall, 
within  thirty  days  after  qualifying,  file  with  the 
city  clerk,  and  publish  at  least  once  in  a  daily 
newspaper  of  general  circulation,  his  sworn 
statement  of  all  his  election  and  campaign 
expenses,  and  by  whom  such  funds  were  contrib- 
uted. 

Any  violation  of  the  provisions  of  this  section 
shall  be  a  misdemeanor  and  be  a  ground  for  re- 
moval from  office. 

MONTHLY    ITEMIZED    STATEMENTS 

Section  15.  The  council  shall  each  month 
print  in  pamphlet  form  a  detailed  itemized 
statement  of  all  receipts  and  expenses  of  the  city 
and  a  summary  of  its  proceedings  during  the 
preceding  month,  and  furnish  printed  copies 
thereof  to  the  state  library,  the  city  library,  the 
daily  newspapers  of  the  city,  and  to  persons 
who  shall  apply  therefor  at  the  office  of  the  city 
clerk.  At  the  end  of  each  year  the  council  shall 
cause  a  full  and  complete  examination  of  all  the 
books  and  accounts  of  the  city  to  be  made  by 
competent  accountants,  and  shall  publish  the 
result  of  such  examination  in  the  manner  above 
provided  for  publication  of  statements  of 
monthly  expenditures. 

APPROPRIATIONS 

Section  16.  If,  at  the  beginning  of  the  term 
of  office,  of  the  first  council  elected  in  such  city 


Appendix  187 

under  the  provisions  of  this  act,  the  appropri- 
ations for  the  expenditures  of  the  city  govern- 
ment for  the  current  fiscal  year  have  been  made, 
said  council  shall  have  power,  by  ordinance,  to 
revise,  to  repeal,  or  change  said  appropriations 
and  to  make  additional  appropriations. 

DEFINITION    OF   TERMS 

Section  17.  In  the  construction  of  this  act 
the  following  rules  shall  be  observed,  unless  such 
construction  would  be  inconsistent  withthe  mani- 
fest intent,  or  repugnant  to  the  context,  of  the 
statute: 

1.  The  words  "councilman"  or  "alderman" 
shall  be  construed  to  mean  "councilman"  when 
applied  to  cities  under  this  act. 

2.  When  an  office  or  officer  is  named  in  any 
law  referred  to  in  this  act,  it  shall,  when  ap- 
plied to  cities  under  this  act,  be  construed 
to  mean  the  office  or  officer  having  the  same 
functions  or  duties  under  the  provisions  of  this 
act,  or  under  ordinances  passed  under  authority 
thereof. 

3.  The  word  "franchise"  shall  include  every 
special  privilege  in  the  streets,  highways,  and 
public  places  of  the  city,  whether  granted  by  the 
state  or  the  city,  which  does  not  belong  to  the 
citizens  generally  by  common  right. 

4.  The  word  "electors"  shall  be  construed 
to  mean  persons  qualified  to  vote  for  elective 
offices  at  regular  municipal  elections. 


1 88  Appendix 

THE    RECALL 

Section  i8.  The  holder  of  any  elective  office 
may  be  removed  at  any  time  by  the  electors 
qualified  to  vote  for  a  successor  of  such  incum- 
bent. The  procedure  to  effect  the  removal  of 
an  incumbent  of  an  elective  office  shall  be  as 
follows:  A  petition,  signed  by  electors  entitled 
to  vote  for  a  successor  to  the  incumbent  sought 
to  be  removed,  equal  in  number  to  at  least  25 
percentum  of  the  entire  vote  for  all  candidates 
for  the  office  of  mayor  at  the  last  preceding 
general  municipal  election,  demanding  an  elec- 
tion of  a  successor  of  the  person  sought  to  be 
removed,  shall  be  filed  with  the  city  clerk,  which 
petition  shall  contain  a  general  statement  of  the 
grounds  for  which  the  removal  is  sought.  The 
signatures  to  the  petition  need  not  all  be  ap- 
pended to  one  paper,  but  each  signer  shall  add 
to  his  signature  his  place  of  residence,  giving  the 
street  and  number.  One  of  the  signers  of  each 
such  paper  shall  make  oath  before  an  officer 
competent  to  administer  oaths  that  the  state- 
ments therein  made  are  true  as  he  believes,  and 
that  each  signature  to  the  paper  appended  is  the 
genuine  signature  of  the  person  whose  name 
it  purports  to  be.  Within  ten  days  from  the 
date  of  filing  such  petition  the  city  clerk  shall 
examine  and  from  the  voters'  register  ascertain 
whether  or  not  said  petitipn  is  signed  by  the 
requisite  number  of  qualified  electors,  and,  if 
necessary,  the  council  shall  allow  him  extra  help 


Appendix  189 

for  that  purpose;  and  he  shall  attach  to  said 
petition  his  certificate  showing  the  result  of 
said  examination.  If  by  the  clerk's  certificate 
the  petition  is  shown  to  be  insufficient,  it  may 
be  amended  within  ten  days  from  the  date  of 
said  certificate.  The  clerk  shall,  within  ten 
days  after  such  amendment,  make  like  examina- 
tion of  the  amended  petition,  and  if  his  certifi- 
cate shall  show  the  same  to  be  insufficient,  it 
shall  be  returned  to  the  person  filing  the  same; 
without  prejudice,  however,  to  the  filing  of  a 
new  petition  to  the  same  effect.  If  the  petition 
shall  be  deemed  to  be  sufficient,  the  clerk  shall 
submit  the  same  to  the  council  without  delay. 
If  the  petition  shall  be  found  to  be  sufficient, 
the  council  shall  order  and  fix  a  date  for  holding 
the  said  election,  not  less  than  thirty  days  or 
more  than  forty  days  from  the  date  of  the 
clerk's  certificate  to  the  council  that  a  sufficient 
petition  is  filed. 

"So  far  as  applicable,  except  as  othei-wise 
herein  provided,  nominations  hereunder  shall 
be  made  without  the  intervention  of  a  primary 
election  by  filing  with  the  clerk  at  least  ten  (10) 
days  prior  to  said  election,  a  statement  of  candi- 
dacy accompanied  by  a  petition  signed  by  elec- 
tors entitled  to  vote  at  said  special  election  equal 
in  number  to  at  least  10  percentum  of  the  entire 
vote  for  all  candidates  for  the  office  of  mayor  at 
the  last  preceding  general  municipal  election, 
which   said   statement  of  candidacy   and   peti- 


igo  Appendix 

tion  shall  be  substantially  in  the  form  set  out 
in  section  ten  hundred  fifty-six-a  twenty-one 
(1056-a  21)  of  the  supplement  of  the  code,  1907, 
so  far  as  the  same  is  applicable,  substituting  the 
word  'special'  for  the  word  'primary'  in  such 
statement  and  petition,  and  stating  therein  that 
such  person  is  a  candidate  for  election  instead  of 
nomination. 

"The  ballot  for  such  special  election  shall  be 
in  substantially  the  following  form: 

OFFICIAL    BALLOT 

Special  election  for  the  balance  of  the  unex- 
pired term  of as 

For_ 

{Vote  for  one  only) 
Names  of  Candidates: 


Name  of  present  Incumbent:. 


Official  Ballot  Attest; 
{Signature) 


City  Clerk."* 

The  council  shall  make,  or  cause  to  be  made, 
publication  of  notice  and  all  arrangements  for 

*The  paragraphs  in  quotation  marks  were  added  by  the  Act  of 
April  16,  1909. 


Appendix  191 

holding  such  election,  and  the  same  shall  be 
conducted,  returned,  and  the  result  thereof  de- 
clared, in  all  respects  as  are  other  city  elections. 
The  successor  of  any  officer  so  removed  shall 
hold  office  during  the  unexpired  term  of  his 
predecessor.  Any  person  sought  to  be  removed 
may  be  a  candidate  to  succeed  himself,  and  un- 
less he  requests  otherv\'ise  in  writing,  the  clerk 
shall  place  his  name  on  the  official  ballot  with- 
out nomination.  In  any  such  removal  election, 
the  candidate  receiving  the  highest  number  of 
votes  shall  be  declared  elected.  At  such  elec- 
tion, if  some  other  person  than  the  incumbent 
receives  the  highest  number  of  votes,  the  incum- 
bent shall  thereupon  be  deemed  removed  from 
the  office  upon  qualification  of  his  successor. 
In  case  the  party  who  receives  the  highest  num- 
ber of  votes  should  fail  to  qualify,  within  ten 
days  after  receiving  notification  of  election,  the 
office  shall  be  deemed  vacant.  If  the  incumbent 
receives  the  highest  number  of  votes  he  shall 
continue  in  his  office.  The  same  method  of 
removal  shall  be  cumulative  and  additional  to 
the  methods  hitherto  provided  by  law. 

DIRECT    LEGISLATION 

Section  19.  Any  proposed  ordinance  may  be 
submitted  to  the  council  by  petition  signed  by 
electors  of  the  city  equal  in  number  to  the  per- 
centage hereinafter  required.  The  signatures, 
verification,  authentication,  inspection,  certifi- 


192  Appendix 

cation,  amendment,  and  submission  of  such  peti- 
tion shall  be  the  same  as  provided  for  petitions 
under  section  18  thereof. 

If  the  petition  accompanying  the  proposed 
ordinance  be  signed  by  electors  equal  in  number 
to  25  percentum  of  the  votes  cast  for  all  candi- 
dates for  mayor  at  the  last  preceding  general 
election,  and  contains  a  request  that  the  said 
ordinance  be  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the  people  if 
not  passed  bythe  council, suchcouncil  shalleither 

{a)  Pass  said  ordinance  without  alteration 
within  twenty  days  after  attachment  of  the 
clerk's  certificate  to  the  accompanying  petition, 
or 

{b)  Forthwith  after  the  clerk  shall  attach  to 
the  petition  accompanying  such  ordinance  his 
certificate  of  sufficiency,  the  council  shall  call  a 
special  election,  unless  a  general  municipal  elec- 
tion is  fixed  within  ninety  days  thereafter,  and 
at  such  special  or  general  municipal  election,  if 
one  is  so  fixed,  such  ordinance  shall  be  submitted 
without  alteration  to  the  vote  of  the  electors 
of  said  city. 

But  if  the  petition  is  signed  by  not  less  than 
10  nor  more  than  25  percentum  of  the  electors, 
as  above  defined,  then  the  council  shall,  within 
twenty  days,  pass  said  ordinance  without  change, 
or  submit  the  same  at  the  next  general  city  elec- 
tion occurring  not  more  than  thirty  days  after 
the  clerk's  certificate  of  sufficiency  is  attached  to 
said  petition. 


Appendix  193 

The  ballots  used  when  voting  upon  said  or- 
dinance shall  contain  these  words:  "For  the 
Ordinance"  (stating  the  nature  of  the  proposed 
ordinance),  and  "Against  the  Ordinance"  (stat- 
ing the  nature  of  the  proposed  ordinance).  If  a 
majority  of  the  qualified  electors  voting  on  the 
proposed  ordinance  shall  vote  in  favor  thereof, 
such  ordinance  shall  thereupon  become  a  valid 
and  binding  ordinance  of  the  city;  and  any 
ordinance  proposed  by  petition,  or  which  shall 
be  adopted  by  a  vote  of  the  people,  cannot  be 
repealed  or  amended  except  by  a  vote  of  the 
people. 

Any  number  of  proposed  ordinances  may  be 
voted  upon  at  the  same  election,  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions  of  this  section;  but  there  shall 
not  be  more  than  one  special  election  in  any 
period  of  six  months  for  such  purpose. 

The  council  may  submit  a  proposition  for  the 
repeal  of  any  such  ordinance  or  for  amendments 
thereto,  to  be  voted  upon  at  any  succeeding 
general  city  election;  and  should  such  proposi- 
tion so  submitted  receive  a  majority  of  the  votes 
cast  thereon  at  such  election,  such  ordinance 
shall  thereby  be  repealed  or  amended  accord- 
ingly. Whenever  any  ordinance  or  proposition 
is  required  by  this  act  to  be  submitted  to  the 
voters  of  the  city  at  any  election,  the  city  clerk 
shall  cause  such  ordinance  or  proposition  to  be 
published  once  in  each  of  the  daily  newspapers 
published  in  said  city;  such  publication  to  be  not 


194  Appendix 

more  than  twenty  nor  less  than  five  days  before 
the  submission  of  such  proposition  or  ordinance 
to  be  voted  on. 

WHEN    ORDINANCES    BECOME    EFFECTIVE.       PRO- 
TEST PETITIONS 

Section  20.  No  ordinance  passed  by  the 
council,  except  when  otherwise  required  by  the 
general  laws  of  the  state  or  by  the  provisions 
of  this  act,  except  an  ordinance  for  the  im- 
mediate preservation  of  the  public  peace,  health, 
or  safety,  which  contains  a  statement  of  its 
urgency  and  is  passed  by  a  two  thirds  vote  of 
the  council,  shall  go  into  effect  before  ten  days 
from  the  time  of  its  final  passage;  and  if  during 
said  ten  days  a  petition  signed  by  electors  of 
the  city  equal  in  number  to  at  least  25  per- 
centum  of  the  entire  vote  cast  for  all  candidates 
for  mayor  at  the  last  preceding  general  munic- 
ipal election  at  which  a  mayor  was  elected, 
protesting  against  the  passage  of  such  ordi- 
nance, be  presented  to  the  council,  the  same  shall 
thereupon  be  suspended  from  going  into  opera- 
tion, and  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  council  to 
reconsider  such  ordinance;  and  if  the  same  is 
not  entirely  repealed,  the  council  shall  submit 
the  ordinance,  as  is  provided  by  subsection  b  of 
section  19  of  this  act,  to  the  vote  of  the  elector 
of  the  city,  either  at  the  general  election  or  at 
a  special  municipal  election  to  be  called  for  that 
purpose;  and  such  ordinance  shall  not  go  into 


Appendix  195 

effect  or  become  operative  unless  a  majority  of 
the  qualified  electors  voting  on  the  same  shall 
vote  in  favor  thereof.  Said  petition  shall  be  in 
all  respects  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
said  section  19,  except  as  to  the  percentage  of 
signers,  and  be  examined  and  certified  to  by  the 
clerk  in  all  respects  as  therein  provided. 

ABANDONMENT  OF  THE  COMMISSION  FORM 

Section  21.  Any  city  which  shall  have 
operated  for  more  than  six  years  under  the  pro- 
visions of  this  act  may  abandon  such  organi- 
zation hereunder,  and  accept  the  provisions  of 
the  general  law  of  the  state  then  applicable  to 
cities  of  its  population,  or  if  now  organized 
under  special  charter,  may  resume  said  special 
charter  by  proceeding  as  follows: 

Upon  the  petition  of  not  less  than  25  per- 
centum  of  the  electors  of  such  city  a  special 
election  shall  be  called,  at  which  the  following 
proposition  only  shall  be  submitted:  "Shall  the 
city  of  (name  the  city)  abandon  its  organi- 
zation   under    chapter of   the    acts    of   the 

Thirty-second  General  Assembly  and  become  a 
city  under  the  general  law  governing  cities  of 
like  population,  or  if  now  organized  under  special 
charter  shall  resume  said  special  charter." 

If  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  at  such  special 
election  be  in  favor  of  such  proposition,  the 
officers  elected  at  the  next  succeeding  biennial 
election  shall  be  those  then  prescribed  by  the 


196  Appendix 

general  law  of  the  state  for  cities  of  like  popu- 
lation, and  upon  the  qualification  of  such  officers 
such  city  shall  become  a  city  under  such  general 
law  of  state;  but  such  change  shall  not  in  any 
manner  or  degree  ajffect  the  property,  right,  or 
liabilities  of  any  nature  of  such  city,  but  shall 
merely  extend  to  such  change  in  its  form  of 
government. 

The  sufficiency  of  such  petition  shall  be  de- 
termined, the  election  ordered  and  conducted, 
and  the  results  declared,  generally  as  provided 
by  section  18  of  this  act,  in  so  far  as  the  pro- 
visions thereof  are  applicable. 

REQUIREMENTS    CONCERNING    PETITIONS 

Section  22.  Petitions  provided  for  in  this 
act  shall  be  signed  by  none  but  legal  voters  of 
the  city.  Each  petition  shall  contain,  in  ad- 
dition to  the  names  of  the  petitioners,  the  street 
and  house  number  in  which  the  petitioner  re- 
sides, his  age  and  length  of  residence  in  the 
city.  It  shall  also  be  accompanied  by  the 
affidavit  of  one  or  more  legal  voters  of  the  city 
stating  that  the  signers  thereof  were,  at  the 
time  of  signing,  legal  voters  of  said  city,  and 
the  number  of  signers  at  the  time  the  affidavit 
was  made. 

ACT   IN    EFFECT 

Section  23.  This  act,  being  deemed  of  im- 
mediate importance,  shall  take  effect  and  be  in 


Appendix  197 

force  from  and  after  its  publication  in  the 
Register  and  Leader  and  Des  Moines  Capital, 
newspapers  published  in  Des  Moines,  Iowa.* 

*Approved  March  29,  1907;  amended  by  Act  of  March  30, 
1909,  as  indicated. 


II.  THE  COMMISSION-MANAGER  PLAN 

As  Outlined  in  Selected  Sections  of  the  Dayton 

Charter 

Sections  i  and  2.     Powers  of  city. 

Section  3.     Form  of  government. 

General  description:  The  form  of  govern- 
ment provided  in  this  article  shall  be  known  as 
the  "Commission-Manager  Plan,"  and  shall 
consist  of  a  commission  of  five  citizens,  who 
shall  be  elected  at  large  in  manner  hereinafter 
provided.  The  commission  shall  constitute  the 
governing  body  with  powers  as  hereinafter  pro- 
vided to  pass  ordinances,  adopt  regulations,  and 
appoint  a  chief  administrative  officer  to  be  known 
as  the  "City  Manager,"  and  exercise  all  powers 
hereinafter  provided. 

NOMINATION   AND    ELECTION    OF    COMMISSIONERS 

Section  4.  All  commissioners  shall  serve  for 
a  term  of  four  years  and  until  their  successors 
are  elected  and  have  qualified.  Except  that  at 
first  election  the  three  candidates  having  the 
highest  number  of  votes  shall  serve  for  four 
years,  and  the  two  candidates  having  the  next 
highest  number  of  votes  shall  serve  for  two  years. 

198 


Appendix  199 


VACANCIES 


Section  5.  Vacancies  in  the  commission 
shall  be  filled  by  the  commission  for  the  re- 
mainder of  the  unexpired  term,  but  any  vacancy 
resulting  from  a  recall  election  shall  be  filled  in 
the  manner  provided  in  such  case. 


ELECTION   PROVISIONS 

Section  7-12.  (These  sections  provide  for 
the  usual  non-partisan  primary  and  election  of 
members  of  the  commission.) 

RECALL    ELECTIONS 

Sections  13-20.  (Providing  for  the  popular 
recall  of  the  commissioners  and  the  city  manager. 
The  recall  of  the  city  manager,  herein  provided, 
is  not  properly  regarded  as  a  part  of  the  com- 
mission-manager plan.) 

Sections  21-35.  Initiative,  Referendum,  and 
Protest. 

MAYOR 

Section  36.  The  mayor  shall  be  that  member 
of  the  commission  who,  at  the  regular  munici- 
pal election  at  which  the  three  commissioners 
were  elected,  received  the  highest  number  of 
votes.  In  case  two  candidates  receive  the  same 
number  of  votes,  one  of  them  shall  be  chosen 
mayor  by  the  remaining  members  of  the  com- 
mission.    In  event  of  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of 


200  Appendix 

mayor,  the  remaining  members  of  the  com- 
mission shall  choose  his  successor  for  the  un- 
expired term  from  their  own  number.  The 
mayor  shall  be  the  presiding  officer,  except  that 
in  his  absence  a  president  pro  tempore  may  be 
chosen.  The  mayor  shall  exercise  such  powers 
conferred  and  perform  all  duties  imposed  upon 
him  by  this  charter,  the  ordinances  of  the  city 
and  the  laws  of  the  state.  He  shall  be  recog- 
nized as  the  official  head  of  the  city  by  the 
courts  for  the  purpose  of  serving  civil  processes, 
by  the  Governor  for  the  purposes  of  the  mihtary 
law,  and  for  all  ceremonial  purposes. 

Section  37.  In  the  event  the  commissioner 
who  is  acting  as  mayor  shall  be  recalled,  the  re- 
maining members  of  the  commission  shall  select 
one  of  their  number  to  serve  as  mayor  for  the 
unexpired  term.  In  the  event  of  the  recall  of 
all  of  the  commissioners,  the  person  receiving 
the  highest  number  of  votes  at  the  election  held 
to  determine  their  successors  shall  serve  as  the 
mayor. 

SALARIES   AND   ATTENDANCE 

Section  38.  The  salary  of  each  commissioner 
shall  be  ^1,200  per  annum,  except  that  of  the 
mayor,  who  shall  receive  ^1,800  per  annum. 

Foreach  absence  of  a  commissioner  from  a  reg- 
ularmeetingof  thecommission,  unless  authorized 
by  a  majority  vote  of  all  members  thereof, 
there  shall  be  deducted  a  sum  equal  to  i  per 
cent.  (1%)  of  the  annual  salary  of  each  member. 


Appendix  201 

Absence  from  five  (5)  consecutive  regular  meet- 
ings shall  operate  to  vacate  the  seat  of  a  member 
unless  such  absence  be  authorized  by  the  com- 
mission. 

'    MEETINGS  OF  THE  COMMISSION 

Section  39.  At  ten  o'clock  a.  m.  on  the  first 
Monday  in  January,  following  a  regular  munic- 
ipal election,  the  commission  shall  meet  at  the 
usual  place  for  holding  the  meetings  of  the  legis- 
lative body  of  the  city,  at  which  time  the 
newly  elected  commissioners  shall  assume  the 
duties  of  their  office.  Thereafter  the  commis- 
sioners shall  meet  at  such  times  as  may  be 
prescribed  by  ordinance  or  resolution,  except 
that  they  shall  meet  not  less  than  once  each 
week.  The  mayor,  any  two  members  of  the 
commission,  or  the  cit}^  manager,  may  call 
special  meetings  of  the  commission  upon  at 
least  twelve  (12)  hours'  written  notice  to  each 
member  of  the  commission,  served  personally  on 
each  member  or  left  at  his  usual  place  of  resi- 
dence. All  meetings  of  the  commission  shall  be 
public,  and  any  citizen  shall  have  access  to  the 
minutes  and  records  thereof  at  all  reasonable 
times.  The  commission  shall  determine  its  own 
rules  and  order  of  business  and  shall  keep  a 
journal  of  its  proceedings. 

LEGISLATIVE    PROCEDURE 

Section  40.     The  commission  shall  be  judge 
of  the  election  and  qualifications  of  its  members. 


202  Appendix 

A  majority  of  all  members  elected  shall  consti- 
tute a  quorum  to  do  business.  The  affirmative 
vote  of  a  majority  of  the  members  elected  to  the 
commission  shall  be  necessary  to  adopt  any 
ordinance  or  resolution.  The  vote  upon  the 
passage  of  all  ordinances  and  upon  the  adoption 
of  such  resolutions  as  the  commission  by  its  rules 
shall  prescribe,  shall  be  taken  by  "Yea"  and 
*'Nay"  and  entered  upon  the  journal.  Every 
ordinance  or  resolution  passed  by  the  commis- 
sion shall  be  signed  by  the  mayor  ortwo  members 
and  filed  with  the  clerk  within  two  days  and 
by  him  recorded. 

CLERK 

Section  43.  The  commission  shall  choose  a 
clerk  and  such  other  officers  and  employees  of  its 
own  body  as  are  necessary.  The  clerk  shall  be 
known  as  the  clerk  of  the  commission  and  shall 
keep  records  and  perform  such  other  duties  as 
may  be  required  by  this  charter  or  the  commis- 
sion. 

Section  44.  Providing  for  the  audit  and  ex- 
amination of  administrative  departments. 

INVESTIGATION    BY   COMMISSION 

Section  46.  The  commission,  or  any  com- 
mittee thereof  duly  authorized  by  the  commis- 
sion so  to  do,  may  investigate  the  financial 
transactions  of  any  office  or  department  of  the 
city  government  and  the  official  acts  and  con- 


Appendix  203 

duct  of  any  city  official,  and  by  similar  investi- 
gations may  secure  information  upon  any  matter. 
In  conducting  such  investigations  the  commis- 
sion, or  any  committee  thereof,  may  compel  the 
attendance  of  witnesses  and  the  production  of 
books,  papers,  and  other  evidence,  and  for  that 
purpose  may  issue  subpoenas  or  attachments 
which  shall  be  signed  by  the  presiding  officer  of 
the  commission  or  the  chairman  of  such  com- 
mittee, as  the  case  may  be,  which  may  be  served 
and  executed  by  any  officer  authorized  by  law 
to  serve  subpoenas  and  other  process.  If  any 
witness  shall  refuse  to  testify  to  any  facts  within 
his  knowledge  or  to  produce  any  papers  or  books 
in  his  possession,  or  under  his  control,  relating 
to  the  matter  under  inquiry,  before  the  com- 
mission, or  any  such  committee,  the  commission 
shall  have  the  power  to  cause  the  witness  to  be 
punished  as  for  contempt.  No  witness  shall  be 
excused  from  testifying  touching  his  knowledge 
of  the  matter  under  investigations  in  any  such 
inquiry,  but  such  testimony  shall  not  be  used 
against  him  in  any  criminal  prosecution  except 
for  perjury  committed  upon  such  inquiry, 

CITY   MANAGER 

Section  47.  The  commission  shall  appoint 
a  city  manager  who  shall  be  the  administrative 
head  of  the  municipal  government  and  shall  be 
responsible  for  the  efficient  administration  of 
all  departments.     He  shall  be  appointed  with- 


204  Appendix 

out  regard  to  his  political  beliefs  and  may  or 
may  not  be  a  resident  of  the  city  of  Dayton 
when  appointed.  He  shall  hold  office  at  the 
will  of  the  commission  and  shall  be  subject  to 
recall  as  herein  provided. 

POWERS    AND    DUTIES    OF    THE    CITY    MANAGER 

Section  48.  The  powers  and  duties  of  the 
city  manager  shall  be 

(a)  To  see  that  the  laws  and  ordinances  are 
enforced; 

(b)  To  appoint  and,  except  as  herein  provided, 
remove  all  directors  of  departments  and  all  sub- 
ordinate officers  and  employees  in  the  depart- 
ments in  both  the  classified  and  unclassified 
service;  all  appointments  to  be  upon  merit  and 
fitness  alone,  and  in  the  classified  service  all 
appointments  and  removals  to  be  subject  to  the 
civil-service  provisions  of  this  charter; 

(c)  To  exercise  control  over  all  departments 
and  divisions  created  herein  or  that  may  be 
hereafter  created  by  the  commission; 

(d)  To  attend  all  meetings  of  the  commission 
with  the  right  to  take  part  in  the  discussion  but 
having  no  vote; 

(e)  To  recommend  to  the  commission  for 
adoption  such  measures  as  he  may  deem  neces- 
sary or  expedient; 

(/)  To  keep  the  commission  fully  advised  as 
to  the  financial  condition  and  needs  of  the  city; 
and 


Appendix  205 

(g)  To  perform  such  other  duties  as  may  be 
prescribed  by  this  charter  or  be  required  of  him 
by  ordinance  or  resolution  of  the  commission. 

SALARY 

Section  49.  The  city  manager  shall  receive 
such  salary  as  may  be  fixed  by  ordinance  of  the 
commission. 

INVESTIGATIONS    BY    THE    CITY   MANAGER 

Section  50.  The  city  manager  may  without 
notice  cause  the  affairs  of  any  department  or 
the  conduct  of  any  officer  or  employee  to  be 
examined.  Any  person  or  persons  appointed 
by  the  city  manager  to  examine  the  affairs  of 
any  department  or  the  conduct  of  any  officer  or 
employee  shall  have  the  same  power  to  compel 
the  attendance  of  witnesses  and  the  production 
of  books  and  papers  and  other  evidence,  and 
to  cause  witnesses  to  be  punished  for  contempt, 
as  is  conferred  upon  the  commission  by  this 
charter. 

DEPARTMENTS 

Departments  Established 

Section  51.  The  following  administrative 
departments  are  hereby  established  by  this 
charter: 

1.  Department  of  Law. 

2.  Department  of  Public  Service. 


2o6  Appendix 

3.  Department  of  Public  Welfare. 

4.  Department  of  Public  Safety. 

5.  Department  of  Finance. 

CHANGES    IN    DEPARTMENTS    AND    SUBDIVISIONS 

THEREOF 

Section  52.  The  commission  may  by  ordi- 
nance discontinue  any  department  and  deter- 
mine, combine,  and  distribute  the  functions  and 
duties  of  departments  and  subdivisions  thereof. 

DIRECTORS    OF   DEPARTMENTS 

Section  53.  A  director  for  each  department 
shall  be  appointed  by  the  city  manager  and  shall 
serve  until  removed  by  the  city  manager  or  un- 
til his  successor  is  appointed  and  has  quaUfied. 
He  shall  conduct  the  affairs  of  his  department 
in  accordance  with  the  rules  and  regulations 
made  by  the  city  manager  and  shall  be  respon- 
sible for  the  conduct  of  the  officers  and  employees 
of  his  department,  for  the  performance  of  its 
business,  and  for  the  custody  and  preservation 
of  the  books,  records,  papers,  and  property  under 
its  control.  Subject  to  the  supervision  and  con- 
trolofthecity  manager  in  all  matters,  the  director 
of  each  department  shall  managethe  department. 

CITY   COMMISSION   AND   ADVISORY   BOARDS 

Section  54.  The  commission  may  appoint  a 
City  Plan  Board  and  upon  the  request  of  the 


Appendix  207 

city  manager  shall  appoint  advisory  boards. 
The  members  of  such  boards  shall  serve  without 
compensation  and  their  duty  shall  be  to  consult 
and  advise  with  the  various  departments.  The 
duties  and  powers  thus  created  shall  be  pre- 
scribed by  ordinance. 

CIVIL   SERVICE 

Members 

Section  93.  The  commission  shall  appoint 
three  electors  of  the  city  as  a  Civil  Service 
Board;  one  to  serve  for  two  years  and  one  for 
four  years  and  one  for  six  years,  to  take  office 
January  I,  1914,  or  as  soon  thereafter  as  ap- 
pointed and  qualified.  Thereafter  members  of 
the  Civil  Service  Board  shall  be  appointed  to 
serve  for  six  years  and  until  their  successors 
have  been  appointed  and  have  qualified.  Mem- 
bers of  the  board  shall  not  hold  any  other  public 
office.  The  commission  may  remove  any  mem- 
ber of  the  board  upon  stating  in  writing  the 
reasons  for  removal  and  allowing  him  an  oppor- 
tunity to  be  heard  in  his  own  defence.  Any 
vacancy  shall  be  filled  by  the  commission  for 
the  unexpired  term. 

OFFICERS    OF   THE    BOARD 

Section  94.  Immediately  after  appointment, 
the  board  shall  organize  by  electing  one  of  its 
members  chairman.     The  board  shall  appoint  a 


2o8  Appendix 

chief  examiner  who  shall  also  act  as  secretary. 
The  board  may  appoint  such  other  subordinates 
as  may  by  appropriation  be  provided  for. 

CLASSIFICATION 

Section  95.  The  Civil  Service  of  the  city  is 
hereby  divided  into  the  unclassified  and  the 
classified  service. 

1.  The  unclassified  service  shall  include: 

A.  All  officers  elected  by  the  people. 

B.  The  city  manager. 

C.  Theheadsofdepartments  and  heads 

of  divisions  of  departments  and 
members  of  appointive  boards. 

D.  The   deputies   and   secretaries  of 

the  manager,  and  one  assistant 
or  deputy,  and  one  secretary 
for  each  department,  and  the 
clerk  of  the  commission. 

2.  The  classified  service  shall  comprise  all 
positions  not  specifically  included  in  this  charter 
in  the  unclassified  service.  There  shall  be  in  the 
classified  service  three  classes  to  be  known  as  the 
competitive  class,  non-competitive  class,  and 
labor  class. 

A.  The  competitive  class  shall  in- 
clude all  positions  and  employ- 
ment for  which  it  is  practicable 
to  determine  the  merit  and  fit- 
ness of  applicants  by  competi- 
tive examination. 


Appendix  209 

B.  The    non-competitive    class    shall 

consist  of  all  positions  requir- 
ing peculiar  and  exceptional 
qualifications  of  a  scientific, 
managerial,  professional, or  edu- 
cational character,  as  may  be 
determined  by  the  rules  of  the 
board. 

C.  The  labor  class  shall  include  ordi- 

nary, unskilled  labor. 

RULES 

Section  96.  The  board,  subject  to  the  ap- 
proval of  the  commission,  shall  adopt,  amend, 
and  enforce  a  code  of  rules  and  regulations, 
providing  for  appointment  and  employment  in 
all  positions  in  the  classified  service,  based  on 
merit,  efficiency,  character,  and  industry,  which 
shall  have  the  force  and  effect  of  law;  shall  make 
investigations  concerning  the  enforcement  and 
effect  of  this  chapter  and  of  the  rules  adopted. 
It  shall  make  an  annual  report  to  the  commis- 
sion. 

EMPLOYMENT    OFFICER 

Section  97.  The  chief  examiner  shall  be  the 
employment  officer  of  all  city  employees  coming 
under  the  classified  service.  He  shall  provide 
examinations  in  accordance  with  regulations  of 
the  board,  and  maintain  lists  of  eligibles  of  each 
class  of  the  service  of  those  meeting  the  require- 
ments of  said  regulations.     Positions  in  the  clas- 


210  Appendix 

sified  service  shall  be  filled  by  him  from  such 
eligible  lists  upon  requisition  from  and  after  con- 
sultation with  the  city  manager.  As  positions 
are  filled  the  employment  officer  shall  certify 
the  fact,  by  proper  and  prescribed  form,  to  the 
city  treasurer  and  the  director  of  the  depart- 
ment in  which  the  vacancy  exists. 

PROMOTION 

Section  98.  The  board  shall  provide  for 
promotion  to  all  positions  in  the  classified 
service,  based  on  records  of  merit,  efficiency, 
character,  conduct,  and  seniority. 

PROBATION    PERIOD 

Section  99.  An  appointment  or  promotion 
shall  not  be  deemed  complete  until  a  period  of 
probation  not  to  exceed  six  months  has  elapsed, 
and  a  probationer  may  be  discharged  or  reduced 
at  any  time  within  the  said  period  of  six  months, 
upon  the  recommendation  of  the  head  of  the 
department  in  which  said  probationer  is  em- 
ployed, with  the  approval  of  the  majority  of  the 
board. 

DISCHARGE    OR   REDUCTION 

Section  100.  An  employee  shall  not  be  dis- 
charged or  reduced  in  rank  or  compensation 
until  he  has  been  presented  with  the  reasons  for 
such  discharge  or  reduction,  specifically  stated 
in  writing,  and  has  been  given  an  opportunity  to 


Appendix  211 

be  heard  in  his  own  defence.  The  reason  for 
such  discharge  or  reduction  and  any  reply  in 
writing  thereto  by  such  employee  shall  be  filed 
with  the  board. 

APPEAL  TO  THE   BOARD 

Section  loi.  Any  employee  of  any  depart- 
ment in  the  city  in  the  classified  service  who  is 
suspended,  reduced  in  rank,  or  dismissed  from  a 
department  by  the  director  of  that  department 
or  the  city  manager,  may  appeal  from  the  de- 
cision of  such  officer  to  the  Civil  Service  Board, 
and  such  board  shall  define  the  manner,  time, 
and  place  by  which  such  appeal  shall  be  heard 
The  judgment  of  such  board  shall  be  final. 

INVESTIGATIONS 

Section  104.  In  any  investigation  conducted 
by  the  board  it  shall  have  the  power  to  sub- 
poena and  require  the  attendance  of  witnesses 
and  the  production  thereby  of  books  and  papers 
pertinent  to  the  investigation  and  to  administer 
oaths  to  such  witnesses. 

GENERAL  PROVISIONS 

Compensation  of  Officers  and  Employees 

Section  161.  The  commission  shall  fix  by 
ordinance  the  salary  or  compensation  of  the 
heads  of  departments,  its  own  employees,  except 


212  Appendix 

as  is  provided  by  this  charter,  the  salary  or  com- 
pensation of  the  members  of  the  divisions  of 
poHce  and  fire  under  immediate  control  of  the 
chief  thereof,  and  of  members  of  boards  in  the 
unclassified  service  of  the  city. 

The  city  manager  shall  fix  the  number  and 
salaries  or  compensation  of  all  other  officers  and 
employees. 

The  salaries  or  compensations  so  fixed  shall  be 
uniform  for  like  service  in  each  grade  of  the 
service  as  the  same  shall  be  graded  or  classified 
by  the  city  manager  in  accordance  with  the 
rules  and  regulations  adopted  by  the  Civil 
Service  Board.  All  such  salaries  and  rates  of 
pay  shall  be  reported  to  the  city  employment 
officer  forthwith.  All  fees  and  moneys  received 
or  collected  by  officers  and  employees  shall  be 
paid  into  the  treasury  of  the  city. 

OFFICIAL    BONDS 

Section  162.  The  commission  or  city  manager 
in  fixing  the  salary  of  any  officer,  clerk,  or  em- 
ployee shall  determine  whether  such  officer, 
clerk,  or  employee  shall  give  a  bond  and  the 
amount  thereof,  which  bond  shall  be  procured 
from  a  regularly  accredited  surety  company 
authorized  to  do  business  under  the  laws  of 
Ohio.  Premiums  on  such  bonds  shall  be  paid 
by  the  city. 


III.    PREFERENTIAL   VOTING 

As  Provided  in  the  Charter  of  Grand  Jiinction, 

Colorado 

PREFERENTIAL  BALLOT 

Form. — ^The  city  clerk  shall  cause  ballots  for 
each  general  and  special  election  to  be  printed, 
bound,  numbered,  endorsed,  and  authenticated, 
as  provided  by  the  constitution  and  laws  of  the 
state,  except  as  otherwise  required  in  this 
charter.  The  ballots  shall  contain  the  full  list 
and  correct  name  of  all  the  respective  offices  to 
be  filled,  and  the  names  of  the  candidates  nomi- 
nated therefor.  It  shall  be  in  substantially 
the  following  form  with  the  cross  (X)  omitted 
when  there  are  four  or  more  candidates  for  any 
office.  (When  there  are  three  and  not  more 
candidates  for  any  office,  then  the  ballot  shall 
give  first  and  second  choice  only;  when  there  are 
less  than  three  candidates  for  any  office,  all  dis- 
tinguishing columns  as  to  choice,  and  all  refer- 
ence to  choice,  may  be  omitted.) 


213 


214  Appendix 

GENERAL    (OR    SPECIAL)    MUNICIPAL 
ELECTION,   CITY  OF  GRAND 

JUNCTION* (Inserting 

date  thereof) 

Instructions. — ^To  vote  for  any  person,  make  a 
cross  (X)  in  ink  in  the  square  in  the  appropriate 
column  according  to  your  choice,  at  the  right  of 
the  name  voted  for.  Vote  your  first  choice  in 
the  first  column;  vote  your  second  choice  in  the 
second  column;  vote  any  other  choice  in  the 
third  column;  vote  only  one  first  and  only  one 
second  choice.  Do  not  vote  more  than  one 
choice  for  one  person,  as  only  one  choice  will 
count  for  any  candidate  by  this  ballot.  Omit 
voting  for  one  name  for  each  office,  if  more  than 
one  candidate  therefor.  All  distinguishing  marks 
make  the  ballot  void.  If  you  wrongly  mark, 
tear,  or  deface  this  ballot,  return  it,  and  obtain 
another. 


*Note  that  the  Grand  Junction  charter,  Uke  several  others, 
provides  for  the  election  of  the  commissioners  to  specific  de- 
partments, which  means  that  the  voter  elects  only  one  man  from  a 
given  group  of  candidates.  The  Spokane  charter,  on  the  other 
hand,  provides  for  the  election  of  five  commissioners,  leaving  to 
the  commission  the  assignment  of  the  departments.  The  Spo- 
kane voter,  therefore,  selects  five  candidates,  voting  five  first 
choices,  five  second  choices,  etc.,  from  a  single  group  of  candidates. 
Spokane,  Duluth,  and  Portland  are  the  only  ones  of  the  com- 
mission-governed cities  having  the  preferential  ballot  which  do 
not  elect  to  specific  office  and  are  thus  led  to  the  election  of  more 
than  one  from  a  group.  The  Spokane  charter  contains  a  provi- 
sion that  a  ballot  is  void  if  the  number  of  first-choice  rnarks  is  not 
equal  to  the  number  of  offices  to  be  filled — a  provision  against 
"  buUeting." 


Appendix 


215 


Commissioner  of 
Public  Affairs 

First  Choice 

Second  Choice 

Third  Choice* 

John  Doe 

X 

James  Foe 

X 

Louis  Hoe 

X 

Dick  Joe 

X 

Richard  Roe 

Commissioner  of 
Highways 

Mary  Brown 

X 

Harry  Jones 

X 

Fred  Smith 

Commissioner  of 
Water  and  Sewers 

Joe  Black 

X 

Robert  White 

Charter  Amendments,  Ordinances,  or  Other  Referendum 
Propositions 


*The  charters  of  Pueblo,  Colorado;  New  Iberia,  Louisiana; 
Portland,  Oregon;  Fort  Collins,  Colorado;  Cadillac,  Mich.;  and  La 
Grande,  Oregon,  restrict  the  voter  to  one  vote  in  the  third  column 
for  each  office  to  be  filled.  The  provisions  in  this  respect  in  the 
Fort  Collins  and  La  Grande  charters  are  somewhat  obscure.  As 
Prof.  L.  J.  Johnson  points  out  in  his  excellent  article  in  the 
National  Municipal  Review  (Jan.  1914,  page  89),  there  is  no  valid 
reason  for  limiting  the  voter's  choice. 

In  some  charters  the  third  column  is  labelled  "  additional  choices." 


2i6  Appendix 

BLANK  SPACES  FOR  ADDITIONAL  CANDIDATES 

Section  19.  One  space  shall  be  left  below  the 
printed  names  of  the  candidates  for  each  office 
to  be  voted  for,  wherein  the  voter  may  write  the 
name  of  any  person  for  whom  he  may  wish  to 
vote. 

REQUIREMENTS  FOR  BALLOTS 

Section  20.  All  ballots  printed  shall  be  identi- 
cal, so  that  without  the  numerical  number  there- 
on it  would  be  impossible  to  distinguish  one 
ballot  from  another.  Space  shall  be  provided 
on  the  ballot  for  charter  amendments  or  other 
questions  to  be  voted  on  at  the  municipal  elec- 
tions, as  provided  by  this  charter.  The  names 
of  candidates  for  each  office  shall  be  arranged 
in  alphabetical  order  of  the  surnames.  Noth- 
ing on  the  ballot  shall  be  indicative  of  the  course 
of  the  candidacy,  or  of  the  support  of  any 
candidate.  No  ballot  shall  have  printed  there- 
on any  party  or  political  designation  or  mark, 
and  there  shall  not  be  appended  to  the  name 
of  any  candidate  any  such  party  or  political 
designation  or  mark,  or  anything  indicating  his 
views  or  opinions. 

SAMPLE   BALLOTS 

Section  21.  The  city  clerk  shall,  at  least  five 
days  before  election,  cause  to  be  printed  not  less 
than  five  hundred  sample  ballots,  upon  paper 
of  different  color,  but   otherwise  identical  with 


Appendix  217 

the  ballot  to  be  used  at  the  election,  and  shall 
distribute  the  same,  upon  application  of  the  can- 
didates, to  the  registered  voters  at  his  office. 

CANVASS  AND  ELECTION 

Section  22.  As  soon  as  the  polls  are  closed, 
the  election  judges  shall  immediately  open  the 
ballot  boxes,  take  therefrom  and  count  the 
ballots,  and  enter  the  total  number  thereof  on 
the  tally  sheet  provided  therefor.  They  shall 
also  carefully  enter  the  number  of  the  first, 
second,  and  third  choice  votes  for  each  candi- 
date on  said  tally  sheet  and  make  return 
thereof  to  the  city  clerk  as  provided  by  law. 
No  vote  shall  be  counted  for  any  candidate 
more  than  once  on  any  ballot,  all  subsequent 
votes  on  that  ballot  for  that  candidate  being 
void. 

The  person  receiving  more  than  one  half  of 
the  total  number  of  ballots  cast  at  such  election 
as  the  first  choice  of  the  electors  for  any  office 
shall  be  elected  to  that  office;  provided,  that  if 
no  candidate  shall  receive  such  a  majority  of 
the  first-choice  votes  for  such  office,  then  and  in 
that  event,  the  name  of  the  candidate  printed 
on  the  ballot  having  the  smallest  number  of 
first-choice  votes,  and  all  names  written  on  the 
ballot  having  a  less  number  of  votes  than  such 
last-named  candidate,  shall  be  excluded  from 
the  count,  and  votes  for  such  candidate  or 
persons    so    excluded    shall    not    thereafter    be 


2i8  Appendix 

counted.*  A  canvass  shall  then  he  made  of  the 
second-choice  votes  received  by  the  remaining 
candidates  for  said  office;  said  second-choice 
votes  shall  then  be  added  to  the  first-choice 
votes  received  by  each  remaining  candidate  for 
such  office,  and  the  candidate  receiving  the  larg- 
est number  of  said  first  and  second  choice  votes, 
if  such  votes  constitute  a  majority  of  all  ballots 
cast  at  such  election,  shall  be  elected  thereto; 
and  provided,  further,  that  if  no  such  candidate 
shall  receive  a  majority  after  adding  the  first 
and  second  choice  votes,  then  and  in  that  event, 
the  name  of  the  candidate  then  having  the 
smallest  number  of  first  and  second  choice  votes 
shall  be  excluded  from  the  count,  and  no  votes 
for  such  candidate  so  excluded  shall  thereafter 
be  counted.  A  canvass  shall  then  be  made  of 
the  third-choice  votes  received  by  the  remaining 
candidates  for  such  office;  said  third-choice 
votes  shall  then  be  added  to  the  first  and  second 
choice  votes  received  by  each  remaining  candi- 
date for  such  office,  and  such  remaining  candi- 
date receiving  the  highest  number  of  first, 
second,  and  third  choice  votes  shall  be  elected 
thereto.  When  the  name  of  but  one  person 
remains  as  a  candidate  for  any  office,  such  person 
shall  be  elected  thereto  regardless  of  the  number 
of  votes  received. 

A  tie  between  two  or  more  candidates  is  to  be 

*This  provision  for  the  dropping  of  the  lowest  man  is  not  found 
in  the  other  preferential  charters.  See  chapter  entitled  "Vital- 
izing the  Ballot,"  page  132. 


Appendix  219 

decided  in  favor  of  the  one  having  the  greatest 
number  of  first-choice  votes.  If  all  are  equal  in 
that  respect, then  the  greatest  number  of  second- 
choice  votes  determines  the  result.  If  this  will 
not  decide,  then  the  tie  shall  be  determined  by 
lot,  under  the  direction  of  the  canvassing  board. 
Whenever  the  word  "majority"  is  used  in 
this  section,  it  shall  mean  more  than  one  half  of 
the  total  number  of  ballots  cast  at  such  election. 

INFORMALITIES    IN    ELECTION 

Section  23.  No  informalities  in  conducting 
municipal  elections  shall  invalidate  the  same,  if 
they  have  been  conducted  fairly  and  in  sub- 
stantial conformity  with  the  requirements  of 
this  charter. 

NOTE    ON    THE    AUSTRALIAN    SYSTEM 

The  so-called  Hare  System  of  Preferential 
Voting,  used  in  parliamentary  elections  in  West 
AustraHa,  Queensland,  and  Victoria,  and  lately 
recommended  by  the  British  Royal  Elections 
Commission,  differs  from  the  plan  in  use  in 
American  cities  in  the  method  of  counting  the 
vote.*  Thus,  by  the  Australian  system,  after 
the  votes  are  tabulated  according  to  first  choices, 
the  man  with  the  lowest  number  is  dropped 
from  the  race  and  his  ballots  are  distributed 
among  the  other  candidates,  according  to  second 

*  Lethbridge,  Alberta,  has  the  so-called  Hare  System,  which  has 
also  been  incorporated  in  the  Wisconsin  primary  law. 


220  Appendix 

choice  marked  on  them.  If  this  does  not  bring 
the  vote  of  any  candidate  up  to  a  majority,  the 
man  who  now  has  the  low^est  number  of  votes  is 
dropped,  and  his  votes  distributed  according  to 
the  second  choices  marked  on  them.  This 
process  is  repeated  until  one  of  the  candidates 
receives  a  majority.  The  defect  of  the  system 
is  that  some  of  the  high  men  may  be  dropped 
before  they  have  received  all  of  the  second 
choices  which  are  due  them. 


SELECTED   REFERENCES  ON  COM- 
MISSION GOVERNMENT 

I.    GENERAL 

Bacon,  E.  M.,  and  Wyman,  M.,  Direct  Elections 
and  Law  Making  by  Popular  Vote,  Houghton,  Mifflin 
&  Co.,  Cambridge,  191 2. 

Beard,  C.  A.,  American  Government  and  Politics, 
pp.  483-484,  598-602.  New  York:  The  Macmillan 
Co.,  1910. 

Beard,  C.  A.,  Loose  Leaf  Digest  of  Short  Ballot 
Charters.  The  Short  Ballot  Organization,  New 
York,  191 1. 

Bradford,  Ernest  S.,  Commission  Government  in 
American  Cities,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  New  York, 
1911. 

Bruere,  H.,  The  New  City  Government,  D.  Apple- 
ton  &  Co.,  New  York,  1913. 

Bryce,  James,  American  Commonwealth,  Vol.  I, 
pp.  662-666.     The  Macmillan  Co.,  New  York. 

Childs,  Richard  S.,  Short  Ballot  Principles,  Hough- 
ton, Mifflin  &  Co.,  Cambridge,  191 1. 

Commission  Government  and  the  City  Manager 
Plan :  A  compilation  of  Annals  of  the  American  Acad- 
emy of  Political   and  Social   Science,  Philadelphia, 

1914- 
Commission    Government    in    American    Cities, 

221 


222  Selected   References 

published  by  the  American  Academj^  of  Political  and 
Social  Science,  Philadelphia,  191 1. 

Deming,  H.  E.,  The  Government  of  American 
Cities,  pp.  97-101,  123-161.  New  York:  G.  P.  Put- 
nam's Sons,  1909. 

Fairlie,  J.  A.,  Essays  in  Municipal  Administration, 
pp.  13,  127.     The  Macmillan  Co.,  New  York,  1908. 

Federal  Government  Report  on  Commission  Cities 
Investigation,  Washington,  1914. 

Goodnow,  F.  J.,  Municipal  Government,  pp.  175- 
178.     New  York:  The  Century-  Co.,  1909. 

Hamilton,  J.  J.,  The  Dethronement  of  the  City 
Boss.     New  York:  Funk  &:  Wagnalls  Co.,  1910. 

Kales,  A.  M.,  Unpopular  Government,  pp.  139- 
161,  162-165.     Chicago,  1913. 

MacGregor,  Ford  H.,  City  Government  by  Com- 
mission. Bulletin  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin, 
No.  428,  Madison,  Wis.,  April,  191 1. 

Munro,  William  Bennett,  The  Government  of 
American  Cities,  Macmillan  Co.,  Boston,  191 2. 

Munro,  William  Bennett,  Initiative,  Referendum, 
and  Recall,  pp.  13,  14,  43,  1 18-122,  D.  Appleton  & 
Co.,  New  York,  191 2. 

New  Encyclopedia  of  Social  Reform.  In  Bliss, 
William,    D.    P.,    ed.     New   York,   1908,    pp.    529- 

530- 

Ostrogorski,  M.,  Democracy  and  the  Party  System 
in  the  United  States,  pp.  356-358.  New  York: 
The  Macmillan  Co.,  1910. 

Pearson,  P.  M.,  ed.,  Intercollegiate  Debates:  be- 
ing briefs  and  reports  of  many  intercollegiate  de- 


Selected  References  223 

bates,  pp.  461-477.  New  York  City :  Hinds,  Noble  & 
Eldredge,  1909. 

Robbins,  E.  C,  editor,  Selected  Articles  on  the 
Commission  Plan  of  Municipal  Government.  Min- 
neapolis: The  H.  W.  Wilson  Co.,  1910.  Debater's 
Handbook  Series. 

Rowe,  L.  S.,  Problems  of  City  Government,  pp. 
183-190,  198-307.  New  York:  D.  Appleton  &  Co., 
1908. 

Wilcox,  Delos  F.,  Government  by  all  the  People, 
The  Macmillan  Co.,  New  York,  1913. 

Wisconsin  University.  University  Extension  Di- 
vision. (Bulletin  No.  423.)  City  Government  by 
Commission,  by  Ford  H.  MacGregor.  Madison: 
The  University,  April,  191 1,  151  pp. 

Woodruff,  Clinton  Rogers,  City  Government  by 
Commission,  edited  by  Clinton  Rogers  Woodruff. 
D.  Appleton  &  Co.,  New  York,  191 1. 

II.    PERIODICALS,    PAMPHLETS,    ETC. 

Allen,  S.  B.,  The  Des  Moines  Plan.  National  Munic- 
ipal League,  Providence  Proceedings,  1907,  156-165. 

Bates,  F.  G.,  Commission  Form,  American  Politi- 
cal Science  Reviezv,  February,  1910. 

Berryhill,  Jas.  G.,  The  Des  Moines  Plan  of  Munici- 
pal Government.  Iowa  State  Bar  Association,  Pro- 
ceedings of  the  Fourteenth  Annual  Meeting,  1908. 
Iowa  City,  Iowa,  pp.  35-50. 

Berryhill,  Jas.  G.,  Commission  Government,  a 
general  statement  prepared  for  the  Commercial  Club 
of  Des  Moines. 


224  Selected   References 

Bradford,  Ernest  S.,  Commission  Government  in 
American  Cities,  Philadelphia,  1910,  pp.  217-228. 
Reprinted  from  Proceedings  of  the  Cincinnati  Con- 
ference for  Good  City  Government  and  the  Fifteenth 
Annual  Meeting  of  the  National  Municipal  League, 
1909. 

Bradford,  Ernest  S.,  a  comparison  of  the  Forms 
of  Commission  Government  in  Cities.  National 
Municipal  League,  Proceedings,  1910,  pp.  246-280. 

Bradford,  Ernest  S.,  Commission  Government  and 
City  Planning,  American  City,  August,  191 2. 

Campbell,  Robert  A,,  Commission  System  of 
Municipal  Government,  Des  Moines  Plan.  American 
Political  Science  Review,  August,  1907. 

Campbell,  Robert  A.,  Commission  Form  of  Gov- 
ernment, American  Political  Science  Review,  Novem- 
ber, 1908. 

Campbell,  Robert  A.,  Municipal  Government, 
Commission  System,  American  Political  Science 
Review,  February,  1910. 

Carlson,  S.  A.,  Simplified  City  Government,  Amer- 
icanCity,  December,  1910. 

Chadwick,  F.  E.,  The  Newport  Charter,  American 
Political  Science  Association,  Proceedings,  1906,  pp. 
58-66. 

Chadwick,  F.  E.,  The  Newport  Plan.  National 
Municipal  League,  Proceedings,  1907,  pp.  166,  177. 

Cheeseborough,  E.  R.,  The  Success  of  the  Galves- 
ton Experiment.  National  Municipal  League,  At- 
lantic City  Proceedings,  1906,  pp.  181-193. 

Cheeseborough,   E.   R.,   Galveston   Plan   of  City 


Selected  References  225 

Government  by  Commission.  Galveston,  Texas, 
1910,  Reprinted  from  Galveston  Tribune,  Decem- 
ber 31,  1909. 

Cheeseborough,  E.  R.,  Commission  Plan.  Citi- 
zen's Bulletin  (Cincinnati),  Vol.  6,  p.  i. 

Childs,  Richard  S.,  The  Story  of  the  Short  Ballot 
Cities.  New  York:  The  Short  Ballot  Organization, 
1910. 

Childs,  Richard  S.,  Commission  Government  and 
Large  Cities,  American  City,  February,  191 1. 

Commission  Government  Luncheon  (Buffalo). 
National  Municipal  League,  Proceedings,  1910,  pp. 
555-567.  Remarks  by  E.  S.  Bradford,  K.  Mixer, 
A.  Wilcox,  L.  Stockton,  W.  B.  Wright,  Jr.,  W.  B. 
Howland,  A.  D.  Mason,  J.  W.  S.  Peters,  S.  Sumner, 
S.  P.  Jones,  R.  Bowman,  S.  Fleischmann,  and  A.  R, 
Hatton. 

Cochrane,  C.  H.,  Should  New  York  Be  Governed 
by  a  Commission.^  Broadway  Magazine,  February, 
1907. 

Commission  Government  in  New  Jersey,  Literary 
Digest,  April  26,  191 3. 

Commission  Government  of  a  Canadian  City, 
Outlook,  September  27,  1913. 

De  Honey,  Carl,  Breaking  Down  Ward  Lines, 
World  To-day,  May,  19 10. 

Does  Commission  Form  Increase  City  Efficiency.? 
American  City,  November,  191 2. 

Donnelly,  F.  W.,  Securing  Efficient  Administra- 
tions under  Commission  Plan,  Annals  American 
Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  May,  191 2. 


226  Selected  References 

Dosh,  A.,  Trenton's  Three  Years  of  Simple  Gov- 
ernment.    World's  Work,  July,  1914. 

Durand,  E.  D.,  Council  Government  versus  Mayor 
Government.  Political  Science  Quarterly,  September- 
December,  1900. 

Economic  Club  of  Boston.  Municipal  Govern- 
ment; shall  it  be  carried  on  by  a  small  board  of  ad- 
ministrators elected  at  large  by  the  people?  Two 
discussions  before  the  club,  January,  ii,  1907,  and 
January  21,  1908,  Boston,  1908,  74  pp.  Addresses 
by  George  K.  Turner,  James  M.  Head,  Charles  W. 
Eliot,  Harvey  S.  Chase,  Arthur  Warren,  Sidney  J. 
Dillon,  J.  H.  Beale,  Jr.,  and  William  M.  Ivins. 

Eliot,  Chas.  W.,  City  Government  by  Fewer  Men, 
World's  Work,  October,  1907. 

Experiments,  Outlook,  May  12,  1906. 

Foster,  W.  D.,  Government  by  Commission,  Sur- 
vey, January  8,  1910. 

Fuller,  A.  M.,  Municipal  Government  by  Com- 
mission. Address  before  Chamber  of  Commerce  of 
Erie,  Pa.,  April  15,  1909.  Erie,  Pa.:  Chamber  of 
Commerce,  1909. 

Gaetz,  H.  H.,  Government  a  Question  of  Business, 
Public  Service  (Chicago),  June,  1909. 

Galveston  Idea,  McClure's,  January,  1907. 

Galveston  Plan  of  City  Government,  Municipal 
Engineering,  April,  1907. 

Galveston's  Civic  Management,  Bulletin  of  the 
League  of  American  Mtinicipalities,  February,  1907. 

Garvin,  Lucius,  Better  City  Government,  Arena^ 
January,  1909. 


Selected   References  227 

Gilbertson,  H.  S.,  Serious  Weakness  of  the  Com- 
mission Plan,  American  City,  September,   191 3. 

Gilbertson,  H.  S.,  Short  Ballot  in  American  Cities, 
Review  of  Reviews,  January,  191 2. 

Goodyear,  De  Mont,  Example  of  Haverhill,  In- 
dependent, January  28,  1909. 

Goodyear,  De  Mont,  Experience  of  Haverhill, 
Independent,  Februan,-  24,  1910. 

Gresham,  Walter,  Galveston's  Charter  Govern- 
ment, Bulletiti  of  the  League  of  American  Munici- 
palities, November,  1905. 

Haskell,  H.  J.,  Texas  Idea,  Outlook,  April  13, 
1907. 

Huston,  Chas.  D.,  Municipal  Government,  City 
Hall  (Des  Moines),  January,  1909. 

Huston,  Chas.  D.,  Cedar  Rapids  under  the  Com- 
mission Plan,  Engineering,  January,  1909. 

Hyde,  H.  M.,  Two  Hundred  Cities  in  Revolt, 
Technical  World,  April,  191 2. 

Iowa  University:  Forensic  League.  Speeches  of 
the  Representative  of  the  University  of  Iowa  in 
the  Intercollegiate  Debate,  190S-9.  Iowa  City,  la., 
1910. 

James,  G.  W.,  Galveston,  Arena,  January,  1907. 

James,  G.  W.,  Houston  and  Its  City  Commission, 
Arena,  August,  1909. 

Kings,  J.  A.,  Legislative  versus  Business  Manage- 
ment of  Municipalities.  League  of  American  Munici- 
palities, Report  of  the  1907  Convention,  pp.  70-74. 
Detroit,  1907. 

Landes,  H.  A.,  Galveston's  Commission  Govern- 


228  Selected  References 

ment,  Bulletin  of  the  League  of  American  Munici- 
palities, February,  1908. 

Mac  Vicar,  John,  City  Government  by  Commis- 
sion, City  Hall  (Des  Moines),  March,  1909. 

McClintock,  W.  E.,  Chelsea,  New  England  Maga- 
zine, March,  1910. 

Moorehead,  F.  G.,  Bringing  Dead  Cities  to  Life, 
Technical  World,  February,  1910. 

More  Than  ^700,000  Improvementfor  j,ooo People, 
World's  Work,  February,  191 2. 

Murdoch,  G.  H.,  The  Commission  Plan  of  City 
Government,  American  City,  February,  1912. 

Progress  ofSimpler  Municipal  Government, /ForWj 

Work,  June,  191 3. 

Paine,  Robert  Treat,  Jr.,  Direct  Legislation  in 
Municipal  Government,  Arena,  January,  1909. 

Relation  of  Charter  Forms  to  Municipal  Improve- 
ments, American  City,  April,  191 2. 

Relation  of  Municipal  Government  to  American 
Democratic  Ideals,  American  Journal  of  Sociology, 
July,  1905. 

Remaking  City  Government,  Nation,  December, 
1911. 

Responsibility  in  Municipal  Government,  Arena, 
January,  1902. 

Russell,  C.  E.,  Sanity  and  Democracy  for  American 
Cities,  Everybody's,  April,  1910. 

Ryan,  Oswald,  Boston's  Misunderstood  Charter, 
Boston  Common,  Boston,  July,  1910. 

Ryan,  Oswald,  Checks  and  Balances,  Indianapolis 
Star,  January  9,  191 5. 


Selected   References  229 

Ryan,  Oswald,  Commission  Government  De- 
scribed. In  "City  Government  by  Commission" 
(Woodruff),  pp.  64-89,  277-282. 

Ryan,  Oswald,  Commission  Government  and  Indi- 
anapolis, Indianapolis  Star,  July  7,  1910. 

Ryan,  Oswald,  Defense  of  Commission  Govern- 
ment, Citizen  s  Bulletin  (Cincinnati),  July,  1913. 

Ryan,  Oswald,  Haverhill,  an  Example,  Boston 
Common,  October  8,  1910. 

Ryan,  Oswald,  Municipal  Parties  of  the  Past  and 
Future,  Western  Monthly,  December,  191 1. 

Ryan,  Oswald,  New  York  and  the  Commission 
Plan,  New  York  Tribune,  August  21,  191 1. 

Ryan,  Oswald,  Salt  Lake  City,  a  Municipal  De- 
mocracy, Harper  s  Weekly,  October  4,  1913. 

Ryan,  Oswald,  The  New  Departure  in  Municipal 
Democracy,  The  American  Citizen  (New  York),  Jan- 
uary, 1914. 

Ryan,  Oswald,  The  Real  Problem  of  Commission 
Government,  Popular  Science  Monthly,  September, 
191 2.  Reprinted  in  Citizen  s  Bulletin  (Cincinnati), 
No.  27. 

Ryan,  Oswald,  The  Revolutionary  Movement  in 
City  Government,  New  England  Magazine,  Decem- 
ber, 191 1. 

Shall  We  Change  Our  City  Government?  Bureau 
of  Municipal  Research,  Dayton,  Ohio,  1913. 

Shambaugh,  B.  F.,  The  Des  Moines  Plan  of  City 
Government,  American  Political  Science  Associa- 
tion, Proceedings  of  1907,  pp.  189-192,  Baltimore, 
1908. 


230  Selected  References 

Showing  the  Jobholder  the  Door,  Collier's,  May  17, 

1913- 

Sims,  Judge  J.  T.,  Defects  of  Commission  Govern- 
ment, Kansas  City  Post,  May  25,  1908. 

Smith,  G.,  City  Government,  Independe^it,  March 
30,  1905. 

Starzinger,  Vincent,  Commission  Government.  In 
H.W.Wilson's  "  Commission  Plan  "  (Debater's  Hand- 
book Series,  Minneapolis). 

Turner,  George  K.,  The  New  American  City  Gov- 
ernment, McClures  Magazine,  May,  1910. 

Turner,  George  K.,  Galveston,  a  Business  Corpora- 
tion.    McClure's  Magazine,  October,  1906. 

Turner,  George  K.,  The  Commission  Government 
of  Galveston,  an  address,  published  by  the  Economic 
Club  of  Boston  (Boston),  1907. 

Unguarded  Commission  Government,  Arena,  Oc- 
tober, 1907. 

Webster,  Walter  A.,  The  Problem  of  City  Govern- 
ment, Pamphlet,  Boston,  1908. 

White,  W.  A.,  Progress  in  American  Cities,  Ameri- 
can Magazine,  April,  1909. 

Whitlock,  Brand,  Spread  of  the  Galveston  Plan, 
The  Citcle,  November,  1907. 

Woodruff,  Clinton  Rogers  (Secretary  National 
Municipal  League),  American  Municipal  Tendencies. 
Proceedings  of  the  Pittsburgh  Conference  of  the 
National  Municipal  League,  1908,  pp.  45-283.  Pitts- 
burgh, 1908. 

Woodruff,  Clinton  Rogers,  Government  by  Com- 
mission, Municipal  Journal,  January  28,  191 1. 


Selected   References  231 

Woodruff,  Clinton  Rogers,  New  Forms  of  City 
Charters,  American  Year  Book,  1910,  New  York, 
1911. 

Woodruff,  Clinton  Rogers,  Present  Phases  of  the 
Municipal  Situation,  National  Municipal  Review, 
January,  1915. 

Woodruff,  Clinton  Rogers,  Simplified  City  Gov- 
ernment, Yale   Review,  January,  19 12. 

III.      THE    COMMISSION-MANAGER    PLAN 

Beard,  Charles  A.,  The  City  Manager  Plan. 
Pamphlet.  The  National  Short  Ballot  Association, 
New  York,  1914. 

Bradford,  E.  S.,  A  City  Business  Manager.  In 
"Commission  Government  in  American  Cities" 
(Bradford),  pp.  1 19-124. 

Bradford,  E.  S.,  Commission  Form  versus  City 
Manager  Plan,  American  City,  January,  1914. 

City  Manager  Plan  of  Municipal  Government. 
Pamphlet.     American  City,  1914. 

City  Manager  Plan,  Outlook,  August  23,  1913. 

Commission  Government  and  the  City  Manager, 
Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and 
Social  Science.    A  Compilation.    Philadelphia,  1914. 

Dayton's  Step  Forsvard  in  City  Government, 
World's  Work,  October,  191 3. 

Dayton's  Unique  Charter,  Literary  Digest,  August 
30,  1913. 

Driving  Politics  out  of  Dayton,  Literary  Digest, 
January  24,  1914. 

Embrey,  A.  T.,  How  a  Little  City  Is  Progressing 


232  Selected    References 

under  a  City  Commissioner,  Fredericksburg,  Va., 
American  City,  July,  191 3. 

Faucher,  F.  W.,  Two  Epoch-Making  Campaigns 
in  Dayton,  American  City,  July,  191 3. 

Gilbertson,  H.  S.,  Commission  Form  versus  City 
Manager  Plan,  American  City,  January,  19 14. 

Halsinger,  S.  D.,  General  Manager  Plan  of  Gov- 
ernment of  Staunton,  Virginia.  Pamphlet.  Staun- 
ton, Va.,  1914. 

Hilden,  R.  G.,  Running  a  Town  as  a  Business, 
Harper  s  Weekly,  May  21,  1910. 

Mariosson,  I.  F.,  Business-Managing  a  City,  Col- 
lier s,  January  3,  1914. 

Patton,  J.  S.,  Municipal  Business  Manager,  Na- 
tional Municipal  Review,  January,  191 5. 

Practical  Short  Ballot  in  Sumpter,  Outlook,  May 
10,  1913. 

Progress  of  City  Manager  Plan,  Review  of  Reviews, 
February,    1914. 

Renwick,  W.  W.,  Democracy  Chooses  an  Autocrat, 
Technical  World,  March,  191 4. 

Riddle,  K.,  Town  Manager  as  City  Engineer, 
American  City,  December,  191 3. 

Ryan,  Oswald,  Evolution  of  City  Government 
Tends  Toward  Biirgermeister,  Indianapolis  Star, 
March  15,  1914. 

Upson,  L.  D.,  How  Dayton's  City  Manager  Plan 
Is  Working,  Review  of  Reviews,  June,  1914. 

Waite,  H.  M.,  City  Manager  Plan,  the  application 
of  business  methods  to  municipal  government, 
American  City,  July,  19 14. 


Selected  References  233 

Waite,  H.  M.,  The  Commission-Manager  Plan, 
National  Municipal  Review,  January,  191 5. 

Woodruff,  Clinton  Rogers,  Staunton  Plan.  In 
"City  Government  by  Commission"  (WoodruflF), 
pp.  302-5. 


A  WORD  ABOUT 
THE  AMERICAN  BOOKS 


The  American  Books 

A  Library  of  Good  Citizenship 

TO  vote  regularly  and  conscientiously  and 
never  to  have  been  arrested  for  disorder 
is  not  the  be-all  and  end-all  of  good  citi- 
zenship. The  good  citizen  is  he  or  she  who  bears 
an  active  hand  in  cleansing  and  making  merry 
the  black  spots  of  the  neighborhood;  who  cher- 
ishes a  home  however  small;  who  takes  an 
increasingly  intelligent  interest  in  all  that  con- 
tributes to  the  country's  welfare,  and  feels  a 
keenly  patriotic  hope  for  the  future  of  the  nation. 

For  such  citizens  the  American  books  are 
designed — a  series  of  small  volumes  on  current 
American  problems.  The  keynote  of  the  series 
will  be  the  discussion  of  distinctively  American 
movements  and  questions  connected  with  the 
future  prosperity  of  the  United  States. 

The  series  was  planned  long  before  the  great 
war,  but  it  has  derived  added  importance  from 
the  position  which  that  great  struggle  has  given 
America  on  the  face  of  the  globe.  The  United 
States,  standing  aloof  from  the  suicidal  blood- 
shed of  the  Old  World,  has  necessarily  become 
the  peaceful  arbiter  of  the  earth's  destinies  and 
the  flywheel  to  keep  the  world's  industry  re- 
volving. 


An  inquiry  into  the  meaning  and  tendency  of 
American  civilization  to-day  is  thus  not  only  a 
matter  of  interest  but  of  patriotic  duty.  The 
publishers  wish  the  American  books  to  be  a 
series  of  brief,  authoritative  manuals  which  will 
attempt  to  lay  bare  some  of  the  problems  that 
confront  us  to-day ;  written  in  popular  terms  that 
will  inspire  rather  than  discourage  the  casual 
reader.  The  series  should  prove  not  only  of 
great  interest  to  all  American  citizens  who  wish 
to  aid  in  solving  their  country's  pressing  prob- 
lems, but  to  every  foreigner  visiting  this  country 
who  seeks  an  interpretation  of  the  American 
point  of  view. 

The  publishers  wish  the  American  books  to 
be  written  by  the  best  men,  and  to  this  end  they 
seek  the  widest  publicity  for  the  plan.  They 
will  be  glad  to  receive  suggestions  as  to  appro-, 
priate  titles  for  inclusion  in  the  series  and  will 
welcome  authoritative  MSS  submitted  from  any 
quarter.  In  particular  they  submit  the  plan  to 
the  consideration  of  the  American  colleges  where 
the  problems  of  the  country  are  being  studied. 
In  science,  literature,  business,  politics,  in  the 
arts  of  war  and  the  arts  of  peace,  the  publishers 
will  seek  writers  who  have  stood  for  fearless 
achievement  or  equally  fearless  failure,  who  will 
build  up  A  Library  of  Good  Citizenship. 

{For   complete  list  of  volumes  in 
'  this  series  see  opposite  title  page.) 


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